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Preface 
The European Union (EU) as it surpasses the 60th Anniversary of the 
signing of the Rome Treaty is experiencing considerable turbulence 
arising from a pronounced increase in uncertainty, risk and contingency 
both within the region, the neighbourhood and globally. Dynamics of 
disorder and disintegration compete with pressures for further func-
tional integration in many spheres. Domestic politics in the member 
states are volatile as challenger parties transform electoral politics and 
party systems.  Government formation and governing has become more 
difficult in hard times. The rise of parties that combine an anti-migration 
and anti-EU platform have exposed the growth of Euroscepticism among 
Europe’s electorates. There is a mismatch between functional pressures 
for further integration and the capacity to supply collective policies. The 
future of the EU is being questioned in ways that would have been incon-
ceivable as recently as 2008. This has been brought sharply into focus fol-
lowing the UK vote to leave. The Trump Presidency in the US in the first 
two years has proven to be an administration that is openly hostile to the 
European Union. Faced with these challenges, public opinion in EU27 is 
nonetheless becoming more favourable to the EU and the Austrian Pres-
idential election in December 2016 have demonstrated that support for 
the EU can be successfully mobilized. 
When the European Union welcomed its new members in May 2004 
in what was the most extensive enlargement in its history, those gathered 
at Dublin Castle, had reason to be optimistic about Europe’s Union. The 
EU had played a central role in easing the transition from a divided con-
tinent and a divided Germany to a Union that was continental in scale. 
The addition of 12 new states by 2007 transformed the geographic reach 
of the Union and underpinned its centrality as the core European institu-
tion above the level of the state. European regionalism, characterised by a 
wide policy remit and deep institutionalisation, seemed robust and resil-
ient. What a difference a decade makes? Since Autumn 2009, just over 
seven years, the Union has been beset by multiple crises and the opti-
Xmism of spring 2004 has morphed into deep pessimism and a weakening 
of confidence that the Union can address its challenges and remain a vital 
part of the European state system. Internal EU divergence and tension is 
exacerbated by wider global transformations. 
Europe’s intertwined crises have unsettled many assumptions about 
the European Union. Gone are the assumptions that exit will never 
happen because it is too expensive or that EU governments have an 
institutional self-interest in the preservation of integration at any cost. 
Gone too is the hypothesis that crises have a rejuvenating effect on the 
EU. Moreover, entrenched integration paradigms such as ‘integration 
through law’ or stealth have been exposed to politicisation. Domestic, 
regional and global transformations require a new research focus on the 
Union and its future.
For these reasons, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
at the European University Institute has launched, at the beginning of 
2018, the European Governance and Politics Programme (EGPP), an 
international hub of high-quality research and reflection on the Euro-
pean Union. The programme builds on the successful experience of the 
European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) which positioned the 
Robert Schuman Centre and the EUI at the forefront of research on the 
EU between 2006 and 2016. EUDO was organised on the basis of four 
Observatories which conducted a series of externally funded research 
projects, offered a platform for the dissemination of research via e-books 
and the EUDO Working Paper series, archived data at the EURO Data 
Centre, fostered engagement on EUDO Café and held an annual dissem-
ination conference. The EGPP retains and develops many of EUDO’s 
features in the framework of a multi-disciplinary approach. The core of 
its activities is funded by external research projects, that in turn foster 
the publication of research-led working papers, policy papers and pub-
lications in scientific journals. The EGPP also promotes engagement on 
contemporary issues through various events, including blog debates and 
thematic conferences and workshops. Each year it hosts an annual con-
ference that focuses on a crucial theme for the European Union. 
The inaugural annual conference was held on 8-9 March 2018 at the 
European University Institute campus in Florence, Italy and focused on 
2017 as Europe’s “bumper year” of elections. This year saw a wave of key 
elections all across Europe, starting with the Dutch general election in 
March. France followed soon after, with the first round of its presidential 
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election in April, and the second round in May. In September, Germany 
held federal elections, with the position of Chancellor a focal point of the 
campaign; Austrian, Romanian and UK citizens also went to the polls at 
the end of 2016 and during this turbulent year.
This edited volume contains a selection of the papers presented during 
the EGPP launch conference and is divided in two parts. The first part is 
composed by a series of four thematic chapters that focus on key political 
and electoral developments of 2017 in various countries, in addition to 
two chapters devoted to Brexit and to the European elections to be held 
in May 2019. Thomas Poguntke and Johannes Smith reflect on the rela-
tionship between party system change and the growth of populism. Cath-
erine de Vries’ contribution focuses on Europe’s waning public support 
for international cooperation. James Dennison gives an explanation to 
the rise of anti-immigration parties in Western Europe. Joost van Spanje, 
together with Haylee Kelsall and Rachid Azrout also focus on anti-immi-
gration parties, by looking at voter perceptions of reactions to these par-
ties in three countries (France, Germany and the Netherlands). Richard 
Rose’s chapter is devoted to the “contested outcome” of the Brexit ref-
erendum, and finally Brian Synnott’s contribution discusses the outlook 
of the Spitzenkandidaten process for the 2019 European Elections. The 
second part is composed by a series of country-specific chapters. Endre 
Borbáth analyses the Romanian elections held in December 2016. Anita 
Bodlos, Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, Martin Haselmayer, Thomas Meyer 
and Wolfgang C. Müller look at the “long campaign” before the Austrian 
election of October 2017. The next three chapters focus on Germany: 
Ferdinand Müller-Rommel explains how the selection of ministers hap-
pened after the German elections, and in particular after the collapse of 
the “Jamaica coalition” talks in November 2017. Marc Debus’s chapter 
analyses party politics in a multilevel system and coalition formation 
between 2017 and 2018. Julia Schulte-Cloos and Tobias Rüttnauer look 
at the dynamics of party activism within Alternative für Deutschland. 
Two chapters, then, focus on France’s 2017 presidential election: Romain 
Lachat applies the associative issue ownership theory to candidate prefer-
ences, and Elie Michel describes the performance of the Front National in 
this election as an “electoral impasse”. Finally, Lorenzo Cicchi and Enrico 
Calossi discuss the reconfiguration of the Italian party system after the 
2018 general election. Overall, these fourteen chapters cover many of 
the crucial elements of the European political and electoral landscape 
between 2016 and 2018, with a specific focus on Europe’s “bumper year” 
of 2017.
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Part 1 – Thematic and 
Comparative Chapters
1The Crisis, Party System Change, and 
the Growth of Populism
Thomas Poguntke & Johannes Schmitt
Introduction
Parties are losing their stable societal anchorage and, as a consequence, 
party systems are becoming increasingly volatile. This general trend has 
been described and analysed many times. Parallel to a general increase 
in volatility and fragmentation, the addition of two new party families 
to the political landscape of Europe has transformed the format of party 
systems substantially over the past decades. First, the Green wave posed 
a substantial challenge to the established political forces in Europe. Yet, 
after a period of uneasy rapprochement, Green political demands became 
part of the political mainstream and Green parties were thus increasingly 
regarded as normal parties of government in Europe (Müller-Rommel 
and Poguntke 2002). Arguably, populist parties signified a more funda-
mental challenge. The first members of this heterogeneous party family 
raised their heads in protest against high tax levels in Scandinavia, actu-
ally preceding the emergence of Green parties (Borre 1977; Särlvik 1977; 
Valen and Martinussen 1977). The main populist wave, however, dates 
from the 1980s and after (Mudde 2004; Mudde 2013; Kriesi 2014). Mainly, 
but not exclusively, situated on the right of the political spectrum, they 
have largely remained outsiders, making government formation difficult.
Arguably, the economic turmoil following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008 has accelerated the erosion of established party systems 
by inducing protest votes in general and support for populist parties in 
2particular. At the same time, the Euro crisis1 and the concomitant polit-
ical conflicts over austerity measures in some countries, and rescue pack-
ages in others, ended the widespread affirmative indifference of the mass 
European public toward the EU. Instead, European integration became 
politicized and the awareness of the repercussions of European deci-
sion-making on national politics and living conditions grew substantially 
(Hobolt and Tilley 2016). As a result, political parties across EU member 
states began to reconsider their stance on ‘Europe’. While Euroscepticism, 
with the notable exception of the UK, remained largely at the fringes of 
party systems during the by-gone age of permissive consensus on Euro-
pean integration (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004), it has now 
become more prominent across the political spectrum. In particular, 
populist parties have identified opposition to European integration as a 
promising theme to mobilize protest against the ‘established elites’.
This chapter takes a closer look at the impact of the Euro crisis on 
the format of party systems. More precisely, it asks: Has substantial party 
system change taken place within European countries? Have we seen 
a significant growth in populist parties? Have populist parties adopted 
Eurosceptic positions? And, finally: Has this been sustained, or can we 
identify a certain degree of ‘normalization’ now that the worst worries of 
the Euro crisis are seemingly over?
In order to disentangle ongoing trends and short-term effects of the 
crisis, this chapter takes a long-term perspective on party system change 
and presents data on volatility and party system fragmentation covering 
several decades. We can clearly identify the impact of the crisis in that 
the bulk of elections with very high volatility and a pronounced increase 
of party system fragmentation occurred after the beginning of the crisis. 
In addition, we demonstrate that a substantial portion of this change 
has been caused by the growing success of populist parties. Finally, we 
explore the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism and show 
that populists tend to mobilize against the EU. 
1  Throughout this chapter, the term Euro crisis is used to refer to the economic upheaval 
associated with the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the 
subsequent financial crisis in Europe. It is often also referred to as the sovereign debt 
crisis or the Great Recession. 
PART I - Thematic and Comparative Chapters
3European party systems on the move
The fluctuations of the vote as measured by volatility is a meaningful 
indicator of party system stability and also of individual voting behav-
iour (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mair 1997; Pedersen 1979). In our context, 
we are primarily interested in the former—namely, the stability of party 
systems and hence their capacity to structure the vote.
When taking a long-term perspective, we can clearly identify a pat-
tern in Western Europe where the crisis is associated with high volatility 
elections2 while Central and Eastern European (CEE) party systems have 
been marked by high volatility ever since the democratic transformation 
(Figure 1.1). Following Hernández and Kriesi (2016, p. 209), we define 
all national elections since December 2008 as post-crisis elections. The 
crisis election in Greece exceeded even the hitherto all-time high of the 
1994 Italian election when the party system of the so-called first republic 
collapsed (Bartolini and D’Alimonte 1996; Bardi 1996). In sum, it seems 
that Western party systems were clearly affected by the crisis while there 
was no systematic impact in newer democracies.
Figure 1.1 Total volatility within European party systems
Note: The following elections with extreme values are excluded from the figure—
Latvia 1993 with 97.2 and the Czech Republic 1992 with 69.3. Source: Our analysis 
is based on data compiled in Emanuele (2015) for Western Europe and ParlGov 
(Döring and Manow 2016) for Central and Eastern Europe. We took party change 
(e.g. mergers) and electoral alliances as defined by ParlGov into account.
2  We have included all countries in the European Union and, additionally, Iceland, Nor-
way and Switzerland.
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4A closer look at the data—concentrating on replacement volatility caused 
by the entry of new parties and the demise of existing ones (type A vola-
tility, see Neff Powell and Tucker 2014)—provides an even clearer image 
of the impact of the crisis on party systems: There are many unusually 
high volatility values which are attributable to the success of new parties 
(Figure 1.2). Again, Central and Eastern Europe has, by and large, never 
been characterized by stable party systems (ibid.). 
Figure 1.2: Volatility caused by new challengers
Note: The following elections with extreme values are not included in the figure—
Latvia 1993 with 81.3, Bulgaria 2001 with 43.4, the Czech Republic 1992 with 39.3, 
Latvia 2002 with 30.4 and Lithuania 2004 with 30.2. Source: Our analysis is based 
on data compiled in Emanuele (2015) for Western Europe and ParlGov (Döring and 
Manow 2016) for Central and Eastern Europe. We took party change (e.g. mergers) 
and electoral alliances as defined by ParlGov into account.
Yet, the impact of the crisis becomes evident if we look exclusively at 
Western party systems. Except for the 1994 Italian election, all elections 
with a type A volatility above 10 are clearly associated with the Euro 
crisis (see also Table 1.1). Remarkably, this covers the entire post-war 
period and includes many party systems that needed to consolidate after 
the Second World War. Not surprisingly, Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, 
Greece) was particularly affected. More than a third of all voters changed 
their voting decision in these elections and new challengers outpaced 
established actors. Yet, the highest score is that of the 2017 French parlia-
mentary election which may mark the beginning of an entirely new party 
system in France.
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5Table 1.1: Western European party systems with high type A volatility
Country Election Volatility (Type 
A)
Volatility 
(Total)
France 11.06.2017 15.3 40.7
Greece 06.05.2012 12.9 48.5
Iceland 27.04.2013 10.9 34.7
Italy 27.03.1994 15.9 39.3
Italy 25.02.2013 18.7 36.7
Spain 20.12.2015 19.0 35.5
Note: All elections with type A volatility of 10 and above since the Second World 
War. Source: Our analysis is based on data compiled in Emanuele (2015).
Toward the fragmentation of European party systems?
Rising levels of volatility are clearly associated with electoral instability. 
The link to party system change, however, is less straightforward because 
volatility does not necessarily imply a change in the format of party sys-
tems. The entry and success of new parties could hypothetically also 
represent the replacement of an established actor by a new one without 
alternating the patterns of interaction—which represents the essence of a 
party system (e.g. Mair 1997, p. 51; Mair 2006, p. 65). Party system frag-
mentation is an established, albeit incomplete, indicator of party system 
change, because even a changing number of parties is not automatically 
associated with a change in the patterns of interaction. A two-bloc system, 
for example, may become more fragmented but the pattern of bi-polar 
completion may remain intact. These limitations notwithstanding, it is 
a useful way of gauging party system change covering a large number of 
countries and elections. Hence, in a next step we focus on the change in 
the format of party systems as measured by fragmentation (Laakso and 
Taagepera 1979). Are the rising levels of volatility accompanied by par-
allel growth in party system fragmentation?
Here, the pattern is less clear. There are several Western European 
elections after the crisis began that are marked by usually high levels of 
party system fragmentation, but they are by no means unique. There is a 
clear long-term trend toward increasing fragmentation of party systems 
in Western Europe. In addition, we register very high party system frag-
mentation also for elections since the 1980s. Again, a clear trend is absent 
The Crisis, Party System Change, and the Growth of Populism - Thomas Poguntke and Johannes Schmitt
6in Central and Eastern Europe. If anything, we register declining frag-
mentation, but the negative slope of the regression line for CEE countries 
is mainly due to very high volatility in the early years after democratic 
transformation.
Figure 1.3: The trend of fragmentation in European party systems
Note: The effective number of parties is calculated based on parties’ vote share. 
Source: ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016).
The picture becomes somewhat clearer if we look at the difference 
between a country’s mean fragmentation before and after the beginning 
of the crisis for Western Europe alone. Table 1.2 lists all post-2008 elec-
tions where party system fragmentation was 1 point above the long-term 
mean of the country. It is evident that fragmentation rose markedly in 
many Western European countries after the onset of the crisis. Unsur-
prisingly, Greece stands out with a value of 4.7 above the average, but the 
Netherlands and Belgium also registered high values and even Germany 
did not go unaffected from this perspective. Thus, in some Western Euro-
pean countries we can observe changing patterns of party system format.
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7Table 1.2: West European party systems with extraordinary 
fragmentation (since December 2008)
Country Election ENP Difference to mean
Austria 28.09.2008 4.6 +1.7
Austria 29.09.2013 5.0 +2.1
Belgium 13.06.2010 9.4 +3.0
Belgium 25.05.2014 9.0 +2.6
Cyprus 22.05.2016 4.9 +1.2
Denmark 18.06.2015 5.9 +1.1
France 18.06.2017 6.4 +1.2
Germany 27.09.2009 5.3 +1.4
Germany 24.09.2017 5.1 +1.2
Greece 06.05.2012 8.0 +4.7
Greece 17.06.2012 4.9 +1.6
Iceland 27.04.2013 5.8 +1.7
Iceland 29.10.2016 5.8 +1.7
Ireland 25.02.2011 4.4 +1.3
Ireland 26.02.2016 5.9 +2.8
Netherlands 09.06.2010 6.9 +1.7
Netherlands 15.03.2017 8.4 +3.1
Spain 20.12.2015 5.5 +1.9
Spain 26.06.2016 4.8 +1.3
Sweden 14.09.2014 5.3 +1.5
United  
Kingdom
07.05.2015 3.9 +1.0
Note: All Western Europe elections with a fragmentation above 1 of the countries’ 
mean value after 2007 are outlined in the table. The effective number of parties is 
calculated based on parties’ vote. Source: ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016).
The interplay of volatility, support, and fragmentation
We have so far only demonstrated that there is a parallel trend toward 
volatility and party system fragmentation, and that this is mainly a phe-
nomenon of Western European party systems while Central and Eastern 
Europe has been characterized by high levels of volatility and fragmen-
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closer look at the interplay between both variables: Does high volatility 
lead to a changing party system format? To begin with, there is a rel-
atively high correlation (r = 0.34) regarding within–country variance 
between volatility and fragmentation. Figure 1.4 shows the graphic rep-
resentation of this association, which is clearly visible. We are not simply 
registering parallel trends across many party systems, but can show that 
volatility and fragmentation go hand in hand within countries. Changing 
electoral behaviour seems to lead to higher fragmentation and, therefore, 
to changing party systems.
Figure 1.4: Interplay between centred ENP and volatility
Notes: The ENP and the volatility values are centred by countries’ mean values. The 
effective number of parties is calculated based on parties’ vote share; data obtained 
from ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016). Source: Emanuele (2015) for Western 
Europe and ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016) for Central and Eastern Europe. 
We took party change (e.g. mergers) and electoral alliances as defined by ParlGov 
into account.
Regarding the magnitude of change, there are two ways of looking at this. 
First, the absolute levels of fragmentation and volatility indicate where 
party systems stand from a comparative perspective. Second, it is also 
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ative to its long-term pattern of stability or fluidity. Table 1.3 lists elec-
tions characterized by a degree of change that was clearly higher than the 
national post-war mean. To this end, we use the following thresholds: 
elections with: (1) one point above a country’s mean ENP; and (2) five 
points above a country’s mean volatility. Hence, all elections are included 
where fragmentation and volatility are clearly above the long-term mean.
The results confirm that a high degree of party system change is pri-
marily a Western European phenomenon. Only two elections in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (Czech Republic 2012 and Slovakia 2016) reveal 
volatility and fragmentation values above the long-term average. On the 
contrary, many Western party systems have exhibited unusual dynamics 
and party system formats since the beginning of the crisis. Most con-
spicuously, the list contains mainly elections after the onset of the Euro 
crisis—21 of 26 elections in Table 1.3 were held after 2007. The magni-
tude of this recent party system upheaval becomes even more impressive 
if we remind ourselves that our data covers the entire post-war period 
including the phase of party system consolidation in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. In a nutshell, many Western European party systems have 
experienced growing volatility and increasing fragmentation, which 
amounts to a substantial transformation of their party systems, both in 
terms of stability and their respective patterns of interaction.
To be sure, this is not a causal analysis but there is substantial prima 
facie evidence here that the crisis played a major role, and other research 
has provided fairly unambiguous evidence on this connection (see for 
example Hernández and Kriesi 2016). Besides the ‘usual suspects’ two 
countries deserve specific mention. Italy, for its absence, because the 
country has had so many highly fluid elections that the spectacular 
upheaval of the 2013 election—when the Five Star Movement came from 
nowhere to become the largest party—did not produce figures above 
our threshold (De Petris and Poguntke 2015). However, it missed the 
cut-off point narrowly with a volatility value of +23 and an ENP of +0.9 
points above Italy’s post-war average. At the other end of the spectrum is 
supposedly hyper-stable Germany, which experienced substantial party 
system change only in 2017 even though the writing had been on the wall 
for some time (Poguntke 2014). The crisis of government formation that 
followed the federal election clearly shows that the government forma-
tion capacity of the German party system has substantially deteriorated 
and indicates patterns of ideological polarization (Schmitt 2018).
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Table 1.3: Elections marked by a high degree of change since the 
Second World War
Country Election Volatility (centred) ENP (centred)
Before the Crisis:
Belgium 1981 +5.5 +2.4
Czech Republic 1992 +39.3 +1.9
Denmark 1973 +10.4 +2.3
Hungary 1994 +6.7 +1.3
Malta 1950 +16.1 +1.8
Norway 2001 +5.8 +1.7
Portugal 1985 +9.4 +1.3
Romania 1992 +10.9 +2.0
Slovakia 2002 +6.0 +2.4
After the Crisis (December 2008):
Austria 2008 +10.5 +1.7
Austria 2013 +7.9 +2.1
Belgium 2010 +5.6 +3.0
Czech Republic 2013 +8.5 +2.0
Denmark 2015 +7.9 +1.1
France 2017 +23.8 +1.2
Germany 2017 +7.1 +1.2
Greece 2012a +35.7 +4.7
Greece 2012b +5.9 +1.6
Iceland 2013 +23.4 +1.7
Ireland 2011 +19.0 +1.3
Ireland 2016 +14.2 +2.8
Netherlands 2010 +10.1 +1.7
Netherlands 2017 +9.7 +3.1
Slovakia 2016 +9.9 +1.1
Spain 2015 +20.5 +1.9
United Kingdom 2015 +10.9 +1.0
Note: table lists elections in countries where volatility was 5 points and 1 more ‘effective party’ above 
the post-war mean. Source: Our analysis is based on data compiled in Emanuele (2015) for Western 
Europe and ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016) for Central and Eastern Europe. We took party change 
(e.g. mergers) and electoral alliances as defined by ParlGov into account. The effective number of parties 
is calculated based on parties’ vote; data obtained from ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016).
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The success of the populist parties
In this section, we will move beyond the prima facie evidence on the 
impact of the Euro crisis on party system change and focus directly on 
the electoral fortunes of populist parties. There is a fairly widespread 
consensus in the literature to regard anti-elitism (‘us vs. them’) and the 
reference to an undiluted will of the ordinary people as the core elements 
of populism, understood as a ‘thin ideology’ (Mudde 2004; Kriesi 2014). 
Following this approach, we draw on the recent literature to identify pop-
ulist parties in Europe (see van Kessel 2016; Stanley 2017; Taggart 2017; 
van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018a; Poguntke et al. 2016 [the Political 
Party Data Base Project]).3
The inherent connection between populist mobilization and the Euro 
crisis is fairly straightforward. Before the Euro crisis lead to the politici-
zation of European integration, it had largely been an elite-driven pro-
ject based on a permissive consensus within European publics. As an 
elite project running into troubled waters, European integration repre-
sented an ideal focal point for mobilization against the allegedly ill-mo-
tivated imposition of elite decisions on the ‘ordinary person’. Clearly, this 
mobilization could have left-wing overtones, arguably more popular in 
countries subjected to austerity measures, or it could come with a right-
wing slant, as in some ‘donor countries’. In sum, this should have led to 
the growing success of populist parties or, in other words, a substantial 
portion of party system change that we have identified above should be 
attributable to the success of populist parties. 
As all our previous analyses have shown that developments differ 
between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe, we focus sep-
arately on both regions. Table 5 shows the mean vote share of populist 
parties before and after the crisis in Western Europe. A clear majority of 
populist parties has been able to increase its vote share since the begin-
ning of the crisis. What is more, amongst those that suffered an average 
decline are three special cases. First, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia is a rela-
tively old party which is susceptible to the ordinary electoral fluctuation 
and is hardly any longer a likely focus for protest voters. Second, the Alli-
ance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) was a break-away from the Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPÖ), which has managed to win back most of its former 
voters. In other words, the growth of the FPÖ made up for the decline of 
3  See Appendix A1 for a list of parties included in the analysis.
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the BZÖ. Third, the Dutch Fortuyn List collapsed soon after the assas-
sination of its founder. Hence, if we discard these three cases we have a 
very clear picture of populist electoral growth in Western Europe since 
the crisis began. In Central and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the 
impact of the crisis is not clearly visible. As a matter of fact, the number 
of populist winners (11) is smaller than that of populist losers (15). These 
results fit the well-known pattern of low party system institutionalization 
in CEE countries (Kriesi 2014; Neff Powell and Tucker 2014). In a situ-
ation of structural electoral fluidity, the additional shock from the eco-
nomic crisis did not leave a clear mark.
Table 1.4: Mean vote share before and after the crisis in Western 
Europe
Notes: ** Regarding Italy (Forza Italia and the Northern League), the second vote 
is taken into account. Source: Data obtained from ParlGov (Döring and Manow 
2016).
PART I - Thematic and Comparative Chapters
13
Table 1.5: Mean vote share before and after the crisis in Central and 
Eastern Europe
Notes: ** Regarding the electoral support of Fidesz, the vote share of the electoral 
alliance is taken into account. Source: Data obtained from ParlGov (Döring and 
Manow 2016).
The East–West divide is also clearly depicted in Figure 1.5, which is based 
on the average gains and losses of populist parties in each country. By 
and large, we see that populist parties have made more electoral gains in 
Western Europe in the wake of the crisis. Except for Belgium, all coun-
tries registering a decline of populist party strength since 2009 are in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
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Figure 1.5: Changes of populist vote share at the country level
Notes: The figure is bases on the difference of the mean vote share of populist parties 
for 2000–2008 and 2009–2018. Positive values (red colour) depict populist gains 
and negative values (green colour) reveal losses. Source: Author’s own elaboration.
The finding that populist parties, particularly in Western Europe, have 
made electoral gains in the wake of the Euro crisis suggests that they 
have mobilized on anti-European issues. The Chapel Hill expert survey 
(CHES) data (Polk et al. 2017) facilitates a direct investigation of the rela-
tionship between a party’s position on European integration and its loca-
tion on the GAL/TAN dimension. Figure 1.6 depicts all parties included 
in the 2014 and 2017 CHES data sets (using the more recent data point 
where available) with populist parties marked by triangles. Most populist 
parties cluster at the anti-European and TAN corner of this two-dimen-
sional space while most other European parties tend to be on the pro-Eu-
ropean side and spread out fairly evenly across the GAL/TAN dimension. 
This clearly shows that populist parties tend to mobilize also on anti-Eu-
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ropean positions (Hooghe and Marks 2002). There is a consistently clear 
and statistically significant relationship between populism, on the one 
hand, and Euroscepticism and GAL/TAN, on the other. At the same time, 
populism tends to be indifferent to economic and general left–right posi-
tions (see Table 1.6). Or, to put it differently, populism can have right-
wing, left-wing and centrist incarnations (Kriesi 2014).
Viewed from a different angle, however, this could also be interpreted 
as a question mark behind the standard definition of populism. If most 
established parties are in favour of European integration, mobilization 
against the EU almost by default turns into mobilization against the 
established elites, which is part of the standard definition of populism. To 
be sure, the sequence of events is often in reverse order in that populist 
parties discovered the suitability of anti-EU positions that tended to fit 
neatly into their general anti-elite discourse, only to later tone it down. 
The Austrian FPÖ or the Italian Forza Italia are well-known examples of 
populist parties adopting Euroscepticism.
Figure 1.6: EU and GAL/TAN Positions in Comparison
Source: CHES 2014 and 2017 (Polk et al. 2017).
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Table 1.6: Linear regression with populism as the independent 
variable
Dependent Variable Coeff. (Std. Error) Squared R
EU Position ~ Populist Party –1.976 (0.289) 0.151
General Left–Right ~ Populist Party 1.366 (0.411) 0.040
GAL/TAN Position ~ Populist Party 2.507 (0.464) 0.100
Economic Position ~ Populist Party –0.568 (0.409) 0.007
Source: CHES 2014 and 2017 (Polk et al. 2017). The sample includes 265 parties.
Concluding remarks
Our overview of party system change in European democracies shows 
that Western European systems have undergone substantial change since 
the onset of the Euro crisis while CEE countries have always been con-
siderably more fluid. In the Western systems, the growth of volatility has 
indeed led to higher party system fragmentation. The degree of change 
stands out when viewed from a long-term perspective and clearly exceeds 
previous crisis elections. In consequence, the immediate impact of this 
has been felt in several countries over the past years in that government 
formation has become more difficult. Spain is a conspicuous example, the 
UK seems to be moving away from stable one-party governments and 
even hyper-stable Germany has been struggling with government forma-
tion. Some of this may be transitory as it will take some time until new 
parties are integrated into the coalition formation process. In contrast, 
the fluidity of CEE party systems conceals potential trends.
To be sure, our data does not establish a causal link between the crisis 
and party system change. Nevertheless, we present substantial prime facie 
evidence that this is in fact the case. This is in line with other research 
on this topic (see, for example, Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Hobolt and 
Tilley 2016). There is ample evidence that the Euro crisis has accelerated 
the growth of populism, particularly in Western Europe. Furthermore, 
populist parties tend to take Eurosceptic positions.
Arguably, the Euro crisis had its most profound impact on Italian par-
ties where most significant political parties started flirting with a more 
or less pronounced anti-European stance, including Forza Italia, the 
Northern League and the Five Star Movement. Most recently, however, 
Forza Italia and the Five Star Movement have toned down their anti-EU 
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rhetoric noticeably. It almost seems that as elections approach, parties 
tend to reconsider the electoral payoffs of a radical anti-European posi-
tion. Similarly, the Austrian FPÖ withdrew substantially from its previ-
ously radical anti-EU stance and no longer talked about a referendum, 
or an Öxit, in the 2017 election campaign. Also, the French National 
Front became more moderate on European integration in the run-up to 
the French presidential elections of 2017. It is not entirely implausible 
to attribute these changes partially to the shock of Brexit. In addition, 
parties that are at least within reach of governmental responsibility are 
confronted with the need to act responsibly—not just responsively (Mair 
2009)—and this includes the French FN, the FPÖ and the Five Star 
Movement.
The United Kingdom is, as always, a special case when it comes to 
European matters. The Eurosceptic faction of the ruling Conservative 
Party was sufficiently strong to push for a national referendum on EU 
membership. To be sure, Prime Minister Cameron’s decision to go to the 
country on EU membership owed much to the sudden rise of the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) which is a classic single-issue 
party campaigning for Brexit. The party ended up with no showing in 
the post-Brexit vote elections of 2017. Mission accomplished. Another 
special case is the traditionally anti-European Sinn Fein in Ireland, which 
changed its position in the wake of Brexit. Confronted with the imminent 
prospect of a ‘hard’ border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland, the party became considerably more pro-European.
Clearly, much depends on the action of political elites and it may be 
indicative that some of the most outspoken anti-EU campaigners have 
become more modest in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. As the 
ongoing negotiations between the EU and the UK demonstrate, easy 
solutions are not easy to deliver, and this may inject a dose of responsi-
bility into European public discourse at the eve of the European election 
campaign.
As the defining nature of populism is its ideological promiscuity, 
anti-European positions may not necessarily remain its main mobiliza-
tion tool. As the German AfD exemplifies, anti-immigration positions 
may be electorally more rewarding. However, as immigration is closely 
connected to EU policy-making and easy solutions are not in sight, the 
2019 elections to the European Parliament are likely to lead to a stronger 
representation of Eurosceptic and populist forces.
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Appendix A1
Table A1.1: All identified populist parties
Country Abbr. Name (English) Name (Original)
Austria BZÖ Alliance for the Fu-
ture of Austria
Bündnis Zukunft 
Österreich
Austria FPÖ Freedom Party of 
Austria
Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs
Belgium FN National Front Front National
Belgium LD|LDD List Dedecker | 
Libertarian, Direct, 
Democratic
Lijst Dedecker | 
Libertair, Direct, 
Democratisch
Belgium VB Flemish Block Vlaams Blok
Bulgaria Ataka Attack Ataka
Bulgaria BBB Bulgarian Business 
Bloc
Balgarski Biznes Blok
Bulgaria BNRP Bulgarian National 
Radical Party
Balgarska Natsional-
noradikalna Partiya
Bulgaria GERB Citizens for Europe-
an Development of 
Bulgaria
Grazhdani za Ev-
ropeysko Razvitie na 
Balgariya
Bulgaria NDSV National Movement 
Simeon II
Natsionalno 
Dvizhenie Simeon 
Vtori
Switzerland LdT Ticino League Lega dei Ticinesi
Switzerland SVP–UDC Swiss People’s Party Schweizerische 
Volkspartei–Union 
Démocratique du 
Centre
Czech Republic SPR–RSC Rally for the Repub-
lic–Republican Party 
of Czechoslovakia
Sdruzení pro repub-
liku–Republikánská 
strana Ceskosloven-
ska
Czech Republic UPD Dawn of Direct De-
mocracy
Úsvit prímé 
demokracie
Czech Republic VV Public Affairs Veci verejné
Germany AfD Alternative for Ger-
many
Alternative für 
Deutschland
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Germany Li/PDS The Left / PDS Die Linke / PDS
Denmark DF Danish Peoples Party Dansk Folkeparti
Denmark FrP Progress Party Fremskridtspartiet
Spain P We Can Podemos
Estonia ERP Res Publica Party Erakond Res Publica
Estonia ERSP Estonian National 
Independence Party
Eesti Rahvusliku 
Sõltumatuse Partei
Finland SP|P Finnish Party | True 
Finns
Suomen Puolue | 
Perussuomalaiset
France FN National Front Front national
United 
Kingdom
BNP British National Party British National Party
United King-
dom
UKIP United Kingdom 
Independence Party
United Kingdom 
Independence Party
Greece AE Independent Greeks Anexartitoi Ellines
Greece LAOS Popular Orthodox 
Rally
Laïkós Orthódoxos 
Synagermós
Greece LS–CA Peoples Association–
Golden Dawn
Laikos Syndesmos–
Chrysi Avg
Greece SYRIZA Coalition of the Rad-
ical Left
Synaspismós Rizos-
pastikís Aristerás
Croatia CL–LP Croatian Labourists–
Labour Party
Hrvatski laburisti–
Stranka rada
Croatia HSP–AS Croatian Party of 
Rights–Dr. Ante 
Starcevic
Hrvatska stranka pra-
va dr. Ante Starcevic
Hungary Fi–MPSz Fidesz–Hungarian 
Civic Union
Fidesz–Magyar Pol-
gári Szövetség
Hungary Jobbik Jobbik Movement for 
a Better Hungary
Jobbik Magya-
rországért Mozgalom
Hungary LMP Politics Can Be Dif-
ferent
Lehet Más a Politika
Hungary MIEP Hungarian Justice 
and Life Party
Magyar Igazság és 
Élet Pártja
Ireland SF Sinn Fein Sinn Féin
Italy FI–PdL Go Italy–The People 
of Freedom
Forza Italia–Il Popolo 
della Libertà
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Italy LN Northern League Lega Nord
Italy M5S Five Star Movement Movimento 5 Stelle
Lithuania DP Labour Party Darbo Partija
Latvia DPS Democratic Party 
Saimnieks
Demokratiska partija 
‘Saimnieks’
Latvia JL New Era Jaunais Laiks
Latvia TB For Fatherland and 
Freedom
Tevzemei un Brivibai
Latvia TKL–ZP People’s Movement 
for Latvia–Siegerist 
Party
Tautas Kustiba Latvi-
jai–Zigerista Partija
Latvia VL All For Latvia! Visu Latvijai!
Netherlands LPF Fortuyn List Lijst Pim Fortuyn
Netherlands PVV Party for Freedom Partij voor de Vrij-
heid
Netherlands SP Socialist Party Socialistiese Partij
Norway Fr Progress Party Fremskrittspartiet
Poland K Kukiz’15 Kukiz’15
Poland LPR League of Polish 
Families
Liga Polskich Rodzin
Poland PiS Law and Justice Prawo i Sprawiedli-
wosc
Poland SRP Self-Defence of the 
Republic Poland
Samoobrona Rzeczy-
pospolitej Polskiej
Poland X Party X Partia X
Romania PP–DD People’s Party–Dan 
Diaconescu
Partidul Poporului–
Dan Diaconescu
Romania PRM Greater Romania 
Party
Partidul România 
Mare
Romania PUNR Romanian National 
Unity Party
Partidul Unitatii Na-
tionale a Romanilor
Slovakia ANO Alliance of the New 
Citizen
Aliancia nového 
obcana
Slovakia HZDS Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia
Hnutie za 
demokratické Slov-
ensko
PART I - Thematic and Comparative Chapters
21
Slovakia OLaNO Ordinary People and 
Independent
Obycajní ludia a 
nezávislé osobnosti
Slovakia SNS Slovak National Party Slovenská národná 
strana
Slovakia SOP Party of Civic Under-
standing
Strana obcianskeho 
porozumenia
Slovakia Smer Direction–Social 
Democracy
Smer–sociálna 
demokracia
Slovakia ZRS Association of Work-
ers of Slovakia
Združenie robotník-
ov Slovenska
Slovenia SNS Slovenian National 
Party
Slovenska nacionalna 
stranka
Sweden NyD New Democracy Ny Demokrati
Sweden SD Sweden Democrats Sverigedemokraterna
Notes: Parties identified as populist parties based on van Kessel (2016); Stanley 
(2017); Taggart (2017); van Hauwaert and van Kessel (2018) and; Poguntke et al. 
(2016). The Political Party Data Base Project.
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Waning Public Support for 
International Cooperation? Some 
Lessons from Europe1
Catherine E. de Vries
Introduction: International Cooperation Is Under Attack
Political and economic cooperation across borders is experiencing 
mounting levels of popular resistance. The outcome of the Brexit vote, 
the election of Donald Trump, and the electoral success of nationalist 
forces across the globe seem indicative of a growing backlash against 
international cooperation. While many thought ever-increasing interna-
tional cooperation to be irreversible—in part because it was expected to 
lead to a universal acceptance of liberal and capitalist values (e.g. Fuku-
yama 1992)—isolationism, nationalism and protectionism are back on 
the political scene with a vengeance. While Donald Trump’s slogan to 
‘Make America Great Again’ is at the heart of his campaign and current 
administration, Nigel Farage’s mantra of taking back control (‘we will win 
this war and take our country back’) dominated the Brexit campaign. 
Although we should not overestimate the extent to which current devel-
opments represent a ‘real’ break from the past—where identification 
with the nation-state and national interest have arguably always been 
important aspects of the political belief systems of citizens and elites alike 
(e.g. Anderson 1983, 1991; Waltz 1979)—something seemed to be have 
changed. A growing number of citizens and elites are willing to take con-
siderable economic and political risks to protect what they perceive as 
vital national interests (be it societal cohesion, national control, borders, 
trade, etc.).
1  A previous version of this chapter was presented at the ‘Challenges to the Contempo-
rary World Order’ Workshop, Filzbach, 6–7 October 2017. I wish to thank all partici-
pants and especially Ben Ansell, Kate McNamara, Tom Pepinsky, Frank Schimmelfen-
nig and Stefanie Walter for their extremely valuable comments and suggestions.
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Recent developments in Europe perhaps most clearly illustrate this. 
On 23 June 2016, against the recommendation of most political and 
economic experts, the British people voted to reverse the status quo of 
European Union (EU) membership and leave the country-bloc. The 
result sent a shock wave through the political establishment in London, 
Brussels and across the globe. The weeks after the vote, over £100 billion 
was wiped off the London Stock Exchange, and the British pound and 
government bond yield reached record lows. Politically, the two major 
political forces in British politics, the Conservative and Labour parties, 
found themselves (and at the time of writing still are) in disarray over 
how to shape Britain’s future relationship with the EU. After the vote, 
many embarked on a process of national soul searching. Why would the 
majority of the British public and so many politicians embark on such 
‘a monumental act of self-harm which will bewilder historians’ in the 
future?2 Two dominant answers have emerged. The Brexit result reflected: 
(1) a revolt of those left behind by globalization or; (2) represented a cul-
tural backlash based on immigration fears and prejudice (for a discus-
sion see Inglehart and Norris 2016; Clarke et al. 2017; Becker et al. 2017). 
These interpretations dovetail with the scholarly debate about the nature 
of public opinion toward supra-national government in Europe or inter-
national governance more generally, stressing both economic interest and 
identity considerations (for an overview see Hobolt and De Vries 2016).
The gloomy discussions in Britain stand in stark contrast with the 
situation on the European continent (the continent includes Ireland). 
Public support for EU membership has risen, at least in part because of 
Brexit (De Vries 2017, 2018). Against this backdrop, Commission Pres-
ident Jean-Claude Juncker presented an optimistic vision for Europe’s 
future in his 2017 State of the Union address, stating: ‘The wind is back in 
Europe’s sails’.3 Juncker suggested that there is a real ‘window of opportu-
nity’ between the series of domestic elections where centrist parties held 
their ground or pro-EU newcomers like Emmanuel Macron won and the 
period just before the 2019 elections for the European Parliament. His 
speech was not met with uniform optimism in Europe’s national capi-
tals. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte described Juncker as a hopeless 
2 http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/article-50-brexit-theresa-may-eu-negotia-
tions-paddy-ashdown-monumental-self-harm-bewilder-historians-a7656306.html (ac-
cessed 22 February 2018).
3 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm (accessed 22 February 
2018).
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‘romantic’ and suggested that ‘people like him who have “visions’ should 
perhaps see an optometrist’.4
In this chapter, I argue that important lessons can be learned from 
the recent developments concerning Brexit and public Euroscepticism 
more generally. These developments can especially inform our under-
standing of the popular backlash against international economic and 
political cooperation across the globe. The recent developments in Euro-
scepticism for example present important empirical puzzles that interest 
and identity explanations have difficulty addressing. For example, why 
is Eurosceptic party support highest in countries that have weathered 
the Eurozone crisis very well and economically benefitted most from the 
single currency? Why did people who were relatively well-off vote for 
Brexit? Why have feelings of national attachment in Europe remained 
remarkably stable in the last decades years or even declined in countries 
that also witnessed stark increases in Euroscepticism? Why do opinions 
toward intra-EU migration and free movement of people only partially 
correlate with Euroscepticism? I maintain that interest and identity 
explanations have overlooked one key aspect—namely, the willingness 
of people to take risks and support elites that propose status quo reversal.
In the ensuing sections, I integrate the notion of benchmarks taken 
from prospect theory—a theory of decision-making under risk, high-
lighted in my recent book Euroscepticism and the Future of European Inte-
gration—to account for people’s surprising willingness to take consider-
able risk by voting Brexit or supporting parties that advocate the reversal 
of the status quo of EU membership. The chapter is structured as follows. 
In a first step, I outline some of the empirical puzzles that the recent rise 
in Euroscepticism presents for both interest and identity explanations. 
Next, I introduce a theoretical lens that accounts for these puzzling find-
ings and present some empirical support for it. Finally, I conclude by 
stressing the lessons that can be learned from the recent developments 
in Europe for grasping popular backlash against economic and political 
international cooperation more globally.
4 https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/09/15/mark-rutte-en-zijn-europese-vergezichten-
13015657-a1573640 (accessed 22 February 2018).
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The puzzle: What’s going on in Europe?5
There is a flourishing literature on public attitudes toward European inte-
gration. Two dominant explanations of public opinion toward the EU 
have emerged: the economic interest and national identity explanations. 
The interest approach was introduced in the writings of Matthew Gabel 
(1998) and colleagues. Gabel argues that the removal of barriers to trade 
allows firms to shift production across borders and increases job inse-
curity for low-skilled workers whereas high-skilled workers and those 
with capital can take advantage of the opportunities resulting from a lib-
eralized European market. As a result, high-skilled workers should be 
more supportive of integration, while low-skilled workers less so (Gabel 
and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel 1998; Tucker et 
al. 2002). The second approach suggests that the European project is 
not only about economic cooperation, but also about the creation of a 
European identity and a sense of mutual obligation (Hooghe and Marks 
2005, 2009; McLaren 2002, 2005; Kuhn 2015). Accordingly, people’s 
attachment to their nation-state and/or perceptions of people from other 
cultures are seen as important drivers of support or scepticism toward 
the EU. Euroscepticism is shown to coincide with strong feelings of 
national identity and pride (Carey 2002), and most pronounced amongst 
those who conceive of their national identity as exclusive of other terri-
torial identities compared to those who have multiple nested identities 
(Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2009). It is significantly weaker amongst those 
who are transnationally mobile or have been exposed to living in other 
EU countries (Kuhn 2015).6
The interest explanation dovetails with the idea that opposition 
toward the EU is mostly the prerogative of those left behind by globaliza-
tion. Processes of economic internationalization and political integration 
in Europe have led to a resistance amongst the most vulnerable—who 
are demanding a fair distribution of wealth and jobs and for their gov-
ernment to take back control of borders—that pits them against cosmo-
politan professionals living in the cities (see also Kriesi et al. 2008; Kriesi 
2016). The identity explanation fits the notion that opposition toward 
the EU is mostly a form of cultural backlash. People with an exclusive 
national identity or strong attachment to the nation-state see an interna-
5  Parts of this section draw on De Vries (2018, Chapter 1).
6  A second set of studies has demonstrated that Euroscepticism is also related to hostility 
toward minority groups and immigrants (McLaren 2002, 2005). 
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tional organization as something that infringes on their sense of national 
belonging (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2009). Liberal elites in Europe 
have stretched their economic, political, and cultural ideas too far, and 
segments of the population demand a correction (Inglehart and Norris 
2016). Both perspectives are crucially important for our understanding 
of public opinion toward the EU, yet recent developments like the rise of 
Eurosceptic parties in national and European Parliament elections give 
rise to important empirical puzzles that both cannot fully address. Let me 
discuss some of these.7
A first puzzle emerges when we look at the 2014 European Parliament 
vote. Figure 1 plots the electoral support for hard Eurosceptic parties in 
the elections against a country’s level of unemployment in the same year.8 
Hard Eurosceptic parties are those that reject EU membership and cam-
paign for their country to secede from the Union (Taggart and Szczer-
biak 2004). Examples can be found on the right of the political spectrum, 
like Marine Le Pen’s National Front in France, Geert Wilders’ Party for 
Freedom in the Netherlands or the United Kingdom Independence 
Party, but also on the left—take the examples of the Communist Party 
in Greece, the United Democratic Coalition in Portugal or the Left Party 
in Sweden. Furthermore, some hard Eurosceptic parties can be difficult 
to classify as left or right, as is the case for Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Move-
ment in Italy for instance.
The aggregate predictions based on the interest explanation would 
suggest hard Eurosceptic parties to do well in countries that do not per-
form well economically (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). When we look 
more closely at Figure 2.1, a quite different pattern emerges. Countries 
that have done relatively well during the Eurozone crisis, like Austria, 
Denmark, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden, show the highest 
levels of electoral support for hard Eurosceptic parties, yet record low 
unemployment. Countries like Cyprus, Greece, Portugal and Spain—
while hardest hit in the crisis—show little electoral support for hard 
Eurosceptic parties (Peet and La Guardia 2014). These results do not sit 
well with predictions based on the interest explanation.
One could argue that these patterns in support for hard Eurosceptic 
7  For a further discussion of empirical puzzles see De Vries (2018).
8  Figure 1 presents the vote shares obtained in the 2014 European Parliamentary elec-
tion for all hard Eurosceptic parties in different member states. In some member states 
like Luxembourg, Spain or Malta no hard Eurosceptic party won seats in the 2014 elec-
tion. 
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parties reflect the debtor–creditor relationships that emerged in the 
Eurozone crisis. Given that the Euro had yet to be introduced when the 
interest explanation was developed, debtor–creditor relationships could 
constitute a new way of understanding support through an economic 
benefit lens. This type of extension looks promising at first, but upon 
closer inspection is quite problematic.
Figure 2.1: Unemployment rate and hard Eurosceptic vote share in 
2014
Note: Figure entries are the vote shares of hard Eurosceptic parties who received 
at least one seat in the 2014 European Parliament and the official unemployment 
rate in 2014 in percent. The correlation coefficient between the vote share of hard 
Eurosceptic parties and the official unemployment rate is negative and not statistically 
significant: Pearson’ R = -0.22 (p=0.26). Source: Author’s own calculations based on 
the official results, see European Parliament (2014) and Eurostat (2017).
Countries like Denmark and Sweden, where hard Eurosceptic party sup-
port is high, are for example not part of the Eurozone and not do not 
contribute to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) designed to safe-
guard and provide instant access to financial assistance programmes for 
member states of the Eurozone in financial difficulty.9 Support for hard 
9  For more information on the structure see European Stability Mechanism (2017).
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Eurosceptic parties is low in Germany and even non-existent in Luxem-
bourg, two of the biggest net contributors to the ESM. The patterns of 
Eurosceptic vote shares in recent elections are not easily accounted for 
through the interest logic.
Can we establish a link between people’s feelings of national iden-
tity and Eurosceptic party support? The identity explanation suggests 
that people who are most opposed to the EU and display a higher like-
lihood to vote for a hard Eurosceptic party, are those with an exclusive 
national attachment (Díez Medrano 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2005, 
2009; McLaren 2002, 2005). Individuals who conceive of their national 
identity as exclusive of other territorial identities are likely to be con-
siderably more Eurosceptic than those who have multiple and nested 
identities. This is because people with an exclusive national identity will 
see an international organization as a threat. Although this view seems 
compelling, Eurobarometer (EB) surveys—which have been polling peo-
ple’s views about European integration for decades—show that people’s 
feelings of exclusive identity have remained remarkably stable over the 
years (European Commission 2016).10
What is more, an examination of the relationship between people’s 
feelings of exclusive national identity and Eurosceptic vote shares in the 
2014 European Parliamentary election suggests that the correlation is very 
weak. Figure 2.2 pits the share of those who state that they feel exclusively 
national against the vote share of hard Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 
European Parliament election for each member state. When we explore 
the relationship between the share of people who identify as exclusively 
national and the electoral support for hard Eurosceptic parties, we find 
little relationship between the two. In fact, in countries characterized by 
relatively high shares of those feeling exclusively national, we find very 
different levels of electoral support for hard Eurosceptic parties. While 
in Great Britain the share of those voting for hard Eurosceptic parties is 
considerable, in Greece or Cyprus, where also a large portion of the pop-
ulation feels exclusively national, support for hard Eurosceptic parties is 
rather modest. Equally, we find that in countries, like Ireland or Bulgaria, 
where the electoral support for hard Eurosceptic parties is very low, the 
portion of the population feeling exclusive national is quite high. Against 
this backdrop, it seems difficult to think that identity considerations are 
10  Since the early 1990s, the EB survey has asked respondents if they feel national only, 
European only, or a mix of the two.
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the determinants behind the recent spike in Eurosceptic sentiment.
Yet, it could be the case that identities matter only when they are 
activated by political parties, especially those on the extreme right of the 
political spectrum (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hutter and Grande 2014).11 
If people’s feelings of national identity need to be activated by political 
parties, we would expect the share of those feeling exclusively national 
to show some affinity with the electoral success of extreme right parties.
Figure 2.2: Feelings of exclusive national identity and hard 
Eurosceptic party support in 2014
Notes: Figure entries display countries as coordinates based on the share of 
respondents who feel exclusively national and the vote share of hard Eurosceptic 
parties who received at least one seat in the 2014 European Parliament. The 
correlation coefficient between the share of respondents who feel exclusively national 
and the vote share of hard Eurosceptic parties is very small and not statistically 
significant: Pearson’ R = 0.09 (p=0.63). Source: Author’s own calculations based on 
official results (European Parliament 2014) and Eurobarometer surveys conducted 
in 2014 (European Commission 2016).
Yet, evidence from the Dutch case suggests that this might not be the case. 
Figure 3 below displays two time series: (1) the share of Dutch people 
11  It is well established that political elites shape public support for the EU (Ray 2003; 
Hooghe and Marks 2005; Hobolt 2007; Hellström 2008; De Vries and Edwards 2009), 
although some studies have shown that this is a reciprocal process whereby parties 
both respond to and shape the views of their supporters (Steenbergen et al. 2007; Gabel 
and Scheve 2007).
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who view themselves as exclusively national based on the EB surveys; 
and (2) the vote share for the different extreme right parties that have 
competed in Dutch elections—the Centre Democrats, List Pim Fortuyn 
and Party for Freedom—over the same time period.
Figure 2.3: Trends in feelings of exclusive national identity and 
extreme right vote shares in the Netherlands
Note: Figure entries represent the share of Dutch respondents who feel exclusively 
national and the vote shares of extreme right parties that obtained seats (Centre 
Democrats, List Pim Fortuyn and Party for Freedom) in Dutch elections in the 
time period. Source: Calculations based on Eurobarometer (European Commission 
2016) and official Dutch election results (Kiesraad 2016).
The Dutch trends do not seem to lend much empirical support for the 
idea that extreme right parties activate feelings of exclusive national 
identity against the EU. While there was a steady increase in extreme 
right party support in the Netherlands from the early 1990s until 2015, 
Dutch people on average feel less exclusively national over the same time 
period. I am not disputing that those who feel exclusively national are 
more likely to harbour Eurosceptic sentiment but given that this share 
has been largely stable (or has even decreased) in the Netherlands, the 
recent rise in Euroscepticism seems unlikely to be due to increased feel-
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ings of exclusive national identity.12
What we are missing: The importance of risk-taking and 
benchmarking in support for status quo reversal
It is important to stress that I am not disputing that both the interest and 
identity explanations are important—they clearly are. Rather, what I am 
suggesting is that they may not account for the recent rise in Euroscepti-
cism. What both interest and identity approaches have failed to consider 
is people’s willingness to take risk and support candidates or parties that 
advocate a reversal from the current status quo of EU membership. As 
I have argued elsewhere (De Vries 2017, 2018), public opinion toward 
the EU is best understood as a comparison of the benefits of the cur-
rent status quo of membership and those associated with an alternative 
state—i.e. one’s country being outside the EU. People are only willing to 
take the risk of voting for their country to leave the EU or casting a ballot 
for a party that advocates secession when they think that the alternative 
to membership is better.
The benefits of the alternative state—one’s country being outside the 
EU—are both unknown and uncertain. They imply a counterfactual—
namely, how would my country do were it not a member of the EU? Coun-
terfactuals ultimately involve risk. Research suggests that due to imper-
fect information about what the future may bring, people will most likely 
favour existing benefits that are known to them over uncertain future 
ones (for a discussion see Hirshleifer and Riley 1992). The alternative 
state of one’s country being outside the EU is largely unknown, so people 
will rely on benchmarks to compensate for these informational shortfalls. 
Based on the idea that people will look at the EU through the lens of the 
political system they know best, their nation-state, I suggest that people 
base their expectations about the alternative state by extrapolating from 
current conditions, most importantly current national economic perfor-
mance and quality of government. The extent to which people support 
the status quo of membership thus crucially depends on their expecta-
12  One could maintain that activation here should be understood as the mobilization of 
feelings of exclusive national identity which previously lay dormant rather than with 
an increase in the share of those identifying as exclusively national. Although this may 
sound persuasive at first, it is hard to see how this interpretation fits the Dutch findings 
presented above, which document a decrease in the share of those with an exclusive na-
tional identity. Like utilitarian concerns, exclusive national identity considerations may 
not fully explain the developments in public sentiment about the EU in recent years.
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tions about how well their country would do outside the European bloc 
and the information they use to form these beliefs. While people could in 
principle also benchmark the alternative state by judging how well coun-
tries like Norway or Switzerland fare that have never joined the EU, the 
transaction costs associated with leaving are fundamentally different as 
Brexit has made fundamentally clear.
One can think about this in the following way. Every individual (or 
group of individuals) derives some benefits from their country through 
the provision of public goods and services, such as roads, public televi-
sion, national defence, etc. To be delivered efficiently, some public goods 
and service, such as trade, require international cooperation. Or certain 
problems transcend national borders and require international solutions, 
such as the climate change (Alesina et al. 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2001). 
Moreover, being part of the EU institutional architecture may deliver 
unique goods and services for individuals that the national systems in 
which they reside by themselves could not. These benefits, originating 
from the advantages of scale, however, can be perceived to come at a 
cost. Single market access in the EU, for example, currently also implies 
the acceptance of the free movement of people. This has already proven 
an important touchstone of dissent within electoral campaigns in some 
member states and was a central issue in the Brexit campaign (Clarke et 
al. 2017, see also Kriesi et al. 2008). Other perceived costs that have been 
highlighted by Eurosceptic pundits are that countries have to accept the 
jurisdiction of the European Court, or engage in some forms of financial 
guarantees, transfer payments or debt relief efforts, for example, through 
membership in the Eurozone.
The core insight of the benchmark approach is simple: what drives 
people’s willingness to take risks and support a reversal from the status 
quo is the degree to which they think the alternative state is viable. In 
other words, what is important are people’s expectations about how well 
they think would their country would fare outside the EU. When the ben-
efits of the alternative state outweigh those of the status quo of member-
ship people will be more willing to take a leap of faith and try their luck 
outside the EU.
One question that arises is why people would not attribute the good 
political and economic performance of their country to membership in 
the EU? An answer to this is what political psychologists have coined 
proximate responsibility attribution. Studies have shown that people 
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attribute credit and blame for policy to more proximate political forces 
(Feldman 1982; Gomez and Wilson 2008). Given the complex web of 
policy attribution in the EU and the lack of a clear executive (Hobolt and 
Tilley 2014), good economic conditions are most likely going to be attrib-
uted to the activities of national elites, and vice versa. The role that single 
market access has played here is arguably much less tangible for people.
Based on the benchmark theory of public opinion we derive hypoth-
eses that diverge in important respects from the classical interest and 
identity explanations. For example, Euroscepticism is likely to develop in 
countries that do relatively well in terms of economic performance and 
quality of government, or amongst those that think that their country 
does better than other member states. While I cannot do the empirical 
testing of the idea of benchmarks full justice here (I provide a wealth 
of empirical evidence in De Vries 2018), Figure 2.4 provides some sup-
port for the idea that the viability of an exit option matters. Based on 
data from the European Election Study 2014, it displays: (1) the share of 
respondents who indicated they had voted in the 2014 European Parlia-
ment elections for a hard Eurosceptic party that advocates withdrawal 
from the EU; and (2) the share of respondents who responded in a survey 
question that they wished for less integration in Europe. The panel on the 
left in the figure displays these shares in countries that had unemploy-
ment levels above—and quality of government scores below—the EU 
average in 2014. The panel on the right shows the same information for 
countries that have performed above the EU average in terms of quality 
of government and have unemployment levels below the EU average 
(based on Eurostat 2017 and the Quality of Governance Standard Dataset 
2016, published by the Quality of Governance Institute at the University 
of Gothenburg).
In line with the benchmark theory, Figure 2.4 shows that both sup-
port for hard Eurosceptic parties and less integration is higher in country 
contexts that do well in terms of economic and political performance, 
while support for a reversal of the status quo of EU membership or for 
parties who advocate this is less pronounced in countries that do rel-
atively worse. This fits the idea that the viability of the alterative state 
matters for the extent to which people are willing to support status quo 
reversal. The notion of benchmarks helps us to understand why hard 
Eurosceptic party support is high in countries with good economic con-
ditions or that support for Brexit was high in both economically deprived 
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as well as more prosperous areas of Britain. What these different groups 
of voters have in common is not necessarily a greater sense of economic 
grievance or exclusive national identity, but a positive national bench-
mark that makes the status quo of EU membership look like a bad deal.13
Figure 2.4: Support for reversal of status quo of EU membership by 
country context
Note: Figure entries represent the share of EU respondents who stated having 
voted for a hard Eurosceptic party and who wish to see less integration in Europe. 
Differences between country contexts are significant at the p<.05 level. Source: 
Author’s own calculations based on: European Election Study (2014), Eurostat 
(2017) and Quality of Governance Standard Dataset (2016).
Brexit as a benchmark14
As I have outlined in the previous section, the benchmark theory sug-
gests that people’s attitudes toward Europe are ultimately rooted in a 
comparison—namely, one between the benefits of the current status quo 
of membership and those associated with the alternative state (i.e. one’s 
country being outside the EU). People are only willing to take the risk of 
voting for their country to leave the EU or casting a ballot for a party that 
13  For further empirical support for these expectations see De Vries (2018).
14  This section heavily draws upon De Vries (2017). 
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advocates secession when they think that the alternative to membership 
is better. The alternative state of one’s country being outside the EU is 
largely unknown, so people will rely on benchmarks to compensate for 
these informational shortfalls. These include current national economic 
performance and quality of government, but also precedents of other 
countries leaving.15 Brexit provides such a precedent.
The immediate economic and political effects of the Brexit vote pro-
vided people with a crucial piece of information, namely what the costs 
or benefits of leaving might be. Directly after the vote, some of the pos-
sible political and economic costs manifested themselves. The result, for 
example, sent a shock wave through the stock and currency markets. 
Over £100 billion was wiped of the London Stock Exchange, the British 
pound and the 10-year government bond yield reached record lows, and 
the UK was stripped of its triple-A rating. In late 2016 and early 2017, 
many of the stock market losses were recovered. Yet, ever since the British 
government started to negotiate its withdrawal from the EU economic 
uncertainty has abounded.16 Political uncertainty was also considerable 
thanks initially to Cameron’s resignation, but also due to debates about 
the nature of the exit and the tensions between the constituent parts of 
the United Kingdom. The new prime minister Theresa May took a hard 
line by stating that Brexit meant Brexit even if that meant leaving the 
single market.17 While her mantra ‘Brexit means Brexit and we’re going 
to make a success of it’ could be seen as a successful holding strategy to 
contain the debate about what it all would mean in practice, it quickly 
unravelled and following the snap election in 2017 her position weak-
ened. While the verdict on the exact costs of Brexit will only be known 
in the long run, the process of withdrawal from the EU will be associated 
with considerable political and economic uncertainty for a long time to 
come. It is that very uncertainty that feeds into the calculations in the 
benchmark model. 
Based on the benchmark theory of public opinion toward the EU, I 
would expect support for the EU to increase when the benefits of alterna-
tive state look less favourable. When the alternative state of one’s country 
being outside the EU looks less viable, support for the status quo of mem-
15  While people could in principle also benchmark the alternative state by judging how 
well countries that have never joined the EU—like Norway or Switzerland—fare, the 
transaction costs associated with leaving are fundamentally different.
16  For a discussion see The Economist, 16 July 2016.
17  For a discussion see The Atlantic, 17 January 2017.
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bership or even further integrative steps in Europe should rise as a result. 
The economic and political uncertainty immediately after the Brexit vote 
provides people with more information about the possible counterfac-
tual, namely how well one’s country would do outside the EU. Against 
this backdrop, I expect that immediately following the Brexit vote sup-
port for the EU should be higher in the remaining 27 member states.
Figure 2.5 below provides some support for this idea. It presents the 
results of the eupinions survey, a quarterly survey that aims to examine 
the public mood toward the EU and national political systems in the EU 
as a whole as well as in the six largest member states in terms of popula-
tion (France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. For more 
information see http://eupinions.eu). In 2016 two waves of the eupin-
ions survey were conducted, one before the Brexit vote in April and one 
after, in August. In both waves respondents were asked how they would 
vote if a membership referendum were held today. Would they vote to 
‘remain’ or to ‘leave’ the EU? Given that I am interested here in support 
for remaining in the EU pre- and post-Brexit within the EU–27, Figure 
2.5 displays the percentage of those intending to vote remain in the EU 
(excluding Great Britain) plus the percentages in the five largest member 
states, namely France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain, where we con-
ducted more in-depth studies. Note that I am not able to causally identify 
a Brexit effect as the surveys are not based on a panel where the same 
group of people get asked the question twice. Thus, there is no way of 
ruling out if factors other than Brexit played a role (in a previous study 
I deal with the causality issue through an additional survey experiment, 
see De Vries 2017). That said, the data is unique in the sense that I am 
able to gauge membership support in hypothetical membership referen-
dums across the EU as a whole and within selected member states.
Figure 2.5 shows that overall support for one’s country to remain in 
the EU is slightly higher in August 2016 compared to April of the same 
year. The increase is statistically significant for the EU–27 as well as Ger-
many and Poland. The biggest jump in support for remaining in the EU 
is recorded in Germany (eight percent). Interestingly, the data shows that 
support for remaining in the EU is quite high overall—70% or higher 
in the EU–27, Germany, Poland and Spain. That said, it is much lower 
in France and Italy. In fact, in Italy support for remaining inside the EU 
hovers between 50 and 55%. This is perhaps a reflection of the fact that 
the EU, and especially the Euro, is a very divisive issue in Italian politics 
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thanks in no small part to the critiques voiced by the Five Star Movement 
against what they see as an inefficient European bureaucracy and heart-
less austerity. Although a referendum on the EU or Euro membership is 
unlikely given the Italian constitutional arrangements, if one were called, 
these findings suggest that the outcome of such a vote would be highly 
uncertain.
Figure 2.5: Comparing support for remaining in the EU before and 
after Brexit
Notes: The dots represent the percentage of people who would vote for their country 
to remain in the EU if a membership referendum were held today in the April and 
August waves of the eupinions survey, with 95% confidence intervals.
The results suggest that it will be crucially important for the EU and 
the national governments of the remaining 27 member states to make 
sure that the British example does not set a positive precedent. If the 
economic and political fallout turns out to be comparatively mild, and 
the British government is able to negotiate a relatively good deal while 
at the same time limiting immigration, this might have significant con-
sequences for support for leaving the EU in other countries. In coun-
tries with vocal Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs—France or Italy, for 
example—having a positive example of how exit can combine trade with 
immigration controls could turn out to be a gamble that people might be 
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willing to take. Of course, for these countries to leave the EU would also 
mean leaving the Euro, which would make the transaction costs so much 
higher. Yet the question is: precisely how high? Nevertheless, in most of 
the remaining EU member states mainstream parliamentary majorities 
that are pro-EU or constitutional hurdles make exit referendums rather 
unlikely. That said, if a referendum were to take place, the findings pre-
sented here would suggest that the outcome would be highly uncertain.
Conclusion: What can we learn from Europe?
This contribution has highlighted the importance of benchmarks for 
public opinion about the EU. So far, public opinion toward the EU has 
largely been understood as a reflection of developments at the EU level. 
In other words, scholars have argued that people will either support or 
be sceptical about the European project based on what they stand to 
gain and lose from integration economically or in terms of their sense of 
belonging. The present contribution suggests that—although these fac-
tors are undoubtedly important—the degree to which people perceive 
that their country would survive or even thrive outside the EU is also key. 
Even people who themselves might gain from market and political inte-
gration in Europe might oppose it. If people think that the benefits of the 
alternative state exceed those of EU membership, support for integration 
may be low regardless of the overall positive benefits of integration for 
themselves or their country.
I wish to conclude this chapter by briefly spelling out some possible 
lessons we can learn from the European continent for understanding the 
development of opposition toward international cooperation across the 
globe. In my view, five such lessons stand out. First, the idea of bench-
marks and the viability of the alternative suggest that people’s views about 
international cooperation will be deeply rooted in national conditions 
and people’s evaluations of them. This may bring about very distinct 
national narratives about globalization. I am not saying that we should 
not look for similarities across country contexts, but deep case studies of 
individual countries or regions within countries might prove very fruitful 
for understanding recent discontent (see for example Cramer 2016).
Second, economic grievances alone are unlikely to serve as a suffi-
cient explanation for opposition to international cooperation. People are 
only willing to take the risk of changing the status quo when they think 
the gamble is worth it. This happens more often when the alternative state 
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looks viable. At the individual level, this can apply to people who have 
very little to lose, but equally to those who can afford to take a risk. This 
might lead to strange bedfellows: both the rich and the poor might be 
willing to change the status quo, while those in middling economic posi-
tions might be most prone to defend the status quo.
Third, the economic or political benefits that might arise due to 
increased international cooperation will be most likely attributed by 
people to national governments or systems (see De Vries 2018). This in 
turn will make the alternative state, i.e. one’s country outside a Treaty 
framework, look more promising. This might point toward a possibly 
paradoxical process underlying international cooperation:  increasing 
benefits associated with more economic and political cooperation across 
borders might over time become the risk-hedging mechanism that allows 
populations or individuals to turn against international governance itself 
(i.e. that which produced the benefit in the first place).
Fourth, when we continue to frame the debate about the roots of 
increasing opposition toward international cooperation in terms either 
economic grievances (the left behind) or cultural values (cultural back-
lash), we are missing something important. For one, the values and 
interest perspectives need not be mutually exclusive. Moreover, other 
factors might be important. Here, I have sought to draw our attention to 
potential additional factors, such as people’s benchmarks or risk aversion. 
These factors could also help us understand when interest and values 
matter and how they interact.
Finally, it is important to remember that globalization—a term that 
refers to increasing international cooperation and increasing interde-
pendence—is, like European integration, an inherently complex phe-
nomenon comprising economic, political, social and cultural aspects 
that bring about tensions. In his seminal book on the topic, Dani Rodrik 
(2011) notes that globalization represents a ‘trilemma’ for societies—they 
cannot be globally integrated, completely sovereign and democratically 
responsive all at once. This suggests that there are inherent trade-offs and 
that it is crucial to study how people make them. This is something that I 
have begun to do when it comes to public opinion toward European inte-
gration (De Vries 2018). I encourage others to do the same when it comes 
to support or opposition to international cooperation more generally.
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Explaining the Rise of Anti-Immigra-
tion Parties in Western Europe
James Dennison
Introduction
One of the most noteworthy political trends of the twenty-first century 
has been the pronounced increase in electoral support for anti-immigra-
tion parties. In this chapter, we consider the causes of this phenomenon. 
We focus on ten parties in ten western European Union (EU) states, for 
both theoretical and methodological reasons. We justify our choice of 
these ten parties not by their bone fide credentials to be a member of a 
particularly party family, such as the ‘populist radical right’ as defined by 
Mudde (2016), but by the prominence with which they give anti-immi-
gration preferences and the extent to which their supporters tend to be in 
accordance with those attitudes. However, each of the ten parties is reg-
ularly classified in party families labelled as ‘radical right’ (e.g. Rydgren 
2018), ‘right-wing populist’ (Clarke et al. 2016), etc.
We focus on the theorized cause of national-level (or macro) vari-
ation in vote shares for anti-immigration parties that has received the 
most consistent empirical backing: namely, immigration rates. We argue 
that, despite the strong evidence of causation, a direct causal effect is 
unlikely because an exogenous event is unlikely to lead to a behavioural 
change without any intermediary change in cognition. We consider atti-
tudinal change as the most obvious cognitive intermediary effect but find 
no evidence for an effect.
We then consider immigration’s salience as an issue amongst voters. 
We first show that there is strong correlation between the salience of 
immigration and voting for anti-immigration parties between 2005 and 
2016 in nine of the ten countries considered. We then produce fixed-ef
48
fects panel data models to show that, when tested separately, both 
immigration rates and immigration’s issue salience have statistically sig-
nificant positive effects on voting for anti-immigration parties. However, 
when tested simultaneously, the effect of neither is statistically significant, 
most likely because of multicollinearity. We also show that immigration 
rates increase immigration’s issue salience. We then go on to test our full 
theoretical hypothesis—namely, that immigration rates have a positive 
effect on vote share for anti-immigration parties only via their positive 
effect on immigration’s issue salience. We produce a multigroup struc-
tural equation model (SEM), which fully confirms our theoretical model.
The rise of anti-immigration parties
The rise of anti-immigration parties across Europe since the 1980s—and 
particularly during the late 2000s and 2010s—has been well documented 
in both academic (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Muis and Immerzeel 2017) 
and popular outlets (Financial Times 2017; The Economist 2016). In Figure 
3.1, we show opinion polling and election vote shares for ten anti-immi-
gration parties between 2005 and 2017. These parties are: the Freedom 
Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs); Flemish Interest 
(Vlaams Belang); the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti); the Finns 
Party (Perussuomalaiset); the National Front (Front National); Alterna-
tive for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland); the North League (Lega 
Nord); the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid); Sweden Demo-
crats (Sverigedemokraterna) and; UKIP.
Each of these parties has experienced a notable increase in support 
since 2005 except Flemish Interest and the Finns Party, though the former 
has experienced a significant local uptick more recently. The largest spe-
cific increases are: from 11% to 35% between 2006 and 2016 in Austria; 
from 12% to 21% between 2011 and 2015 in Denmark; from 7% in 2009 
to 31% in 2015 in France; from 3% to 13% between 2013 and 2016 in 
Germany; from 6% to 24% between 2006 and 2015 in the Netherlands; 
from 4% to 15% between 2013 and 2015 in Italy; from 3% to 21% between 
2006 and 2015 in Sweden; and from 2% to 15% between 2010 and 2016 in 
the UK. We can also see that in all ten countries, anti-immigration parties 
enjoyed local or absolute peaks in support around late 2015, after which 
support dipped in every country.
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Figure 3.1. Opinion polling and election vote share for ten anti-
immigration parties, 2005–2017 
Source: Eurobarometer, Eurostat. Monthly average, all polling for parliamentary 
elections except the 1st round of the French presidential election
We choose the ten countries in this chapter’s analyses according to four 
criteria. First, we do not consider post-communist countries for theoret-
ical reasons. Central and East European (CEE) countries have distinct 
party systems, value sets within the electorate, migration patterns and—
partially as a result—likely causal dynamics of support for anti-immigra-
tion parties that justify a separate analysis (see White et al. 2013). Second, 
we only consider EU member states. We do so primarily for reasons of 
data availability; the Eurobarometer data on which our later analyses are 
based is only carried out in these countries in Western Europe. Other-
wise, we would have likely included the Norwegian Popular Party and 
Swiss People’s Party in our analysis. Third, we do not include the Republic 
of Ireland, Portugal, Spain or Greece in our analyses. The first three do 
not have anti-immigration parties of any notable strength (for reasons 
discussed in O’Malley 2008, and Alonso and Kaltwasser 2014) and, as 
such, there is no variance in support to be explained. The reasons for 
the omission of Greece are less singular: there are at least three different 
parties with strong anti-immigration platforms (Golden Dawn, Χρυσή 
Αυγή), Independent Greeks (ΑΝΕΛ) and the Popular Orthodox Rally 
(ΛΑ.Ο.Σ), making analysis less simple. The most successful of these is 
akin to a neo-Nazi party far more so than the contemporary versions of 
the ten parties under consideration.
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We select the years 2005 to 2017 due to data availability. One of the two 
independent variables of interest in the later analyses—issue salience—is 
only available from 2005, when it was first included in the Eurobarometer 
survey. We choose the parties that we do for each country because they 
were the primary anti-immigration party for all or most of the period 
under investigation. However, it is worth noting that during this period 
in three countries other anti-immigration parties were able to win seats in 
the national legislature at general elections. These were: the People’s Party 
(Parti populaire) in Belgium in 2010 (1.3% of the overall vote) and 2014 
(1.5%); the Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) in 2013 (2.0%); the National 
Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale) in Italy in 2006 (12.3%); and the Forum for 
Democracy (Forum voor Democratie) in the Netherlands in 2017 (1.8%). 
Except for Italy, however, in all ten countries there was indisputably only 
one electorally relevant anti-immigration party during the time period 
in question. In 2007 the National Alliance merged with the centre–right 
People of Freedom party, making tracking its fortunes over time difficult.
Explaining the rise of anti-immigration parties: attitudinal 
transformation?
Numerous media commentators and political analysts have attempted to 
explain the rise of the above parties in recent years. Probably the most 
common explanation is a supposed widespread increase in anti-immi-
gration sentiment amongst European electorates. Typical statements in 
news outlets include ‘a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment is sweeping 
the world’ (Dunt 2016). Similarly, political analysts have explained the 
success of anti-immigration parties by arguing that ‘attitudes to immi-
gration have turned more negative […] in the US as well as in Europe’ 
(Bloomberg News 2015).
However, the notion that European electorates are turning against 
immigration finds no evidence in survey research. Indeed, Dennison and 
Geddes (2017) use European Social Survey (ESS) data to show that in 
14 European countries, between 2002 and 2016, attitudes to accepting 
immigrants ‘from poorer countries outside of Europe’ had become more 
positive in ten, had not changed in two, and had become more negative in 
two. Moreover, they showed that, between 2014 and 2016, during the big-
gest spike in polling for anti-immigration parties, attitudes became more 
favourable in nine countries, did not change in four and only became 
more negative in two. Similar increases in positivity toward the effects 
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of immigration on the economy, culture, quality of life, jobs, govern-
ment accounts and crime can be tracked in most European countries—
including the ten under investigation here—between 2002 and 2016 (see 
Heath and Richards 2016), as well as to acceptance of EU immigrants. 
Between 2014 and 2017 the Eurobarometer has asked respondents in 
all 28 member states about their positivity toward both EU and non-EU 
immigrants. In the vast majority of countries, there is increased net 
positivity to both groups. Overall, then, the notions that Europeans are 
becoming more negative to immigration and that this is the cause of the 
increase in support for anti-immigration parties can be rejected.
Academic explanations for the rise of anti-immigration 
parties
There is a well-developed literature on the determinants of support 
for populist radical right, far right, and anti-immigration parties, with 
a number of consistent findings. A theoretically important distinction 
amongst these studies is between those testing effects at the individual 
level, which are more numerous, and those doing so at the national level, 
which are more applicable for this chapter. The former group of studies 
have produced a number of debates but there is a general consensus on 
the typical socio-demographic and, particularly, value-based and attitu-
dinal determinants of support for anti-immigration parties (see Arze-
heimer 2018) amongst individuals.
However, since these predictors are all fairly stable in the period 
under question in this study, we instead focus on aggregate-level (or 
‘macro’) effects. In an overview of explanations of support for the rad-
ical right, Arzeheimer (2018) identifies four such relevant effects. First, 
media effects based on theories of agenda-setting—the notion that indi-
viduals turn to anti-immigration parties following attention and framing 
by anti-immigration media cues—have ‘attracted considerable interest’. 
However, ‘the evidence is limited’ (ibid., p. 157) aside from a few studies 
such as Boomgaarden and Vliegenthard (2007), who find a positive effect 
of attention given to immigration by the Dutch media on support for 
anti-immigration parties between 1990 and 2002 when controlling for 
unemployment and immigration rates. Second, ‘high crime rates are sup-
posed to benefit the radical right, but there is not much empirical evi-
dence to back up this claim’ (Arzeheimer 2018, p. 156). Third, the effects 
of unemployment remain contested and are ‘far from conclusive’ (ibid., 
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p. 155), with studies finding both positive, negative and nil effects on 
of national-level unemployment figures on voting for anti-immigration 
parties.
In contrast to the other three groups, ‘results for the effect of immi-
gration are less equivocal’ (ibid., 155). Indeed, Knigge (1998), Lubbers, 
Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002), Golder (2003), Swank and Betz (2003), 
Arzheimer and Carter (2006) and Arzeheimer (2009) all find positive 
effects of national immigration rates on voting for anti-immigration 
parties. Not only have immigration rates been repeatedly empirically 
validated as a determinant of support for anti-immigration parties, but 
they are also key to a number of theoretical explanations for voting for 
these parties. Perhaps the two most prevalent of these are the ‘economic 
insecurity perspective’ (also known as the ‘losers of globalization’ thesis) 
and the ‘cultural backlash thesis’ (Inglehart and Norris 2016). The first of 
these argues that higher immigration rates increase voting for anti-im-
migration parties because immigrants increase competition for resources 
and jobs, disproportionately negatively affecting certain socio-demo-
graphic groups who then express their dissatisfaction at the ballot box. 
The second explanation argues that individuals vote for anti-immigra-
tion parties because of the threat that they perceive high immigration 
rates pose to a homogenous, orderly, mono-cultural nation-state, which 
they are keen to preserve or resurrect. In this chapter we remain agnostic 
about which of these theories best explains voting for radical right par-
ties. Instead, we note that both are likely to be theoretically incomplete 
when explaining the increase in support for anti-immigration parties.
A direct causal effect of immigration on voting for anti-immigration 
parties is unlikely because such an exogenous event is unlikely to lead 
to a behavioural change without any intermediary change in cognition 
(von Eckardt 1996). Psychologically, electoral behaviour presents indi-
viduals with a choice that necessitates decision-making: first, whether to 
vote and, second, for whom to vote. From the psychology literature, we 
know that decision-making is a multi-step process that has been defined 
in a number of ways. Yet it almost always includes some description of 
four steps: 1) the individual has preferences and goals; 2) the individual 
gathers information about the outside world; 3) the individual cogni-
tively evaluates the outside world and options for behaviour and; 4) the 
individual chooses the option for behaviour that is most in accordance 
with their preferences given their understanding of the outside world and 
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their cognitive evaluation (Janis and Mann 1977; Pious 1993; Hall et 
al. 2007; Gold and Shadlan 2007; Moutsiana et al. 2013). According to 
this framework, a change in immigration rates would not be enough to 
lead directly to behavioural change; it would have to first lead to a change 
in the outcome of the cognitive evaluation of the accordance of prefer-
ences and options for behaviour, as deduced from external information. 
In short, there should be a cognitive change by which voting for anti-im-
migration parties is considered optimal whereas it was not before.
One outcome of this cognitive evaluation could be a change in atti-
tudes to immigration—the individual’s preferences. It could be that higher 
immigration rates make individuals more opposed the admittance of 
immigrants or less credulous toward the benefits of immigration. How-
ever, as has already been established, attitudes to immigration—both in 
terms of numbers to be accepted and perceived benefits and costs—have 
remained largely stable, with a tendency for greater positivity, in recent 
years. Less considered than preferences regarding immigration has been 
its salience—the individual’s assessment of whether immigration is an 
important issue affecting their country (Wlezien 2005). Indeed, it has 
already been noted that ‘at the national level these two dimensions [pref-
erence and salience] of public opinion move differently over time and in 
response to different macro-level variables […] both dimensions need to 
be taken into account when assessing the overall climate of public opinion 
towards immigration’ (Hatton 2016, p. 1). Hatton goes on to describe the 
different predictors of both preferences and salience but does not con-
sider voting for anti-immigration parties in his analysis.
Given that salience is likely to be the result of both immigration 
rates, media interest, party cues and other concerns—not least the rela-
tive importance of other political issues at that time—it may be that sali-
ence can help explain the considerably greater volatility in support for 
anti-immigration parties than simple immigration rates. Furthermore, 
variation in salience may be the missing variable in the decision-making 
process of voting and part of the varying cognitive evaluation that is 
partly informed by immigration rates and predicts voting for these par-
ties. In short, individuals will only vote for anti-immigration parties if 
they are opposed to immigration in some way and at those times that 
they perceive immigration to be of relatively greater importance than 
other political issues, which is likely to be partially informed by a percep-
tion of high immigration. This leads to the sole hypothesis of this chapter:
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H1. Immigration rates lead to greater support for anti-immigration parties 
only via the positive effect they have on the salience of immigration as a polit-
ical issue.
Indeed, Ford et al. (2015, p. 1,394) made a similar argument about the 
predictors of national immigration policy, arguing that ‘public opinion 
becomes an important factor when the prevailing mood is highly neg-
ative, and the issue is salient to voters and to the media.’ In the follow 
section, we seek to deduce whether there is any relationship between sali-
ence and voting for anti-immigration parties.
Salience and voting for anti-immigration parties
Since May 2005, the Eurobarometer has asked individuals from every 
EU member state what they ‘think are the two most important issues 
facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?’ Surveys tends to be bi-an-
nual, though in two years the Eurobarometer ran three, rather than two, 
surveys. Respondents are asked to pick two political issues from a range 
of 14, one of which is immigration.
There is a positive correlation between the percentage of individuals 
responding that immigration is one of the top two issues and the average 
polling in that month for anti-immigration parties in nine of the ten 
countries between May 2005 and May 2017. Only Finland shows no pos-
itive correlation between electoral support for the anti-immigrant party 
and immigration’s salience as an issue. The other countries all display 
correlations above 0.5 except France. In Figure 3.2, we see the ten cor-
relations displayed graphically, all of which are clearly positive, except in 
Finland, and strong, except in France.
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Figure 3.2. Correlations between polling for anti-immigration parties 
and percentage listing immigration as one of two most important 
issue affecting their country
Source: see Figure 3.1, Eurobarometer
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The exact correlations and their p-values are as follows:
Country r p Observations
Austria 0.66 0.01 13
Belgium 0.50 0.10 12
Denmark 0.68 0.01 14
Finland -0.52 0.07 13
France 0.31 0.26 15
Germany 0.64 0.06 9
Italy 0.73 0.00 18
Netherlands 0.54 0.06 13
Sweden 0.90 0.00 12
UK 0.50 0.08 13
We now move on to testing the general effects of immigration salience on 
support for anti-immigration parties. To do this requires an econometric 
model that measures the effect of salience over time while controlling 
for country-specific effects—such as the effects of the electoral system, 
political culture, history, etc.—on each party’s polling. To do this requires 
fixed-effects panel data models that predict polling for anti-immigration 
party () in a country () at a certain time point () according to the effect 
of the predictors ( in that country at that time as well as an error term (). 
All country time-invariant unobserved effects are controlled for in the 
within-transformation of the fixed-effects model , which essentially con-
trols for country-specific effects. This leaves a model using the following 
formula: 
In Table 3.1, we show the results of four models that test the effect of 
salience (model 1), immigration rates (2) and both together (3) on sup-
port for anti-immigration parties. We then show the results of testing the 
effect of immigration rates on immigration issue salience. In model 1, we 
can see that issue salience has a positive, statistically significant effect on 
support for anti-immigration parties. Thus, a 1 percentage point increase 
in the salience of immigration should lead to a 0.179 percentage point 
increase in electoral support—an important effect given the high vari-
ation in salience as shown in Figure 3.2. In model 2, we show that—in 
accordance with previous findings in the literature—immigration rates 
have a positive, statistically significant effect on voting for anti-immigra-
tion parties. 
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Thus, a 1% increase in that year’s number of immigrants as a share of 
the country’s population (using Eurostat data) has the effect of increasing 
national-level support for anti-immigration parties by over 13%. In 
model 3, we test the effects of both predictors simultaneously, finding 
no statistically significant effects (though both are positive), which is 
possibly the result of multicollinearity. Indeed, in model 4, we show that 
higher immigration rates have a positive, statistically significant effect on 
immigration’s salience.
Table 3.1. Fixed-effects panel data models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Polling for 
anti-immigra-
tion parties
Polling for 
anti-im-
migration 
parties
Polling for 
anti-im-
migration 
parties
Immigra-
tion issue 
salience
Salience 0.179*** 0.067
(0.0329) (0.066)
Immigration 
rate
13.455*** 9.719 44.523***
(3.375) (4.839) (6.305)
Constant 10.173*** 1.072 3.086 -21.122***
(0.832) (3.122) (3.868) (5.818)
Observations 132 62 49 81
R-squared 0.196 0.238 0.267 0.416
Number of 
ctry
10 10 10 10
However, as interesting as these models are, they do not directly test the 
hypothesis of this chapter—that immigration rates lead to greater support 
for anti-immigration parties only via the positive effect they have on the 
salience of immigration as a political issue. To test this requires a multi-
group (i.e. multi-country) structural equation model (SEM) in which the 
effects of both immigration rates and salience on support for anti-immi-
gration parties are tested simultaneously, while testing the effect of immi-
gration rates on salience. This model is displayed graphically in Figure 3.
Explaining the Rise of Anti-Immigration Parties in Western Europe - James Dennison
58
Figure 3.3. Multigroup structural equation model of support for anti-
immigration parties
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
The full results of this model are displayed in Table 3.2. These results con-
firm hypothesis 1. Only salience, and not immigration rates, has a direct, 
positive, statistically significant effect on support for anti-immigration 
parties while immigration rates have a positive, statistically significant 
effect on salience.
Table 3.2. Multigroup Structural Equation Model
(1) Polling for anti-immigration parties
Polling <-
Salience 0.126*
(0.055)
Immigration rate 1.550
(3.204)
constant 10.25***
(2.471)
Salience <-
Immigration rate 14.900***
(3.666)
constant 5.788
(3.385)
Mean (rates) 0.880***
(0.030)
Observations 222
Log likelihood -1233.2996
Number of country 9
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Conclusion
In this chapter we tested the hypothesis that higher immigration rates 
positively affect support for anti-immigration parties via the positive 
effect that they have on immigration salience. Whereas the positive effect 
of immigration rates on voting for anti-immigration parties is well estab-
lished we considered it theoretically unlikely to be directly causal given 
the nature of human decision-making processes. Instead, we proposed 
that there is likely to be an intermediary change in cognition that fol-
lows the change in immigration rates but precedes a change in electoral 
behaviour. Using simple correlations, we showed that this is unlikely to 
be attitudes to immigration but is far more likely to be the salience of 
immigration as an issue. We then confirm this three-variable relation-
ship, and thus our hypothesis, using a multigroup SEM.
There are several shortcomings with our analysis. First, our empirical 
analysis is solely at the national level yet its theoretical basis is at the indi-
vidual level. There is therefore a risk of the ecological fallacy (Robinson 
2009).1 Unfortunately, the key data source for issue salience—Euroba-
rometer—does not include a variable about electoral behaviour. It does 
include a variable measuring party identification, though this varies far 
less than electoral support and the proportion reporting identification 
with anti-immigration parties is far less than their vote share, the key 
phenomenon this chapter seeks to explain. The second shortcoming 
of the chapter is that the selection of countries only includes those in 
Western Europe that have significant anti-immigration parties. Our 
analysis is not able to explain why high immigration salience in some 
countries—such as in Spain in the mid-2000s—did not translate into 
growth of an anti-immigration party. Finally, although the models we 
use—fixed-effects panel data models and a multigroup structural equa-
tion model—already prioritize robustness over efficiency, there may be 
confounding variables that we have omitted, biasing the results.
These shortcomings point to the next steps for research. First, the 
key theoretical proposition—that awareness of higher immigration rates 
leads to higher immigration salience in some individuals and then to 
voting for anti-immigration parties—should be tested at the individual 
level using panel data. Hypothetically, we might assume that salience is 
more likely to increase in those that have anti-immigration attitudes, 
1  Note, however, King’s (1997) suggestion that aggregate data can be used notwithstand-
ing Robinson (1950).
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although Hatton (2016) provides some evidence to doubt this, and 
that these latent anti-immigration predispositions are activated by immi-
gration rates, along with other things such as cues from media and politi-
cians. Due to data availability, such an analysis is currently only likely to 
be possible in a handful of countries.
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Isolated and Imitated? Voter Percep-
tions of Reactions to Anti-Immigra-
tion Parties in Three Countries
Joost van Spanje, Haylee Kelsall & Rachid Azrout
Introduction
‘These are the quarter-finals in trying to prevent the wrong sort of pop-
ulism from winning’, the Dutch prime minister, Mark Rutte, announced 
two days before the 2017 Dutch general election. ‘The semi-finals are 
in France in April and May… then in September in Germany we have 
the finals’, he continued, adding ‘I want the Netherlands to be the first 
country which stops this trend of the wrong sort of populism’.
The ‘wrong sort of populism’ to which Rutte referred attracted inter-
national news media, intent on watching the ‘quarter final’ play out in 
the political arena. In the Netherlands, a new upset of the establishment 
seemed to be in the making—coming just a few months after the UK 
had voted to leave the EU and the US had elected Donald Trump as 
their president. Indeed, on 21 December 2016—seven weeks before the 
vote—Geert Wilders’ anti-immigration ‘Party for Freedom’ (Partij voor 
de Vrijheid, PVV) was leading in the aggregate poll of polls.1 The PVV 
was projected to win between 31 and 37 seats in the lower house of the 
Dutch national parliament. Eleven weeks later, on election day, the PVV 
obtained only 20 of their projected 31 to 37 seats. ‘We’re hearing the mes-
sage from all across Europe: the Netherlands stopped the wrong sort of 
populism!’ Rutte told his supporters afterwards. What had happened to 
the PVV’s predicted success?
1  For the Dutch aggregate poll of polls, see www.peilingwijzer.nl.
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There are a multitude of reasons which have been advanced to 
account for this decline in PVV support. This chapter however, is con-
cerned with establishing the extent to which the ‘parroting the pariah 
effect’ could have explained the reduction in electoral support for the 
PVV, and similar parties in France and Germany. ‘Parroting the Pariah’ 
implies a combined strategy on the part of an established party against 
a challenger party, where the established party simultaneously ostracizes 
the challenger within the political arena, while imitating its core policy 
positions. In this scenario, such a strategy essentially diminishes the like-
lihood of policy-oriented voters continuing to support the challenger. 
The reason for this is two-fold. Firstly, with little chance of government 
involvement (e.g. as a coalition partner) the challenger becomes less 
attractive for a voter who wishes to see their policy concerns addressed. 
Secondly, as established and more experienced parties would in such a 
scenario address their policy concerns, little reason remains to vote for 
the challenger party.
Earlier scholarship has found parroting the pariah to be an effective 
strategy for established parties to limit and/or diminish challenger party 
support, on both the left and right of the political spectrum. Evidence 
concerning the effectiveness of this strategy has been found across 15 dif-
ferent national contexts since 1944, using both experimental and non-ex-
perimental methods (van Spanje, 2018; van Spanje and De Graaf 2018; 
cf. van Spanje & Weber 2017). We seek to cross-validate these previous 
findings, and to further investigate the underlying mechanism by for the 
first time tapping voter perceptions of both these two strategies. After all, 
what matters for election outcomes is not reality (whether or not parties 
parrot another party and treat it as a pariah), but voters’ perception of 
reality (whether or not voters think that parties do so).
We tested the ‘parroting the pariah effect’ in the recent, highly rele-
vant contexts of the three key elections in the fight against ‘the wrong sort 
of populism’, i.e. the 2017 Dutch, French, and German general elections. 
Drawing on voter perceptions across these elections also permitted the 
first individual-level analysis of the effects of ‘parroting the pariah’ in a 
non-experimental setting. This facilitated the testing of higher levels of 
susceptibility to the strategy of policy-oriented voters compared to other 
voters. It also allows this chapter to extend the current literature by taking 
into account voter perceptions of the extent to which a party is parroted 
and is a pariah. These perceptions differ considerably from perceptions 
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of political party experts, which have been used in the past (see, e.g., van 
Spanje 2018). For example, we found that a substantial minority of the 
German electorate expected the Alternative for Germany (AfD) to coop-
erate with the centre–right CDU–CSU. At the same time, these voter per-
ceptions have electoral consequences, as we will see.
Theoretical background
Established parties are expected to respond to the presence of a chal-
lenger by employing either issue-based (e.g. Meguid 2005) or non-issue-
based tactics (e.g. Downs 2012). Parroting the pariah can be viewed as 
a combination of these responses, where the practice of imitation (par-
roting) exemplifies an issue-based response, and ostracism (pariah) a 
non-issue-based response (van Spanje 2018). Recent research suggests 
that this combined strategy is effective, leading to diminished support 
for anti-immigration parties and communist parties amongst policy-ori-
ented voters (van Spanje 2018; van Spanje and De Graaf 2018; cf. van 
Spanje and Weber 2017). However, these responses need not be com-
bined—they may also be utilized by established parties as stand-alone 
means of reducing electoral support for challenger parties.
Issue-based response: The Parroting Effect
The parroting element refers to the imitation of a (challenger) party by 
other parties in terms of its core policy issue position. Applied to anti-im-
migration parties, established parties adopt a similarly restrictive stance 
on immigration issues. While they may not espouse such an extreme 
position as anti-immigration parties, there is evidence to suggest that 
established parties are indeed moving closer toward anti-immigration 
parties with regards immigration policy. An overview of established 
party manifestos in 15 countries since 1944 showed that in particular, 
criticism of the multiculturalist ideal has increased in the last 20 years 
(van Spanje 2018), partly as a reaction to anti-immigration party success 
(van Spanje 2010a; Han 2015; Abou-Chadi 2016, 2018). In other words, 
dominant established parties would appear to be moving closer toward 
the immigration policy positions of their anti-immigration challengers.
Meguid (2005, 2008) calls such a tactic an ‘accommodative strategy’. 
She argues that these strategies have a negative effect on the electoral sup-
port of anti-immigration parties:
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[b]y challenging the exclusivity of the challenger party’s policy stance, the 
accommodative established party is trying to undermine the new party’s 
issue ownership and become the rightful owner of that issue. The established 
party is aided in this process by its greater legislative experience and gov-
ernmental effectiveness. In addition, established parties generally have more 
access to the voters than challenger parties, allowing them to publicize their 
issue positions and establish name-brand recognition. Given these advan-
tages, the established party ‘copy’ will be perceived as more attractive than 
the challenger party ‘original’ (Meguid 2005, p. 349)
The success of the ‘Parroting Effect’ finds further support in the work 
of Schain (2006) and Art (2006). Discussing anti-immigration party 
voters, Schain (2006) notes that often these are issue-oriented voters who 
cast their ballot in protest against established parties which they view as 
having ‘ignored their interests and concerns’. He further argues that
(i)n some cases established parties can recapture […] voters by co-opting 
and reworking the issues that defined the initial protest […]. Co-optation of 
radical-right issues has operated quite successfully in the British case (in the 
1970s), somewhat less so in the German case (in the 1980s) and not at all in 
the French case (in the 1990s) (p. 272).
Furthermore, Art (2006, p. 7) found some evidence that established 
parties in Germany and Austria were to some extent, able to ‘decrease 
support for right-wing populism by adopting xenophobic discourse and 
strict policies on immigration’. 
These observations support the assumption that when established 
parties draw on the issue-based tactic of parroting, electoral support for 
anti-immigration parties will often decline. We assume that the effects 
observed at the aggregate level are likely to be a reflection of a similar phe-
nomenon at the individual level. Previous studies have mainly focused on 
aggregate effects, but if we wish to understand the process we may need 
to look at the individual level. Furthermore, we pay attention to what 
the actual individual-level mechanisms are, focusing on the perceptions 
of voters. We expect to find that voters who perceived an anti-immigra-
tion party parroted by another party to be less inclined to vote for that 
anti-immigration party (H1). The Parrot Effect is also presumed to be 
stronger as voters are more policy-oriented voters (H2). This is because 
voters who may be inclined to vote for a populist right-wing party for 
other reasons than policy preferences would be less likely to be affected.
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Non-issue-based response: The Pariah effect
The second element concerns the pariah effect. Parties have various ways 
to react to one another—not only issue-based tactics such as imitating 
policy positions, but also non-issue-based tactics (cf. Meguid 2008). A 
common non-issue-based reaction of established parties to the emer-
gence of anti-immigration parties is ostracism (Downs 2012; van Spanje 
and van der Brug 2007; van Spanje and van der Brug 2009; van Spanje 
2010b). Downs (2012) regards this as simply refusing to engage in coa-
litions with an anti-immigration party, however other scholars view it 
more broadly. We considered a party to be a ‘pariah’ once others ruled 
out any aspect of political cooperation. This definition is in line with van 
Spanje (2018), as we have defined ostracism as the systematic refusal to 
politically cooperate with a party at any political level. Several anti-im-
migration parties can be considered ostracized in European politics, 
including the Flemish Interest (VB) in Belgium, and the National Rally 
(RN)2 in France (van Spanje 2018). 
Few scholars have considered how the electorate would respond to 
such a strategy however, and opinions remain divided concerning its 
ability to reduce support for anti-immigration parties. Some argue, often 
implicitly, that being treated as a pariah harms an anti-immigration party 
electorally, regardless of whether a formal cordon sanitaire as seen with 
the Flemish VB is in place. Schikhof (1998) and Art (2006, 2011), for 
instance, argue that ostracism hurts the recruitment potential of anti-im-
migration parties. As a result, anti-immigration parties cannot attract 
‘the type of activists they need to succeed’ (Art 2011, p. 149) and instead 
attract extremists and outcasts (Schikhof 1998, pp. 150–154). Previous 
research suggests this is likely to scare away other voters, and particularly 
those interested in policy-making (Bargsted and Kedar 2009; Kedar 2009; 
Adams et al. 2005).
In contrast, Mudde (2007, p. 89) suggests that anti-immigration par-
ties may receive votes due to their ‘pariah’ status:
The cordon [sanitaire] not only helps these parties to keep the Fundis and 
Realos together, as the exclusion by the established parties takes away the 
incentive to moderate, but it also helps the populist radical right parties to 
focus themselves fully on a vote-maximising strategy. Unlike established par-
2  The National Rally (Rassemblement National) was known as the National Front (Front 
National) until 1 June 2018. In this chapter, we refer to it by the new name, abbreviated 
‘RN’.
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ties, which have to keep in mind possible coalition talks after the election 
campaign, pariah parties like the Belgian VB need not concern themselves 
with these kinds of tactical considerations.
However, this interesting possibility is unlikely, as the VB has actually lost 
a large number of supporters over time. Moreover, it is not backed by firm 
theoretical considerations. We therefore formulated the hypothesis that 
voters who considered an anti-immigration party a pariah, would have a 
lower propensity vote for that anti-immigration party (H3). Note that a 
pariah effect was found for communist parties during the Cold War (van 
Spanje 2018). We also expected that the more policy-oriented voters are 
the stronger this effect is (H4), as an ostracized party offers little chance 
for their core policy concerns to be implemented. Voters who vote merely 
based on a political protest cannot be expected to react in this way.
The Parroting the Pariah Effect
In the Netherlands, Prime Minister Rutte combined these two responses, 
banking on a Parroting of the Pariah Effect on the PVV. To understand 
why this particular combination would be effective, van Spanje (2018) 
points to the reason why citizens would find an anti-immigration party 
attractive to vote for in the first place. Drawing on rational choice the-
ories of voting (e.g. Downs 1957; Kedar 2009), which at present are the 
dominant paradigm in electoral studies, one can argue that many voters 
would opt for a particular party in order to have their preferred policies 
enacted. Given this assumption, there are generally two factors which 
would motivate an anti-immigration party vote. The first reason is that 
the voter had aimed to have the anti-immigration party enact the restric-
tive immigration policies they favoured—at least, to the extent that that 
party holds what Sartori (1976) calls ‘coalition potential’. The second pos-
sible reason is that they had aimed to have the anti-immigration party 
force others to enact those policies. That is, to the extent that that party 
had what Sartori (1976) calls ‘blackmail potential’.
In the first scenario an anti-immigration party with ‘coalition poten-
tial’ would be able to have direct influence on policy through a coalition 
partnership, while in the second the anti-immigration party vote would 
instead be used to signal other parties to the immigration concerns of the 
voter, and provide the anti-immigration party electoral support, which 
(if the concerns remain unaddressed by governing parties) could result 
in continued electoral losses for those who were in power. There is quite 
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some evidence that other parties actually adopt more restrictive immi-
gration positions in response to anti-immigration party success (van 
Spanje 2010a; Han 2015; Abou-Chadi 2016, 2018).
When an anti-immigration party is afforded pariah status in the 
eye of the voter, the initial reason to vote for the anti-immigration par-
ty—‘coalition potential’—disappears. If no other party would cooperate 
with an ostracized party, the anti-immigration party will be left on its 
own, without any chance of directly serving any purpose to the voter 
who desired heavier restrictions on immigration.3 However, the anti-im-
migration party may have still appealed to the voter, as their signalling 
ability could push other parties further to the right on immigration mat-
ters, provided it received a good share of the vote.
In a case where the anti-immigration party was parroted, this value 
and consequently the second reason to vote for that party would vanish. 
When an established party reflects a similar anti-immigration stance 
in their policies as that party, little reason would remain to vote for the 
anti-immigration party. After all, there would no longer be a need to 
influence the established parties. Still, the voter may have desired the 
anti-immigration party itself to restrict immigration, particularly as a 
voter could not be sure the established parrot party would be as com-
mitted to the issue as the anti-immigration party, whose core policy issue 
was immigration from the start. It is only when a voter views an anti-im-
migration party as both parroted and as a pariah that neither of the two 
reasons to vote for the party remains. In other words, a rational voter 
would not have any reason to vote for a parroted pariah.
It is worthwhile to note that this does not necessarily mean that the 
voter would instead vote for the established parrot party. As the estab-
lished party now addresses his or her primary policy concern, the voter 
might instead have opted to vote for a party which catered to his or her 
secondary policy goals. For example, a voter might be particularly wor-
ried about immigration and to a lesser extent that same voter may wish 
to see healthcare reforms implemented. She may then have opted to vote 
for a party whose healthcare policy aligned with her own desires, and 
not necessarily the party which had adopted the anti-immigration par-
ty’s stance on immigration. Of course, she may also have abstained from 
voting entirely.
3  That is, unless the anti-immigration party reaches an absolute majority of the vote, 
which is unlikely in a multiparty setting.
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For a politically progressive reader, it may help to think in terms of 
environmental policy. Suppose a voter was concerned about environ-
mental problems. That voter has two policy-driven reasons to vote for 
a country’s Green party: to help that party obtain power, or to help it 
receive so many votes that other parties become greener in response. If, 
for some reason, the Green party were boycotted by all other parties and 
at the same time these other parties were just as green as the Green party, 
the voter would have no policy-driven reason remaining to vote for that 
party. Again, this is not to say that she would then vote for the (now just 
as green) established party. Rather, as she perceives her environmental 
concerns now addressed by others, she may instead opt to vote for an 
alternative party whose policies addressed her secondary concerns, or 
she may choose to abstain. In any case, a challenger that is a parroted 
pariah was expected to receive fewer votes (H5). The votes that that party 
loses were not just any votes, but policy-oriented ones (H6).
Note that the parroting the pariah effect is in line with findings that 
some European democratic regimes in the 1930s succeeded in dimin-
ishing electoral support for anti-democratic parties by using a similar 
two-fold strategy of repressing these parties and wooing their supporters 
(Capoccia 2005). The existence of such an effect has also been alluded to 
by Rummens and Abts (2010), and more implicitly in particular cases in 
Germany (Art 2006), Belgium (Pauwels 2011), and France (Mayer 2007; 
Minkenberg 2013; Shields 2010). However, the effect had no strong the-
oretical underpinning, or clear empirical support, until van Spanje and 
De Graaf (2018) and van Spanje (2018), who also consider voter heter-
ogeneity. Moreover, the effect was tested on not only anti-immigration 
parties but also communist parties.
The ‘parroting the pariah’ hypothesis has been empirically tested 
through multiple approaches by van Spanje (2018), finding support in 
each case. Electoral results at the aggregate level were considered, with 
policy imitation (parroting) identified in manifestos, while ostracism 
was identified through both a literature review and interviews with party 
politics country experts. A similar approach has been used to investigate 
the phenomena over time, again finding support for the hypothesis (van 
Spanje and De Graaf 2018). Individual-level empirical support has been 
established with experimental evidence, and additionally through voter 
studies. In the latter, parroted parties which were also treated as pariahs 
were identified using the same methods as above, while voters’ issue-in-
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volvement was also considered in relation to their reported likelihood to 
vote for anti-immigration challengers. Support was again found for the 
combined use of these strategies, and, in line the with theoretical argu-
ment, it turned out that policy-driven voters were particularly suscep-
tible. As such, the effect is hypothesized to be larger for policy-oriented 
voters.
The cases
While the parroting the pariah strategy may not have been truly adopted 
in France’s ‘semi-final’ and the ‘final’ in Germany, it was employed by 
the established centre–right party in the Netherlands, the VVD. In the 
2017 Dutch general election, Rutte—Prime Minister and VVD leader—
adopted a clear deliberate strategy to both ostracize and imitate the 
anti-immigration party of interest: Wilders’ PVV. On the 15th of January 
he told the news media that he would never politically cooperate with 
the PVV (isolating); while exactly one week later, on the 22nd of January, 
he followed with an ‘open letter to all Dutch citizens’ published in major 
newspapers. In this letter he went out of his way to copy the PVV’s harsh 
rhetoric on immigration and immigrant integration (imitating), making 
statements such as that ‘we feel uncomfortable when people abuse our 
freedom to spoil things, when they have come to our country for that 
very freedom’. Rutte repeated these messages at several points throughout 
the campaign, including during the one-on-one televised live debate 
against the leader of the PVV, Geert Wilders, on the eve of the elections. 
In doing so, he emulated the strategy waged by his predecessor Frits 
Bolkestein against an anti-immigration party in the 1990s (van Spanje 
2018). Other examples include VB in Belgium, that had been isolated 
since 1989 and lost unprecedented numbers of votes only after it had 
been imitated from 2007 onwards (Pauwels 2010) and RN in France, a 
pariah since the 1980s that incurred dramatic losses after Nicolas Sarkozy 
had taken the helm at the centre–right party in 2007 (Mayer 2007; Shields 
2010). More generally, the parroting the pariah effect has been argued and 
demonstrated to have an average effect across 39 occasions concerning 
leftist and rightist parties in 15 countries since 1944 (van Spanje 2018).
In the elections which followed in France and Germany however, the 
parroting the pariah strategy does not appear to have been adopted. In 
France, the situation was less clear than in Germany. The candidate of the 
centre–right, François Fillon, can certainly be considered a parrot, who 
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beat the more moderate candidate Alain Juppé. However, to what extent 
he ostracized the anti-immigration party of concern, RN, is unclear. 
Moreover, in April he failed to make it to the second round of the pres-
idential elections following a political scandal, which led to his loss of 
control of the centre–right party.
In Germany, the centre–right Prime Minister Angela Merkel had 
repeatedly solemnly sworn to never cooperate with the anti-immigration 
AfD. At the same time, since she had opened the German borders to over 
890,000 refugees, predominantly from Syria, she had a radically different 
reputation on immigration issues than AfD. To sum up, she treated AfD 
as a pariah yet did not parrot that party—at least, in the eyes of most 
German voters she is unlikely to be seen that way.
Regardless, in light of the present study the extent to which the estab-
lished centre–right parties have actually responded to anti-immigration 
parties through isolation and imitation may not matter. Instead, what 
matters is the extent to which voters recognize these responses, as these 
perceptions are expected to influence their likelihood to vote for the 
anti-immigration party. After all, for voters it is their perceptions, opin-
ions and understandings of the political arena which ultimately aid in 
determining their vote choice. We thus asked voters in all three countries 
about their perceptions.
Data
To assess our hypotheses, we relied on panel survey data pertaining to 
the Dutch (n=1,239), French (n=2,198), and German (n=3,453) elections 
of 2017.
The source of the Dutch data was a study by van Praag and De Vreese 
(2017), fielded by the ESOMAR-compliant firm Kantar Public using 
CAWI. A sample of 2,144 respondents, representative of the Dutch elec-
torate, was drawn from the Kantar Public database, which at the time of 
selection comprised 159,000 eligible Dutch voters. The respondents were 
interviewed in four waves. The first wave was mid-October 2016, and 
field work for the fourth—in which our key variables were measured—
was conducted in the week that followed the 15 March Dutch general 
election, between 17–21 March 2017. In that wave 1,351 respondents 
were left, 1,239 of which answered both the parroting and the pariah 
question.
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The French data sources were wave 16 and 17 of the DYNAMOB 
voter panel. This is a panel study for which respondents were invited to 
participate at least four times a year from 2013 until 2017. Respondents 
were provided with a free tablet and internet access to administer their 
answers and to limit attrition. The survey focused on ‘Dynamics of Mobi-
lization’. A team of researchers affiliated with Sciences Po Paris (CEE, 
CEVIPOF), Sciences Po Bordeaux (CED), Sciences Po Grenoble (Pacte) 
and the University of Montpellier (CEPEL) designed the questionnaires 
and collected the data. The National Institute of Statistics and Economic 
Studies INSEE drew two random samples from census data in 2011 and 
2014, adding up to 13,500 households in France (without Corsica). The 
sampling was stratified in multiple ways as well as clustered. From each 
household, French-speaking individuals between 18 and 79 years old 
who did not intend to move out within three months were randomly 
selected and recruited face-to-face, by mail or by phone. Both the ESO-
MAR-compliant agencies—TNS Sofres and Ipsos—were involved in the 
interviewing. Data was collected between 11 May and 9 June 2017 (wave 
16), and between 19 June and 26 July 2017 (wave 17). The two-round 
elections took place on 23 April and the 7 May 2017 (presidential) and 
on 11 and 18 June (legislative). A total 2,297 respondents participated in 
both waves, of which 2,198 answered both the parroting and the pariah 
question.
The German data originate from the GESIS panel. This is a mixed-
method access panel hosted by the GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social 
Sciences, Mannheim. It surveyed a sample that was representative of the 
German adult population. In 2013, permanent residents in Germany 
between 18 and 70 years of age were recruited using face-to-face inter-
views so that a total 4,900 participated in the first wave in early 2014. 
In 2016 a new sample of 18+ respondents was drawn from the General 
Social Survey (ALLBUS). In the present research we use information 
about these respondents from waves a11, d11, a12, d12 (demographics), 
eb (left–right self-placement), ec (various), and ed (intention to vote for 
the AfD). The field work dates for the relevant waves were from the 19th 
of April until the 13th of June (eb), from 14 June to 15 August (ec), and 
from 12–23 September (ed). The German general election took place the 
next day, on 24 September 2017. A total of 3,453 respondents answered 
the questions used in our analysis.
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Measurements
The dependent variable was anti-immigration party support. This was 
measured in each country firstly through propensity to vote items, which 
aimed to capture the electoral utility of the relevant anti-immigration 
party amongst the electorate (see van der Eijk et al. 2006). Secondly, in 
the Netherlands we measured support through vote choice in the 2017 
general election. This was also measured in France, where vote inten-
tion data was also available. In the case of France, intent and vote choice 
were measured for both the presidential and legislative elections of 2017. 
Vote choice was not available in the German data, instead we rely on vote 
intention in the 2017 general election which was measured in the 12 days 
right before that election. We have opted for multiple measures of the 
dependent variables in each country so as to be maximally confident in 
our findings.
The three key independent variables were party parroted status, party 
pariah status, and voter policy-orientation. With regard to parroted and 
pariah status, voter perceptions of both imitation and ostracism of the 
relevant anti-immigration party were measured in each context by the 
brand-new indicators. Two questions were added to each of these datasets: 
a question on isolating and a question on imitating. These questions were 
specifically designed for this study. The questions were: ‘To what extent 
do you expect [the centre–right party] to cooperate with [the anti-im-
migration party] the next few years?’ (isolating) and ‘To what extent 
do you consider the immigration policy positions of [the centre–right 
party] different from those of [the anti-immigration party]’ (imitating). 
The answers to these questions were measured on a scale ranging from 
1 ‘rule out all cooperation’ to 7 ‘will cooperate if necessary’ (isolating) 
and from 1 ‘[the centre–right party] exactly the same as [the anti-immi-
gration party]’ to 7 ‘[the centre–right party] totally different from [the 
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anti-immigration party]’ (imitating).4 Both questions included a ‘do not 
know’ option. They were asked in the week after the Dutch elections, just 
ahead of the French legislative elections, and more than a month before 
the German elections. In each country we focused on only one anti-im-
migration party. In the Netherlands the relevant anti-immigration party 
was the PVV, in France RN, and in Germany AfD.
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of the parroting and pariah variables
  Parroting Pariah
France (N = 2,198) 3.88
(1.60)
4.37
(1.70)
Germany (N = 3,453) 2.55
(1.56)
5.86
(1.53)
Netherlands (N = 1,239) 3.37
(1.57)
5.64
(1.31)
Note: Entries are means, with standard deviations in parentheses.
In Table 13.1 we show the descriptive statistics of our parroting and pariah 
measures. As both variables are measured from 1 to 7, we observe that on 
average German respondents think that the centre–right party does not 
parrot the anti-immigration party and that the anti-immigration party is 
treated as a pariah—which is in line with common knowledge, as men-
tioned above. Dutch respondents observed slightly less pariah status and 
considerably more parroting than in Germany, which also makes sense. 
In France, the perceptions are on average less pronounced, perhaps due 
to the fact that the concepts of isolating and imitating are less amenable to 
a majoritarian context. In all three countries, the entire range of potential 
answers was used by respondents. But with regard to the pariah measure, 
4  Besides language differences, the questions differed slightly from country to country. 
In the Netherlands, respondents were asked about ‘other parties’ cooperating, not just 
VVD (from 2010 to 2012 the PVV formally lent support to a minority government of 
VVD and CDA). Also, respondents were asked about both VVD and CDA imitating, 
and we took the mean of these responses. In France, the phrase ‘differs from’ was re-
placed by ‘is the same as or differs from’ to introduce more balance. In addition, given 
the particular context the isolation question was changed to ‘To what extent do you 
expect Marine Le Pen to implement immigration policy in the coming years?’ with the 
answering options ranging from ‘Le Pen will be unable to implement any policies’ (1) to 
‘Le Pen will surely implement many policies’ (7). In Germany, ‘immigration policy’ was 
translated ‘Flüchtlingspolitik’, which literally means ‘refugee policy’ but was recom-
mended by German experts because a literal translation would confuse respondents. 
Finally, in Germany a propensity to vote AfD question was added (using a mandatory 
1–7 scale), whereas in the Dutch and French versions a propensity to vote battery of 
questions was already included (using a 1–10 scale).
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the relative high mean in the Netherlands and especially Germany led to 
a considerable skew in the distribution.
A voter’s policy-orientation in terms of immigration policy was meas-
ured in three ways—based on questions on the importance of immigra-
tion policy, based on the ‘most important problem’ question, and based 
on questions tapping attitudes toward immigration. In the Netherlands, 
respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they considered var-
ious policy issues important—including ‘immigration and immigrant 
integration’. These items were measured using a scale which ranged from 
‘1’ (‘not important’) to ‘7’ (‘extremely important’). In France, answers to 
the open question of what the respondent felt the most important issue 
facing the country was were coded ‘1’ if it mentioned ‘immigration’ or 
‘law and order’ or ‘terrorism’, and ‘0’ otherwise. In addition, the French 
respondents were asked a battery of questions about immigration in par-
ticular, the answers to which were recoded to form a scale where a score 
of ‘1’ represented weaker anti-immigrant attitudes through to ‘4’ repre-
senting stronger anti-immigrant attitudes. A scale concerning immigra-
tion attitudes was also built in the German context, however this instead 
ran through to the score of ‘5’ which represented stronger anti-immi-
grant attitudes. See Appendix A13 for the questions about immigration 
in France and Germany.
Control variables were also used to account for other predictors of 
anti-immigration party support outside of those hypothesized. In each 
country we controlled for age, gender, education level, and left–right 
position. In the Netherlands and Germany, we controlled for an individ-
uals’ degree of political satisfaction, while in France we included political 
apathy. In the tests that are marked ‘with controls’, we also kept constant 
political interest,5 attitudes toward immigrants, and immigration issue 
importance. Again, see Appendix A13 for the question wordings.
Methodology
As we did not harbour strong predictions concerning national differences 
and in light of the small N of included countries, we instead focused on 
similarities across the three in order to increase confidence in any trends 
which emerged from the data.
5  Political interest was repeatedly measured in all three countries, and a respondent’s 
average score across these repeated items was used to determine their self-reported 
level of interest.
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Data were analysed per country, using multiple linear and binary 
logistic regression analyses as appropriate. Three types of dependent var-
iable were employed to test the hypotheses; propensity to vote for the 
anti-immigration party (all), anti-immigration party vote intention in 
a future election (in France and Germany) and anti-immigration party 
vote choice in an actual election (in the Netherlands and France). Mul-
tiple linear regression was used for hypothesis testing where propen-
sity to vote for the anti-immigration party was the dependent variable, 
while binary logistic regression was used for vote intention and vote 
choice (i.e. respondents indicated they intended to vote or voted for the 
anti-immigration party, or they did not). Each hypothesis was tested in 
each national context first by including only the independent, dependent 
and where appropriate, interaction variables. In a second test for each 
hypothesis, the relevant control variables were added to the models.
To test the hypotheses concerning policy-oriented voters’ suscepti-
bility to the strategies, interaction variables were created. For this, voters 
who placed the most importance on immigration (in the Netherlands 
and France) or that held the strongest anti-immigrant attitudes (in France 
and Germany)—deemed most involved with the issue of immigration 
and therefore policy oriented—were assigned the value ‘1’ while others 
were assigned ‘0’. See Appendix A13 for a detailed description of how 
immigration importance and anti-immigrant attitudes were measured.
Results6
We found strong support for just one of our hypothesized expectations. 
Before controlling for other relevant factors, for all hypotheses we found 
considerably more support than would be expected based on random 
chance alone. When including the appropriate controls, however, only 
6  We also tested the susceptibility of two other groups of voters to these strategies. First, 
female voters were presumed to be more susceptible to the pariah effect and the com-
bined parroting the pariah strategy due to their expected higher susceptibility to social 
cues and greater importance which they attach to a party’s reputation (Harteveld and 
Ivarsflaten 2016). However, little evidence was found to support these assumptions, 
suggesting that gender plays no role in determining an individual’s susceptibility to 
imitation and isolation strategies. Second, we tested the extent to which the parroting, 
pariah and parroting the pariah hypotheses held up more strongly amongst the most 
politically interested voters than amongst other voters, in analogy to the argument 
about policy-oriented voters (van Spanje 2018). This, however, yielded underwhelm-
ing results. This suggests that for the parrot hypothesis it is the policy oriented rather 
than politically interested who are most affected, and for the other hypotheses no group 
seems affected at all.
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the Pariah Hypothesis holds up (H3)—and, to some extent, also the 
Parrot Hypothesis regarding policy-oriented voting (H2). See Table 13.2.
Table 4.2: Level of empirical support for each of our hypotheses
H# Party is… Effect 
amongst…
Number of 
tests
Proportion 
of tests 
supportive 
of H
H1 parroted all 8 0%
H2 parroted policy oriented 12 42%
H3 pariah all 8 83%
H4 pariah policy oriented 12 17%
H5 parroted pariah all 8 0%
H6 parroted pariah policy oriented 12 0%
Note: ‘Proportion of tests supportive of H’ is weighted so that each of the three 
countries contributed equally, because the French data allowed for more tests than 
the Dutch and German data.
The parroting effect
Firstly, we expected that when voters considered an anti-immigration 
party parroted by the established centre–right party in their country, they 
would be less likely to support that party (H1). We find support for this 
hypothesis in the Netherlands (2 out of 2 tests), and in France (3 out of 
4 tests). As shown in Table 13.2, however, these effects were no longer 
significant once control variables were added. In the Dutch case, we find 
support for both propensity to vote for the PVV and for voting for the 
PVV on Election Day—but only without controls. A similar case can be 
seen in France, where the propensity to vote RN, the intention to vote RN 
in the legislative elections and also voting for Le Pen in the presidential 
elections all decreased as perceptions of Les Républicains parroting RN 
increased. Also here, these effects lost their statistical significance when 
controlling for additional contributing factors. Furthermore, it appears 
that parroting had no effect on RN voting in the legislative elections, nei-
ther with nor without controls. In the German case, we find no lower AfD 
support amongst voters who felt CDU–CSU parroted its core policy posi-
tion in any of our models. We conclude that there is no support for H1.
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Our second hypothesis posited that perceptions of a parroted anti-im-
migration party would diminish policy-oriented voters’ support for the 
party. Without controls, this was corroborated in 42% of our tests, which 
is the weighted mean of the Dutch (2 of out 2 tests), French (2 out of 
8 tests) and German cases (0 out of 2 tests). When taking into account 
appropriate controls, this remains the same—thus, still a 42% propor-
tion, see Table 13.2. Full support was found for both PVV tests with and 
without controls, and for two tests of the propensity to vote RN in France 
(one using immigration importance and one using anti-immigrant atti-
tudes), also both with and without controls. In these cases, policy-ori-
ented voters became significantly less likely to vote for an anti-immigra-
tion party when they believed the main right party imitated its position. 
No evidence was found for any of the other RN tests, or for any of the 
AfD tests. We conclude that we find some empirical evidence in support 
of H2.
The Pariah Effect
Our third hypothesis concerned the pariah effect—that voters who con-
sidered an anti-immigration party ostracized would be less likely to vote 
for that party. We found strong support for this before controls (4 out of 
8 tests), and even stronger after controls (6 out of 8 tests). In the latter 
case the pariah effect was vindicated in the Netherlands (2 out of 2 tests) 
and Germany (2 out of 2 tests), and limited support in France (2 out of 4 
tests). This adds up to 83% support when weighted across countries—see 
Table 13.2. Dutch voters who perceived the PVV as ostracized were sig-
nificantly less likely to vote for the PVV both in the 2017 general election 
in particular and in the future, both even after controlling for additional 
factors. In France we find evidence of the pariah effect with regard to the 
propensity to vote RN, and the Le Pen presidential vote. These however 
are only observed once additional confounding variables are kept con-
stant within the model—not without controls, and not concerning the 
RN vote or RN vote intentions. In Germany, the more AfD was viewed as 
a pariah, the more both propensity to vote AfD in general, and intention 
to vote AfD in the 2017 election decreased, both also after controlling for 
other relevant factors. Figure 13.2 provides a graphic representation of 
how the intention to vote for the AfD in the 12 days before the general 
election was affected by perceiving AfD as a pariah two months earlier.
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Figure 4.1. The predicted proportion of voting for the AfD by values 
of pariah status
Figure 13.1 is quite suggestive, showing that voters’ intention to vote for 
the AfD decreased as its pariah status increased in their eyes. To recap, 
pariah status reduced anti-immigration party support in the Dutch and 
German multiparty settings, yet perhaps less so in the majoritarian 
French context.
Our fourth hypothesis, by contrast, only found support in one test 
in Germany (17%, see Table 13.2). That is, three tests in France do not 
hold up after controlling for other relevant variables. As voters were more 
worried about immigration and perceived RN more as a pariah, their 
propensity to vote RN declined, and at the same time they became less 
likely to vote for Le Pen. Similarly, as voters were more anti-immigra-
tion considered RN ostracized to a greater extent, their RN vote intention 
went down. However, only the effect in Germany, on propensity to vote 
for the AfD, was robust to the inclusion of controls. As all other tests of 
H4 failed, only 1 in 8 resulted in support for this hypothesis.7 Thus, the 
hypothesis that the pariah effect would be stronger as voters are more 
policy oriented was not supported.
7  When we consider those voters who are maximally policy oriented concernign immi-
gration in a dichotomous way instead of the entire degree of policy orientation (just 
as we did as an additional analysis for H2), the proportion of tests supportive of H4 
decreases from 17% to 4%.
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The Parroting the Pariah Effect
Our two final hypotheses concern the parroting the pariah effect. As 
shown in Table 13.2, none of our tests resulted in support of H5. This 
was the case regardless of putting the appropriate control variables in the 
models or not.
Our sixth hypothesis was not corroborated either. In only one of our 
models we found that the more policy oriented the voters, the more sus-
ceptible they were to the parroting the pariah strategy. This case pertains 
to anti-immigrant attitudes and the intention to vote for RN, and only 
without controls. After controlling, again 0% of support was left, see 
Table 13.2.8
Discussion
Can established parties discourage voters from casting a vote for an 
anti-immigration party? In elections across Europe, this has been, and 
continues to be, a major question that the political establishment and 
interested citizens alike are pondering. In the three 2017 key general elec-
tions, news headlines focused on the electoral performances of the PVV, 
RN, and AfD. In this chapter, we have analysed to what extent voters were 
dissuaded from voting for one of these parties, which voters, and under 
which circumstances.
We have found evidence for two of our six hypotheses. This said, the 
proportion of tests corroborating these two hypotheses differed consider-
ably, 42% for H2 and 83% for H3. In addition, consistent evidence mainly 
stemmed from Dutch tests for H2, and from tests in all three countries 
for H3.
In the Dutch and French cases, we found some evidence that support 
for an anti-immigration party decreased when other parties imitated 
that party as voters were more driven by immigration policy (H2). In 
Germany, we did not consistently find this. Our hunch is that the wider 
gap in immigration policy position in Germany (between the AfD and 
Prime Minister Angela Merkel’s party) makes it plausible that German 
voters who nonetheless saw large degrees of imitation belonged to either 
8  As a robustness check, we replaced the dichotomous variable concerning policy-ori-
entation with the continuous one, just as we did for H2 and H4. As a result, the pro-
portion of tests resulting in support of H6 increases to just 17%, which is still not much 
higher than what would be expected based on mere chance.
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a group of multiculturalists or a group of voters who were uninformed 
regarding immigration policy, neither of whom are likely to vote for the 
AfD anyway.
The (albeit limited) evidence for the parrot thesis lends support to 
arguments of earlier scholarship. In the eyes of the voter, and particu-
larly the policy-oriented voter, centre–right parties which moved closer 
to the immigration policy of their anti-immigration parties appeared to 
be successful at diminishing those parties’ support base, in line with the 
claims made by Meguid (2005), Schain (2006) and Art (2006). Such a 
finding is important not necessarily for the established party to attempt 
to woo anti-immigration party voters, but rather as a tactic to divert 
those anti-immigration party votes elsewhere. By addressing the issue of 
immigration in a similar fashion, the established party is able to diminish 
anti-immigration party support, and therefore limit the growth and 
power of the anti-immigration party politically.
Ostracizing a party, or at least voters believing a party to be ostra-
cized, proved an effective tactic in the Netherlands and Germany, and 
to some extent this may also be the case in France (H3). In the major-
itarian environment in France, this worked less well than in the Dutch 
and German multiparty contexts. This makes sense, as parties in the 
Netherlands and Germany have to cooperate with others to have poli-
cies enacted, so that ostracism may affect the calculations of Dutch and 
German policy-minded voters more than those of their French counter-
parts. Note that the pariah effect finding is in line with observations made 
by Schikhof (1998) and by Art (2006, 2011), and in accordance with a 
study of election results of communist parties during the Cold War in 
15 West European countries between 1944 and 1989 (van Spanje 2018). 
However, it counters various analyses concerning anti-immigration par-
ties in these countries in recent decades (van Spanje 2018).
Interestingly, we did not find the pariah effect to be stronger amongst 
more policy-oriented voters (H4). This may be an indication that voters’ 
tendency to avoid a party with pariah status goes beyond its uselessness 
for policy-making. Similarly, we failed to find a general Parrot Effect 
(H1). With regard to the combined strategy of parroting the pariah, 
this appeared to be not effective in reducing anti-immigration party 
support (H5), not even amongst policy-oriented ones (H6). This is not 
very surprising in France and Germany, where simply no isolating and 
imitating occurred. In the Dutch case, however, this is surprising given 
experimental evidence of the parroting the pariah effect on the PVV (van 
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Spanje 2018), and given indications from earlier waves: Of those who 
found the VVD incapable of handling the immigration issue, 68% stuck 
to the PVV in the three months before the 2017 general election, whereas 
only 32% of those who found the VVD capable did. However, the specific 
questions on isolating and imitating analysed for this chapter were asked 
only after the election, together with reported vote choice, which may 
have contaminated the effects. So, earlier waves did not have these par-
ticular questions to rely on, and the questions may have been asked too 
late to detect any parroting the pariah effect in the 2017 Dutch context.
Furthermore, it is interesting that voter perceptions vary consider-
ably. For example, quite a few German voters observed ‘parroting’. This 
is striking, because, due to Merkel’s earlier refugee policy, the position of 
the CDU–CSU on immigration to us seems radically different to that of 
the AfD. These remarkable results underline the importance of asking 
voters about their perceptions of party politics rather than relying on 
other observers.
Our findings are quite intuitive. For example, the two hypotheses that 
find support are that voters are reluctant to vote for pariahs (H3), and that 
voters who worry about immigration tend to vote for an anti-immigra-
tion party more often if they see larger policy differences with the centre–
right (H2). This said, endogeneity problems loom large. Concerning H3, 
there are indications that anti-immigration party support affects pariah 
perceptions rather than the other way round. This means our analyses 
may overestimate the pariah effect (H3). However, once controlling for 
various other relevant factors, the findings hold up in even more cases 
than without controls, which is a good sign. Moreover, the finding for 
AfD vote intention in September, months after measuring perceptions, 
makes us quite confident that there is a pariah effect. Turning to H2, the 
data indicate that perceived policy differences between parties systemat-
ically differ with the voter’s stance on the issue. This opens up the possi-
bility that, rather than those who perceive large differences with the main 
right party voting for an anti-immigration party, it is anti-immigration 
party supporters who tend to see a large gap. In other words, that there 
is a selection effect at play here rather than an effect of perceptions. Also 
for H2, however, we found that even after controlling for relevant fac-
tors the findings remained significant in three cases, which is reassuring. 
Furthermore, AfD vote intention was affected although asked several 
months after having tapped voter perceptions about the AfD, which also 
increases confidence in our findings.
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Our chapter has several substantial shortcomings. First, this research 
was conducted in only three countries during one election in each 
country. On the one hand, it is perfectly possible that in these widely-ad-
vertised fights against ‘the wrong sort of populism’ results are more pro-
nounced than in other times and places, particularly contexts in which 
immigration issues are less salient. On the other hand, ‘populist’ electoral 
successes in other countries and constant media attention highlighting 
anti-immigration party support could have served to enhance the legiti-
macy of the three anti-immigration parties under study. This could cause 
voters to become less susceptible to effects of isolating and imitating. 
Future studies, involving multiple elections across multiple contexts, 
should cross-validate our findings in other contexts, also re-testing the 
parroting the pariah effect.
Keeping in mind these limitations, it is important that we have for 
the first time tested voters’ perceptions of isolating and imitating, and 
found further evidence that either of the two can be an effective means 
of diminishing anti-immigration party support. The combined strategy 
appears to have had little effect in these recent examples. Considering 
that both experimental and non-experimental research has highlighted 
this as an effective means of reducing anti-immigration party support, 
this finding is quite surprising. Dutch Prime Minister Rutte may boast 
about it but there is little evidence that his strategy worked. Various rea-
sons can be mentioned fort his, including his own low credibility because 
of a series of promises he had not delivered on in earlier years, his short-
term decision to ostracize his rival, and the fact that the PVV was an 
already established party in 2017. However, it will take the academic 
community a long time to reach consensus on the electoral effectiveness 
of his strategic ploy, if ever they do. By that time, Rutte will have pro-
ceeded to a next career move, propelled by the apparent success in his 
fight against ‘the wrong sort of populism’.
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Appendix A13: Question wordings
Netherlands
• Education level: 1=lower secondary or less, 2=higher secondary, 
3=bachelor or uni, 4=master and above
• Left–right position: 1=right, 11=left, reverse code of variable DV90
• Political interest was asked on a scale running from 1 (‘none at all’) 
through 7 (‘a lot’)
• Immigration salience: 1=not at all important; 7=very important 
scale, mean of the variables CV130_2 and CV130_10
• Political satisfaction, scale of the mean of items CV740_1_COR 
through CV740_5_COR
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France
• Education level: 1= Lower Secondary, 2=Higher secondary, 3=Bach-
elor or uni, 4=Master and above, recode of variable ea17_B18_rec
• Left–right position: 0=Right, 10=Left
• Political interest was measured on a scale which runs from 1 (‘very 
little interest’) through 4 (‘a lot of interest’), recoded from variables 
dn16_INTPOL, dn16_INTPRE2, ea17_I1
• Immigration salience: 1=immigration or terrorism or crime men-
tioned as most important, 0=something else mentioned as most 
important
• Immigration attitude: 1=pro-immigration attitude, 4=anti-immi-
gration attitude, recodes of variables dn16_ETH2MUSU, dn16_
ETH1ENRI, and MANY_IMMI
• Political apathy: 0 = lowest political apathy, 1=highest political apathy, 
a scale based on the items DEM_FUNC, POLS_CARE, MPS_CARE, 
POL_COMP, CHANGE_LEAD, and CHANGE_VOTE
Germany
• Education level: 1=Lower Secondary, 2=Higher secondary, 3=Bach-
elor/uni/higher technical college degree/master above, based on 
zEDU, and on variables d11d086b and a11d086b
• Left–right position: 1=Right, 11=Left
• Political interest was gauged by a scale from 1 (‘very little interest’) 
through 5 (‘very interested’), recodes of variables ecbo080a and 
ebzc001a
• Immigration attitude: 1=pro-immigration attitude, 5=anti-immi-
gration attitude, scale based on mean of reversely coded eczj113a, 
eczj114a, eczj119a, and eczj120a
• Political satisfaction: mean of scale using variables ecbo081a, 
ecbo084a, and ecbo087a, recoded into 0=low political satisfaction, 
1=high satisfaction
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BREXIT: A Referendum Vote with a 
Contested Outcome
Richard Rose 
Introduction
A referendum is a decisive vote on a single day, the outcome of which, 
however, is not decisive. It is thus one event in a long and dynamic 
process with causes that go well back in time and with uncertain con-
sequences that stretch into the indeterminate future. In the case of the 
2016 British referendum on withdrawing from the European Union, the 
causes go back to the Second World War and its aftermath, when Britain 
was the only major country not to be defeated and occupied. In a sense, 
the Brexit vote marked a return to the policy of the 1950s, when the Attlee 
and Churchill governments declined to participate in drafting European 
institutions that were authorized by the 1957 Treaty of Rome (Rose 1960; 
Young 1998; Bishop 2018). 
Unlike what happens when the opposition party enters Downing 
Street the day after the winning a majority of seats in the House of Com-
mons, the referendum majority for Brexit (that is, Britain leaving the 
European Union) could not be implemented the next day. This is because 
no one in Westminster or in Brussels knew what Brexit would mean in 
practice. Uncertainty was magnified when Theresa May became prime 
minister and pledged to the malleable silly putty principle: Brexit means 
Brexit. The effective meaning will be given to this slogan only by the 
approval of an Act of Parliament. Given the split over Europe within both 
the Conservative and Labour parties, neither May nor Jeremy Corbyn 
can control or even predict how many of their MPs will follow the party 
whip in critical votes on Brexit in the House of Commons. Even less pre
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dictable are the amendments the House of Lords will impose. The 
prime minister’s loss of a government majority after unnecessarily calling 
a general election in June 2017 has increased uncertainty by requiring 
a coalition of MPs from more than one party to secure a Commons 
majority giving statutory meaning to the referendum vote for the prin-
ciple of withdrawal.
Any Brexit bill is subject to the constraints of a bounded democracy. 
Whatever British politicians would like it to include, it will require the 
assent of the European Union as well. Securing agreement involves a 
process of negotiation between representatives of the British government 
seeking a deal that Eurosceptic Tory MPs will support, and EU officials 
with the priority of maintaining the acceptance of EU obligations by its 
member states. To secure a parliamentary majority, British negotiators 
want to keep a maximum number of benefits with virtually no obligations. 
To prevent Brexit from undermining its authority, the EU cannot allow a 
departing country to have more benefits at less cost than the remaining 
27 member states. In the absence of each side’s red lines turning pink, 
the default position is that the United Kingdom will cease to belong to 
the EU in March 2019. This will give the new European Commission 
and Parliament that enter office in summer 2019 more time to deal with 
major problems of European integration without being encumbered by 
the objections of the UK, which has been opposing further steps to Euro-
pean integration ever since the European Economic Community became 
the European Union.
Long-term dynamics
For almost three-quarters of a century the British policy toward Europe 
has gone back and forth between opting out and opting in. The British 
response to the initial steps creating European institutions was to reject 
membership. In the 1960s both Conservative and Labour prime minis-
ters hesitantly explored opting in to the nascent European institutions, 
but their efforts were unsuccessful. Uniquely amongst British politicians, 
Edward Heath shared the commitment to European integration of conti-
nental prime ministers and led negotiations culminating in 1973 that saw 
the UK join the European Economic Community with limited impact on 
member states. Critics on the left and the right, such as Anthony Benn 
and Enoch Powell, attacked joining as a threat to the sovereignty of the 
British Parliament. Harold Wilson sought to silence intra-party divisions 
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by calling a referendum in 1975; it produced a 64.5% vote in favour of 
retaining membership (Butler and Kitzinger 1976). Margaret Thatcher’s 
commitment to the free market led to a Single European Market. She 
re-asserted the British readiness to value the EU in exclusively economic 
terms by securing a rebate on the British contribution to the EU budget.
The readiness of the great majority of member states to adopt pol-
icies promoting European integration was met by British resistance to 
inclusion in an ever-closer Union. To get parliamentary approval of the 
Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, Prime Minister John Major 
was forced to call a parliamentary vote of confidence in the govern-
ment. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s desire to promote himself as a leader 
in Europe was frustrated by domestic opposition. Blair promised a ref-
erendum on whether to approve a draft European constitution but did 
not need to call it because other countries vetoed it. Blair also promised 
a referendum on Britain joining the Eurozone but did not need to call it 
because of opposition by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown, and the Treasury. In opposition, David Cameron promised a 
referendum on whether to approve or veto the Lisbon Treaty furthering 
European integration. An incidental consequence of Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown delaying calling a general election until 2010 meant that 
by the time that Cameron entered Downing Street the Lisbon Treaty was 
in effect. Cameron accepted this as a fait accompli.
During the 2010–15 parliament, anti-EU Conservatives switched 
from a reactive strategy of opposing further European integration to a 
proactive strategy of seeking a referendum on whether Britain should 
remain in or leave the European Union. Their influence on David Cam-
eron was strengthened by the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) making withdrawal one of its major goals, and by UKIP winning 
the most votes in the 2014 election of British Members of the European 
Parliament. To appease his backbenchers and to reverse the defection of 
voters to UKIP, Cameron included in the party’s 2015 election manifesto 
a promise to hold a referendum on withdrawal.
When the Conservatives won an absolute majority at that election, 
the first bill the Conservative government introduced in the new Parlia-
ment authorized a referendum on EU membership. Cameron expected 
that Tory Eurosceptics would be satisfied by him winning additional opt-
outs from existing EU policies embedded in the acquis communautaire. 
The EU refused his demands. It feared that acceding to them would cause 
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a cascade of demands from other member states invoking the British 
precedent of securing release from clauses of the acquis that they disliked. 
The slight, symbolic concessions Cameron obtained were counterpro-
ductive. They demonstrated that the EU would not accept a reduction in 
the country’s European obligations. The only way to achieve this would 
be by withdrawing from the EU completely.
The stark referendum choice
In contrast to a ballot for electing MPs, a referendum question normally 
offers a dichotomous choice between two positions on a single issue. Thus, 
an electorate that had returned MPs from 11 different parties at the 2015 
British general election was given a choice between two stark alterna-
tives: Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union 
or leave the European Union? The wording was chosen following careful 
evaluation by an independent research institute of how different terms 
were viewed by focus groups (House of Commons Library 2016). The 
threshold for winning the referendum—an absolute majority of votes—
was abnormally high by the standards of British politics. No British party 
has won an absolute majority of vote in a general election since 1935.
The structure of a referendum choice differs from public opinion 
polls about attitudes toward the European Union, which always offer 
three or more choices. For example, the standard Eurobarometer eval-
uation of the EU asks: ‘Do you think our country’s membership of the 
European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, neither a good thing nor 
a bad thing, or don’t you know?’ This gives respondents the chance to 
give an answer that more accurately reflects their state of mind. It also 
means that the median group of voters usually has neither a positive nor 
a negative opinion of the European Union (cf. Rose and Borz 2016). A 
multiplicity of alternatives also means that the winner in an opinion poll 
has a plurality of votes. By contrast, in a referendum the winner must 
have an absolute majority of the votes cast. The British parliamentary 
election practice of converting a plurality of votes into a majority of seats 
in the House of Commons encouraged the British media and British pol-
iticians, including Prime Minister David Cameron, to confuse finishing 
first in an opinion poll with finishing first in a referendum ballot in which 
an absolute majority is required for victory.
Campaign alternatives. Political science theories identify three ways 
in which support may be mobilized in a referendum campaign. 
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Electors can cast a ballot in keeping with the position of their national 
party; they can follow a trusted leader; or they can vote on the issue on 
the referendum ballot (Marsh 2018). Divisions within the two largest 
parties, including ambiguities about the position of party leaders, left 
partisans with the task of having to choose which of their party’s con-
flicting positions they preferred. The parties most united on the ref-
erendum issue—UKIP, the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National 
Party—between them won just 25% of the vote in 2015 and only 12% at 
the post-referendum election in 2017. The influence of the parties was 
further reduced by a majority of the electorate no longer trusting any 
party leader (cf. Rose and Wessels 2018). Electors were therefore encour-
aged to focus directly on the issue on the referendum ballot: to stay in or 
to leave the European Union.
 The EU had an expressed policy of favouring the United Kingdom 
remaining a member state. Notwithstanding the billions of euros that the 
European Commission and European Parliament spend in promoting 
understanding (that is, positive support) for the EU, it is debarred from 
taking any actions that could influence voters when a national vote is 
held. Thus, its public relations teams in EU offices in the UK and Brussels 
had to abstain from engagement with the British referendum ballot.
Under British law, public recognition and funds were allocated to a 
pair of officially designated groups to campaign for remaining in and for 
leaving the EU. Divisions within the major party removed the problem of 
creating a campaign organization composed of party leaders competing 
with each other for votes at a parliamentary election. The Conservative 
Party organization was officially neutral and the Remain group ostenta-
tiously sought to be above party politics. The strategy was made easier 
by the Conservative Party organization being officially neutral and both 
major party leaders maintaining low profiles. On the Leave side there 
were divisions about campaign strategy and tactics. There could be no 
division on policy, since the referendum ballot offered the same stark 
dichotomous choice to voters throughout the United Kingdom.
The stark choice of the referendum question was matched by the stark 
choices that each side made in campaigning for votes. The two sides were 
not debating with each other about alternative means to a commonly 
valued goal, such as how to advance Britain’s prosperity. Instead, they 
were debating mutually exclusive goals that each side owned, in an effort 
to mobilize their own supporters without engaging with what their oppo-
nents were saying. 
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Given the problems of the British and the Eurozone economies 
since 2008 and before, the Remain campaign followed Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) in assuming that people tend to be more averse to risk 
rather than favouring uncertain benefits. It thus stressed the risk inherent 
in making a break from the status quo, British membership of the EU. 
The key risk that the Remain campaign emphasized was damage to the 
economy. Assumptions drawn from free trade theories about the costs of 
leaving the EU were fed into sophisticated econometric models to pro-
duce numerical data showing down to a tenth of a percentage point the 
predicted damage to economic growth that leaving the EU would cause. 
The numbers were publicized without the qualification inherent in any 
forecast: all other conditions remaining equal. Nor was any sensitivity 
shown to the error margin inherent in forecasts. The forecasts came not 
only from campaign groups but also from such institutions as the Bank 
of England. The forecasts were converted into per capita figures which, 
when multiplied to represent a four-person household and after being 
multiplied by a five- or ten-year period, showed that leaving the EU 
threatened a household loss of thousands of pounds. 
A nationwide online survey of 1,517 people conducted by BMG 
Research at the start of the referendum campaign in March 2016 found 
that single-minded concentration on the economy was unwise. When the 
BMG Research Group asked Britons to identify the most important issue 
facing the country at the start of the 2016 referendum campaign, 36% 
put immigration and asylum first; only 9 per cent named the national 
economy (cf. Dennison 2018).
The Leave side emphasized political values from the past. It did not 
go so far back in history as Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell, who invoked 
the loss of a thousand years of British [sic] history when opposing Harold 
Macmillan’s abortive effort to join what was then the European Economic 
Community. It invoked the state of Britain as it was in Winston Church-
ill’s lifetime, a global empire and a country that could defend itself alone, 
and then with American help, while the six founding members of the EU 
suffered defeat and occupation. It also repeated the charge common in 
academic writings that the EU had a democratic deficit. Instead of advo-
cating reforms to make the EU more democratic, the campaign advo-
cated withdrawal to regain the full sovereignty of the British Parliament 
and prevent it from becoming a vassal of Brussels.
 The Leave campaign sought to turn the EU’s history against itself by 
emphasizing that the European Economic Community that Britain 
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had joined in 1973 had been transformed. It is no longer just a 
common market but a political Union of 28 member states and peoples. 
Many of these countries are more distant historically than the Anglo–
American world in which most British people feel more at home. UKIP 
campaigners emphasized the threat to Britain from the free movement 
of people from low-wage countries in Eastern Europe to Britain. To this 
was added the prospect of an increased influx of asylum seekers and 
economic immigrants from war-troubled countries on other continents. 
Ironically, since Britain is outside the Schengen zone it has been far less 
affected than other EU members by the 2015 initiative of German chan-
cellor to welcome asylum seekers into the EU. Even though leaving the 
EU would not place controls on immigration to Britain from India, Paki-
stan and former African colonies, this important distinction was hidden 
behind the symbolic appeal of taking back control of Britain’s borders 
from Brussels.
 Each side mistakenly branded the forecasts of the other side as false 
facts.1 This was a category error: forecasts about the future are always a 
halfway house between historical truths and false facts, because when 
they are made there is no evidence to prove that they are true or false. 
They are non-facts that are either more or less supported by logical rea-
soning and extrapolations from verifiable evidence. By definition, fore-
casts made during a referendum campaign can be found to be more or 
less true only after the result is known.
Instead of fear, the Leave side offered a rosy vision of the future in 
which Britain, free of EU regulations, could establish itself as a global 
economic force by strengthening links with the old Dominions and 
the new Commonwealth, with China and with the United States. Few 
details were offered about how the country would achieve this promised 
goal in a world that had changed since the UK was the world’s biggest 
trading nation. The Remain campaign dismissed these forecasts as uni-
corn visions, since there was no evidence of what was promised. Remain 
campaigners did not want to appear anti-British by arguing that global 
changes meant that Britain could never regain its past status and needed 
the European single market of half a billion people high-income coun-
tries as a secure base for its economic activity, regardless of what this 
meant for nominal sovereignty. It could and did cite evidence of the 
current scale of British trade with Europe and claimed its econometric 
models based on recent decades made its assumptions better than those 
of Leavers invoking pre-1939 maps in which almost one-quarter was 
coloured red to represent the British Empire.
1  https://fullfact.org/europe/false-claims-forecasts-eu-referendums.
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A majority for change
The dichotomous nature of the referendum ballot produced a clear divi-
sion of the vote. The 51.9% majority endorsing leaving the EU compares 
with the minority that was won by every British governing party since 
1935. It was also much larger than the vote for the governing party at 
a recent British parliamentary election. Equally important, it was more 
than four times that won at the 2015 general election by UKIP, the party 
most united and most against the EU, and half again larger than the vote 
that David Cameron’s party gained in winning a majority in the House of 
Commons in 2015. The Remain campaign claimed 16.1 million votes, a 
very large number by general election standards, but a losing share in a 
referendum requiring an absolute majority for victory.
 The outcome was close in percentage terms and Remain supporters 
have complained that it is unfair and undemocratic for slightly more than 
half the electorate to mandate their views on everyone in society. The 
Leave side has emphasized its majority of more than 1.2 million votes 
over the losers. This was much greater than that required by the British 
standard of deciding who wins: a one-vote margin is enough. The turnout 
of 72.2% added to the authority of the Leave majority. It was more than 
double the UK turnout at the 2014 European Parliament election and 
six percentage points higher than the turnout at the 2015 parliamentary 
election.
The Act of Parliament authorizing the referendum did not contain a 
clause stating that the referendum decision was binding or advisory; its 
status was left vague. Legally, the referendum decision was not a binding 
Act of Parliament. This requires a recommendation by the government 
of the day and support by both Houses. Politically, the result has been 
treated as binding in principle. Having campaigned for the UK to remain 
in the EU, David Cameron resigned as prime minister within hours of the 
result becoming known. His successor, Theresa May, promptly replaced 
him unopposed after pledging to uphold the principle ‘Brexit means 
Brexit’. A substantial majority of MPs in both major parties has accepted 
the principle that a direct democracy referendum majority has greater 
legitimacy than the traditional principle of British parliamentary democ-
racy that MPs have the sovereign right to make decisions after debating 
the issues involved. In voting in the 2016 referendum, a majority of MPs 
in all major parties voted in favour of remaining in the EU. 
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Unlike many national constitutions, Article 50 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union gives any member state the unilateral right to withdraw from 
membership at any time it chooses to do so. Constitutionally, the British 
government has the power to notify the EU it is withdrawing. Prime 
Minister May was under conflicting pressures about the date. Whitehall 
officials wanted to delay until officials had plans in place to deal with the 
consequences of withdrawal, while pro-Brexit MPs wanted withdrawal 
accomplished forthwith, and at the latest within the two-year time limit 
specified in Article 50 for conducting negotiations about post-Brexit rela-
tions between the EU and the UK. Withdrawal was notified nine months 
after the June 2016 referendum, fixing the UK’s becoming a non-member 
state at a date no later than 29 March 2019.
Political consent is necessary to implement an election commitment, 
whether stated on a referendum ballot or a party manifesto (Anderson 
and Mendes 2006). Within Westminster members of the cabinet must 
first agree the measures that will be put to Parliament and then secure 
approval by the House of Commons and the House of Lords of a number 
of complex bills required to replace existing clauses and laws that assume 
the UK is an EU member state with laws that reflect the legislative sover-
eignty of the British Parliament.
The groups campaigning for Leave and Remain cannot participate in 
giving consent to the implementation of the referendum decision because 
they were ad hoc coalitions that dissolved once the referendum was over, 
rather than political parties and government ministers. Nor have they left 
behind detailed plans for implementing Brexit. The Leave campaigners 
were intent on securing the maximum vote for withdrawal on 23 June 
2016. Like opposition parties fighting a parliamentary election, they had 
little understanding of the difficulties of implementing their promises 
if they won. Moreover, both sides sought to make themselves appear 
non-political by giving prominent roles to businesspeople and advocates 
who were not Members of Parliament, the institution that is necessarily 
required to give majority consent to whatever is enshrined in the statute 
book and in treaties as the meaning of Brexit.
As the winners, campaigners for Brexit have been more than happy to 
give their consent to the 2016 referendum as binding in practice as well 
as principle and reject any talk of a second referendum. A big majority of 
Conservative MPs who cast a referendum vote to remain in the EU 
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and most Labour MPs likewise have accepted that the majority vote 
for withdrawal from the EU vote must be accepted. However, there is 
no agreement within either group about whether the consequences of 
Brexit should be hard, avoiding the obligations that go with maintaining 
participation in EU activities deemed to be to Britain’s advantage, or soft, 
keeping significant economic and related links at the cost of accepting 
related EU legislation and sharing in EU administrative costs.
Theresa May became the unopposed choice of Conservative MPs as 
prime minister in July 2016 by pledging ‘Brexit means Brexit’ without 
spelling out what this means in practice. Since then she has been hesi-
tant to set out an agenda for domestic legislation implementing Brexit 
or to propose an agenda of terms that the European Union will accept as 
suitable for the UK negotiating an agreement about the its relationship 
with the EU after it ceases to be a member state. After calling an election 
in June 2017 and spectacularly losing her majority, the prime minister 
has hesitated to state a view of her own about what Brexit will mean in 
practice for fear that this will lead to her deposition from Downing Street 
by a vote of Conservative MPs. Nor has she been able to stop Conserv-
ative cabinet ministers from campaigning publicly for conflicting hard 
and soft Brexit options and ridiculing proposals tentatively floated by 
Downing Street with her approval. 
Campaigners for remaining in the EU have been divided about 
whether or how to give consent to leave it. Unlike academics free of elec-
toral accountability, who can emphasis that the traditional doctrine of 
parliamentary democracy allows MPs to implement withdrawal, most 
MPs who voted Remain do not want to vote against the referendum ver-
dict. Labour, the official opposition party, is divided. The official policy, 
backed by Jeremy Corbyn and his supporters, is to accept withdrawal to 
escape from pro-market EU policies inconsistent with left-wing Labour 
policies, while maintaining pro-labour social policies. An alternative 
approach is to agree to membership in the customs union and single 
market, with all the obligations these entail, including the particularly 
welcome protection for workers’ rights and manufacturing jobs. Whereas 
the Socialist option has no support from other MPs, maintaining sig-
nificant engagement with single market policies has some cross–party 
support, including from pro-EU Tory MPs and business groups.
Conflicting opinions about the meaning of Brexit are compounded 
by uncertainties about whether the House of Commons and the House 
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of Lords will approve whatever proposal May presents to Brussels 
and even greater uncertainty about whether parliamentary majorities 
will approve whatever agreement she might bring back that is acceptable 
both to European Union authorities and to Downing Street (Rose 2018). 
The uncertainties arise from the Conservative Party lacking a majority 
of MPs in the Commons and being in a minority in the Lords. To be 
sure of a majority, the party requires the support of the Northern Ireland 
Democratic Unionist Party. The Labour opposition would need to add 
the united support of at least four other parties to come close to rejecting 
a government policy unanimously backed by Conservative MPs. Since 
neither of the two largest parties is united on fundamental features of 
Brexit, the outcome of a decisive Commons vote on Brexit will be deter-
mined by how many Conservative MPs defect from the government’s 
proposal; how united Labour MPs are in voting against the proposal; and 
what position other parties take on the final proposal that the Conserva-
tive government puts to Parliament.
Interdependence creates a bounded democracy
The theory and practice of British parliamentary democracy are national. 
A general election gives the government of the day the legitimacy to 
take whatever decision it wants as long as it is endorsed by a majority 
of MPs and not in contradiction of readily amended Acts of Parliament. 
The introduction of referendums has made a direct democracy majority 
a second source of legitimacy.
A structural challenge. The theory of national democracy is limited, 
being confined to policy-making in a closed political system. It assumes 
that, on its own or following a referendum, Parliament can make effective 
decisions independent of external constraints. This is the case as long 
as the object is solely within the power of the national government, for 
example, a referendum about election laws or legislation concerning local 
government. The old distinction between first-order national politics 
and second-order European politics is increasingly eroded as institutions 
of multilevel governance are engaged in making intermestic policies 
that have both an international dimension and domestic implications. 
When this is the case, the outcome of what a national government does 
is bounded by what is done by other governments, not least the United 
States; intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations and the 
European Union; and international markets in currency and such com
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modities as oil (Keohane and Nye 2001; Rose 2015, chapter 7). For 
European countries as well as the United Kingdom, interdependence 
has a major effect on the outcome of policies on refugees and migration, 
trade, interest rates and the foreign exchange value of the euro, the pound 
and the dollar.
 In dealing with problems of interdependence, all national democ-
racies are bounded democracies (Rose 2014). The leaders of small states 
recognize this as a fact of life, whether they have a single big neighbour 
like Austria has, or band together to increase their visibility and poten-
tial visibility, as is the case with the Benelux countries. They know from 
experience that whatever is decided nationally will be indecisive unless 
it takes into account or is co-ordinated with what other countries do. 
The attraction of the European Union is that it offers every member state 
juridical equality, for example, a seat at the table when discussions are 
held; and voting rights weighted to require a concurring majority of small 
and big states (Rose and Trechsel 2013).
For centuries after the English Crown gave up Calais in 1558 and 
Sir Francis Drake sailed around the world, the Crown has always been 
involved in a global system of political interdependence. However, Brit-
ain’s position has changed radically from being the dominant economic 
power as the first industrial nation and ruler of a global empire (Bishop 
2018). Britain’s leaders from Churchill to Blair have been ready to pro-
claim that the country still has the capacity to punch above its economic 
and military weight in Washington, in the European Union and globally. 
They have been unwilling to accept that the British Parliament can no 
longer decide the outcome of all the policies for which it is nominally 
responsible. The popular British press has recognized interdependence 
only to denounce it and argue for making first-order national politics the 
only influence on decisions facing Britain.
To assess how the British public views interdependence, I designed 
a battery of survey questions addressing four areas of policy which nec-
essarily involve interdependence: the global economy, military threats, 
immigration and terrorism. The questions were asked in a nationwide 
sample survey of conducted by BMG Research three months before the 
2016 referendum. Respondents were asked how much risk they thought 
Britain faced in each area: a big risk, a fair amount, not much risk, no risk 
or they had no opinion.
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Notwithstanding the insular appeal of the Leave campaign to take 
back control of government policies, a big majority of British people 
realize that there is no drawbridge that can be pulled up to isolate the 
country from the risks that arise beyond its shores. Terrorism was seen 
as the chief risk to the country. An absolute majority, 55%, thought it 
was a big risk and an additional third that it offered a fair amount of risk. 
Immigration came second: for 47% it presented a big risk to Britain and 
almost one-third thought it fairly risky. By contrast, only 22% thought 
problems in the global economy a big risk to the country. There is, none-
theless, awareness that problems in the global economy could constitute 
a fair amount of risk. Fear of military threats was much lower. Only one 
in eight saw this as a big threat, and an absolute majority saw little or no 
risk from military action.
In response to risks, a government has three broad choices: to empha-
size self-reliance; working with a select ally on a particular issue; or 
dealing with common problems through an intergovernmental institu-
tion. The referendum ballot was confined to asking about Britain’s partic-
ipation in the European Union. However, this is not the only intergovern-
mental institution with which the United Kingdom is involved in dealing 
with common policies for intermestic problems. It relies on NATO for 
military security; it has a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council; and it has special relationships affecting immigration and ter-
rorism with countries within the Commonwealth. The Remain campaign 
concentrated exclusively on the importance of the UK dealing with inter-
dependent problems within the European Union. By contrast, the Leave 
campaign tended to emphasize dealing with immigration by pulling up 
a notional drawbridge, while dealing with the economy by concentrating 
on global rather than European trade.
 To determine which, if any, intergovernmental institutions Britons 
believed would be best to work with, respondents were asked which of 
the following could best help Britain deal with the problem named. Five 
alternatives were offered in the same order for each question: the United 
Nations, the European Union, the United States, plus Britain must be able 
to look after itself on its own, and don’t know. 
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Table 5.1 Share of British voters anwsering who can best help Britain 
address major issues (%)
UN EU USA Look after 
ourselves
Don’t know
Problem
Global economy 8 18 6 46 22
Military threats 26 8 20 26 20
Immigration 6 19 1 59 15
Terrorism 23 11 14 34 18
Average 16 14 10 41 19
Source: BMG Research online survey of a stratified sample of 1,517 respondents, 
17–23 February 2016.  
The most common view, given on average by 41% of respondents, is that 
the best way for Britain to deal with major problems of interdependence 
is that the country must look after itself. By default, this strategy is pas-
sively supported by the one in five who do not know if any political insti-
tution can deal with major risks. This view appears to be an expression 
less of bulldog nationalism than of uncertainty about whether there is 
any institution—the United Nations, the American government or the 
European Union—that can offer effective help.
An average of only one in seven think the European Union is best 
suited to help Britain deal with major problems. The proportion rises to 
19% seeing the EU as best suited to help Britain deal with problems of 
immigration, an issue of major importance in referendum voting. The 
alternative endorsed by the Leave campaign—Britain must be free to 
look after immigration on its own—was endorsed by more than three 
times as many people (Table). Similarly, almost one in five valued the 
EU for help in dealing with problems of the global economy, a position 
stressed by the Remain campaign. However, the position stressed by the 
Leave campaign-Britain must be free of EU constraints to look after its 
interests in the global economy–is endorsed by two and one-half times 
this number. Military threats and terrorism are the interdependent chal-
lenges that Britons see themselves as relatively less able to deal with alone. 
However, instead of turning to the EU for help, the most favoured institu-
tion for help is the United Nations, followed by the United States.
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An outcome out of British hands. A referendum can be decisive in 
determining British withdrawal from the European Union, but it is inde-
cisive about the outcome; a decision requires agreement between two 
separate but interdependent political systems. The Brexit referendum 
result has become an input to the EU political system in which British 
politicians have excluded themselves by notifying their withdrawal from 
the EU system (Rose 2018, Figure 2).
The EU position is determined by discussions within and between 
the European Council of 27 member states; the multi-national European 
Parliament in which British Conservative MEPs are marginalized; and a 
European Commission with a supra-national commitment to deal with 
interdependent problems by adopting policies that deal with an ever-
closer Union. Since 2004 these institutions have been challenged by a 
majority of referendums in ten member states that have rejected specific 
EU policies (Rose 2018, Figure 1). EU institutions have responded by 
invoking their treaty powers to protect their supra-national authority 
(Rose 2018, Table 2). Ironically, the UK’s unilateral decision to invoke 
Article 50 to withdraw from the EU is easier for Brussels to handle, 
because it removes an awkward partner, than the challenge to EU 
authority of an anti-immigrant Hungary referendum, because Hungary 
remains an EU member state.
 EU institutions have been quicker than the British government in 
arriving at its red-line conditions for agreeing a post-Brexit relationship 
than has a divided British government. This is because the institutions 
share a common goal: to protect the authority of the European Union. 
This means that no country withdrawing from EU membership should 
continue to enjoy the same EU rights as member states. Any benefits 
it wishes to retain after withdrawal, such as participation in a customs 
union or free trade area, carry with them the obligation to accept reg-
ulatory, financial and judicial practices accepted by member states. Up 
to a point, these conditions may be modified by the EU negotiating 
team led by Michel Barnier, but its priority is clear: to protect the EU’s 
authority vis à vis the remaining 27 member states. Therefore, it is against 
allowing the British government to cherry-pick exceptions to benefit its 
first ex-member state, benefits that could encourage 27 member states to 
seek exceptions to their current obligations by threatening withdrawal.
The British government is learning that the claim of Brexit cam-
paigners that leaving the EU would enable it to take back control of 
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British policies is a half-truth (cf. Hannan 2016). The UK would 
like to negotiate major exceptions to existing EU policies vis à vis non-
member states, retaining significant economic benefits while accepting 
light obligations. However, Article 50 not only gives the British govern-
ment the right to withdraw from EU membership; it also gives the Euro-
pean Union the authority to decide conditions that must be accepted by 
the British government if any agreement is to be reached, such as guar-
anteeing the rights of EU citizens resident in Britain and maintaining 
an open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 
The EU regards the policies that the British government has to date put 
forward as unacceptable. This leaves the British government a choice 
between making concessions to secure an agreement acceptable to the 
EU but challenged by pro-Brexit MPs as violating a direct democracy 
mandate or leaving the EU abruptly without any deal.
When the United Kingdom joined what was then the European Eco-
nomic Community in 1973, the interdependencies of member states were 
limited. There were hopes and fears but no certainty about what Europe 
or the UK would be like two decades later, let alone two decades into the 
twenty-first century. A leading proponent of membership, Andrew Shon-
field (1972), aptly described the decision as A Journey to an Unknown 
Destination. On 23 June 2016 the decision of a majority loosened Britain’s 
European moorings. In accepting the direct democracy vote as having 
binding legitimacy, the British government is now steering the ship of 
state on another voyage to an unknown destination.
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‘United in Diverse Campaigns’: The 
2019 Spitzenkandidaten Process, Pro-
cedural Solidarity and Party Diversity
Brian Synnott
Introduction
The 2014 European Election marked a new chapter in the definition of 
the European political space. Based largely on an ambitiously proactive 
interpretation of Article 17 paragraph 7 of the Treaty of Lisbon, it was 
an attempt to establish a lasting link between the result of the European 
elections and the Commission Presidency. The decision to select, run, 
endorse and ultimately elect—in the European Parliament on 15 July 
2014—a Spitzenkandidaten, was a milestone. The step was the third and 
final one after the 26–27 June European Council, which had agreed to 
propose Jean-Claude Juncker as candidate for President of the Euro-
pean Commission, and the European elections of 22–25 May, which had 
made his political group, the European Peoples Party (EPP), the largest 
in the European Parliament. Proving the doubters wrong (Hobolt 2014), 
Juncker, the candidate for the EPP, became President of the European 
Commission. The defeated rivals—Martin Schulz of the Party of Euro-
pean Socialists (PES), Guy Verhofstadt of the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Ska Kellar and José Bové from the Euro-
pean Greens, and Alexis Tsipras with the European United Left–Nordic 
Green Left (GUE)—had each played a role in the legitimization of the 
process.
Using that first and historic 2014 campaign as a reference, this chapter 
examines how the Spitzenkandidaten process has evolved in 2014–2018 
and assessed how it could play out during the European Parliament elec-
tions in May 2019. The thesis of the chapter is two-fold. Firstly, in 2019, 
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as in 2014, the European political parties will play a central role in the 
legitimization of the process. Secondly, the election of the Spitzenkandi-
daten should not been seen as a single campaign. Instead, it can be con-
sidered as four separate but linked operations. These four operations can 
be described thus:
1. Efforts of European political parties to commit their respective national 
parties to the process.
2. A traditional ‘presidential’ election campaign across the EU member states, 
managed by the European political parties.
3. A parallel education campaign to familiarize voters with the Spitzenkan-
didaten process, done with the help of the parties but led by the European 
Parliament and European Commission.
4. A campaign to ensure that the European Council endorses the ‘winning’ 
Spitzenkandidaten.
These four steps marked the chapters of the 2014 campaign and will 
again form the narrative arc of the campaign in 2019, over a significantly 
extended timeframe. In addition to these four factors the role of the 
European media was—and will again be—highly significant.
Developments in the Spitzenkandiddaten process 2014–
2018
Before assessing the multiple campaigns to be waged for the legitimi-
zation of the Spitzenkandidaten process, it is perhaps worth outlining 
political developments during the 2014–2018 period. Roughly speaking, 
these can be put in two categories: external political factors, and specific 
proposals related to the Spitzinkandidaten concept.
External political factors
The first category needs the least introduction, given the political vol-
atility of the period. The headline events were: the 23 June 2016 deci-
sion by the United Kingdom’s electorate to leave the European Union, 
the so-called ‘Brexit’; the election of Emmanuel Macron as President of 
the French Republic on 7 May 2017; and the German elections on 24 
September of that same year. Each of these events should be seen in the 
context of Spitzenkandidaten legitimization. The respective attitudes in 
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France, Germany and the United Kingdom influenced the process in 
2014, and will have a profound impact in 2019—albeit, in the case of the 
United Kingdom, by the fact of its absence from the European election.
One further factor that can be noted, but which will not be consid-
ered in detail, is a trend that has no specific date to point to but is no less 
significant for it. This is the political ‘weaponization’ of social media—a 
factor where the 2019 election will be significantly different to that of 
2014 (Nissen 2015). In 2014, it is true that the social media reach of the 
candidates was one of the significant ‘successes’ of the campaign (Peñalver 
García and Priestley 2015). However, the social media reach can be cate-
gorized as ‘organic’. The campaigns were concerned merely with the con-
tent of rival campaigns’ messages, rather than their validity or, indeed, 
their provenance. In 2019 such an approach cannot be assumed.
The influence of Brexit on the Spitzenkandidaten process
In 2014, UK media interest in the Spitzenkandidaten was remarkably low. 
The contrast between the number of mentions in the British press com-
pared to the German press can only partly be explained by the nation-
ality of the respective candidates in 2014 (Hix and Wilks-Heeg 2014). 
The attitude of then British prime minister, David Cameron, is well 
noted. His attempts to assert the primacy of the European Council as the 
institutional body to decide the next Commission President ultimately 
ran aground. The consistency of his position was matched by its futility, 
having only Hungarian prime minister Victor Orban for company in 
opposition to the 27 June 2014 decision to nominate Juncker.
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Figure 6.1 German and British press covering the Spirtzenkandidaten 
campaign
Number of articlews in German and British citing both “Juncker” and “Schultz”, 
weekly from March 31, 2014. Source: Library Press Display searches (fugure: Stuart 
Wilks-Heeg/The Monkey Cage)
However, one factor that is highly significant in Spitzenkandidaten con-
siderations is the position of the respective UK members of the European 
parliamentary parties. The candidates of the three main parties suffered 
from a de facto ‘travel ban’ to the United Kingdom. EPP candidate Juncker 
was hamstrung by the decision of the UK Conservative Party to leave 
the EPP in 2009, thus ensuring Juncker having no ‘host’ party to come 
to. Schulz’ PES had a fraught relationship with the Labour Party, which 
indicated that it did not wish to have any visits, having also abstained 
from voting for him at the PES congress in March 2014. ALDE had held a 
congress in London in November 2013, but it was entirely separate from 
the election congress of late February 2014 in Brussels. Verhofstadt made 
only one, low-key visit to Manchester.
The absence of the UK from the 2019 election will remove the national 
party disinterest and the prime ministerial antipathy from the equation. It 
will also remove the virulently anti-EU London-based press. During the 
2014 campaign, there was a reflex—certainly by the PES candidate—to 
temper policy specific messages that would have further antagonized the 
UK Labour party. The absence of the UK in 2019 could reduce somewhat 
the reserve of the candidates in portraying a pro-European message—in 
the many forms that can take.
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The influence of the election of Emmanuel Macron as President of 
France
In 2014, France had been a solid if not spectacular ground for the pro-
motion of the Spitzenkandidaten process. Under each of the four cam-
paign criteria—national party support, traditional campaign, education 
of the electorate, persuasion of European Council—the French polity had 
performed comparatively well. The French prime minister, Manuel Valls, 
had campaigned with the PES candidate in both Lyon, and across the 
border in Barcelona. The then president, François Hollande, had stayed 
out of the direct campaign events but had been a strong supporter of the 
process being validated by the European Council in June 2014.
In 2019, the French government’s attitude is different. The opposition 
of President Macron to the Spitzenkandidaten process has been crystal 
clear.1 Instead, Macron has championed a transnational list of seats for 
the European Parliament. President Macron’s party En Marche is not cur-
rently a member of any EU-level political party or any European Parlia-
ment political group. A decision by En Marche to join (or create) an EU 
political group ahead of the 2019 European elections is currently being 
debated.
The German election of September 2017
The federal election of September 2017 led to a period of political insta-
bility in Germany. The renewal of a grand coalition between Chancellor 
Merkel’s CDU and the SPD has been secured, although without a great 
deal of enthusiasm. The ultimate continuation of this grand coalition will 
have a significant impact on European political space, and specifically the 
Spitzenkandidaten process in 2019.2
The grand coalition is seen by many in Germany as a pragmatic solu-
tion, particularly after the collapse of talks between CDU and FDP with 
the Liberals walking out on 20 November 2018. However, the 2014 elec-
tion provides a precedent to illustrate that there are both advantages and 
disadvantages to a European election campaign. On 23 November 2013 
a grand coalition was agreed. This meant that the parties would go in to 
1  https://www.euractiv.fr/section/elections/news/macron-soppose-au-systeme-des-spitzen-
kandidaten/.
2 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/germany-merkel-schulz-
afd-spd-populism/547817/.
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the 2014 European elections as coalition partners. It would seem that the 
pattern is repeating for 2019. While this bodes well for the preserving the 
integrity of the Spitzenkandidaten process, it possesses risks in terms of 
the two main parties providing clear political distinctions between them. 
A necessary element in developing the process is through voter engage-
ment, which are more easily stimulated by a credible and clear choice 
than options between two brands of the same product.
The specific proposals related to the Spitzinkandidaten concept
The beginning of 2018 saw a flurry of activity regarding the develop-
ment of the Spitzenkandidaten. On 14 February, the European Com-
mission issued a Recommendation on enhancing the European nature 
and efficient conduct of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament.3 
Although not entirely focused on the Spitzenkandidaten, including ref-
erence to transnational lists, citizen dialogues and the, controversial, 
concept of merging of Council and Commission President, the Recom-
mendation was clearly set up primarily to protect the Spitzenkandidaten 
process. The Recommendation followed on from a report adopted in the 
European Parliament, adopted on 7 February. It called the 2014 process a 
success and underlined that the 2019 elections would be an opportunity 
to further establish legitimacy. The report was adopted by 457 votes to 
200, with 20 abstentions.
Figure 6.2 Timeline for the election of the new President of European 
Commission
Source: ‘Building on the Spitzenkandidaten model’—European Political Strategy 
Centre (EPSC), European Commission
3 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/recommendation-enhanc-
ing-european-nature-efficient-conduct-2019-elections_en.pdf 
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The Parliament’s rapporteur, Esteban González Pons (EPP, ES) stated 
that: ‘The EU has to be more democratic, more transparent, or it simply 
will not be. The fact that citizens know the candidates for President of the 
European Commission before the elections is an important step in the 
right direction’.4 The reaction of the European Councilto the Parliament’s 
report and particularly the Commission’s recommendation—issued on 
23 February 2018—will be discussed in subsection titled ‘The campaign 
to ensure European Council endorsement of the ‘winning’ Spitzenkandi-
daten’ below.
One observation regarding this political activity relates to the timing. 
To have such public institutional positions 18 months ahead of the 
European Parliament election is a positive signal. It indicates a level of 
formal institutional investment that was not clearly present in 2014. More 
importantly, making these public positions clear so far in advance of the 
election shows an awareness of the separate ‘operations’ to ensure the 
Spitzenkandidaten process, namely national party commitment, ‘pres-
idential’ campaigns, education of electorate about the process and the 
European Council proposal of an existing Spitzenkandidaten. The 18–
month time frame will allow for a longer period to engage with national 
parties—the first of the four ‘operations’ listed above.
Efforts of European Political parties to commit their 
respective national parties to the process.
The following excerpt is a European Commission recommendation ‘that 
informs voters about the affiliation between national parties and Euro-
pean political parties’
While taking account of the specificities of the national party political land-
scapes of the member states, national political parties participating in the 
elections to the European Parliament should make publicly known ahead of 
those elections and before the start of the electoral campaign, if and with 
which European political party they are affiliated and which lead candidate 
they support.
To the extent possible, national political parties should prominently 
display this information, including, where appropriate, the logo of the 
European political party, in all campaign materials, communications and 
political broadcasts.
4  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180202IPR97026/spitzenkandi-
daten-process-cannot-be-overturned-say-meps.
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Having outlined some of the ongoing factors regarding the process, I 
would like to turn to the first of the four ‘campaigns’ or operations needed 
for 2019 if the result in 2014 is to be further developed. The ‘headline’ 
opposition to the Spitzenkandidaten process, as we shall see, has been 
through the voice of the European Council—namely, the Heads of State 
and Government who formally propose the President of the European 
Council.
This was not the only element of opposition to the process in 2014. 
Across the political spectrum, there was a patchy level of support amongst 
national political parties. An important distinction should be made here. 
Formally, and particularly during the respective ‘election’ congress of the 
parties, there was broad support for each nominee. The ALDE congress 
in Brussels (on 23 February), the PES congress in Rome (1 March), and 
the EPP congress in Dublin (6 March), all delivered warm messages and 
images of party leaders welcoming the election of Verhofstadt, Schulz 
and Juncker.
However, resistance to the process was in evidence before and after. 
The idea of any primaries being held to elect the candidates was a concept 
that did not make it off the drawing board, with the notable exception of 
the European Green Party.5 The follow through after the party congresses 
in support for the candidates over the 10–12 weeks to the elections was 
sub-optimal. With the exception of Germany, where Martin Schulz was 
heading the national list for the Social Democrats (SPD), there was no 
real programmatic promotion of the candidates. Outside Germany, and 
to a lesser extent Luxembourg, they had simply not been factored into 
the election campaigns of political parties. This absence of a programmed 
link to the Spitzenkandidaten process, and the European political parties 
in general goes further than the resistance to the call for party logos to be 
displayed, or respective candidates to be displayed in election literature as 
mentioned in the February 2018 Commission recommendation.
The dynamics regarding party support for the process were portrayed 
as pro or anti. But in reality, it was more nuanced. In France, Germany, 
Spain and, for reasons more related to the location of EU institutions, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, there was relative enthusiasm. Besides the 
clear-cut resistance in the UK, there was also considerable wariness in 
Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden (Peñalver García and Priestley 2015). 
5  The European Greens held an online open primary with 22,676 people voting Ska 
Keller and José Bové from France as the lead candidates. 
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This reluctance regarding the process translated into support on the cam-
paign. This is partly due to the classic ‘second-order’ nature of the elec-
tion but can also be linked to the varying degrees to which national party 
hierarchies perceived the ‘lead candidates’ as a help or a hindrance to 
their electoral objectives.
The election manifesto of a national political party, even in a ‘sec-
ond-order’ election, has an established place. The commitments made 
are usually specific, formally agreed and, sometimes, accurately costed. 
This is even more so when the elections are combined with other first-
order elections, such as in Belgium, which carried out national and local 
elections in 2014 (and will again in 2019). Therefore, logically there is a 
degree of tension about aligning with the European party manifestos. As 
a consequence, and being the less established process, the latter were gen-
eral in tone and content. This made it difficult to build clear distinctions 
between the European parties.
Perhaps the largest factor is the issue of funding. As a second-order 
election, the European Parliament campaign is also second tier when it 
comes to spending. The scarcity of funds can be considered as a factor in 
directly supporting the Spitzenkandidaten. This will be discussed in the 
next section.
A traditional ‘presidential’ campaign managed by the 
European political parties
The second campaign or operation relates to the need for strong cam-
paigns by the candidates selected by the EPP, PES, ALDE and the Greens.
European party funding
The biggest barrier to the EPP, PES, ALDE and European Greens 
mounting ‘traditional’ Election campaigns is funding. In 2018, the entire 
election budget for the EPP amounted to 1.8 million for the PES, just 
over 1 million.6 For a 28 country wide campaign these were not, com-
paratively, large amounts. For context, there was a €10 million spend by 
the two big parties in Spain, PSOE and PP during the same European 
elections. Another illustrative example is Bulgaria, where the two big 
parties, GERB and BSP, spent the equivalent of €800,000 and €900,000 
6  Peñalver García and Priestley 2015, p. 108
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respectively for the 2014 campaign.7 Therefore, there needs to be a con-
siderable increase in the financial capacity of the European parties. The 
Council has recently issued willingness to discuss political party funding 
with the European Parliament.8 The Council is examining how European 
political parties are formed. The aim is that they can only be established 
by national parties and no longer by individuals. Such European parties 
should ensure a genuine European nature by including parties from at 
least a quarter of the number of member states. The Council is also con-
sidering that the way funding is shared amongst European political par-
ties should be adjusted. Out of the total budget, 10% would be shared 
with all parties, rather than the existing 15%, thus increasing the alloca-
tion of funds based on proportionality. At the same time, co-financing 
obligations for political parties would go from 15% to 10%.
These measures would have the probably not unintended conse-
quences of bolstering ‘mainstream’ parties and thus those who are, 
generally speaking, pro-European Union. This gets to the crux of the 
issue. There is an obvious and understandable impulse to legitimize the 
European Union by the EU institutions. Funding the European political 
parties that reflect the political consensus is a natural corollary of this. 
However, the solidarity on a process should be kept separate from overt 
convergence on policy. As the Financial Times (2018) recently noted 
about the 2014 campaign: ‘There was hardly any ideological difference in 
2014 between Mr Juncker and the other main candidate, Martin Schulz 
of the Socialist bloc, whose groupings were in any case in a grand coali-
tion in the parliament.’ While the author would contest that in the detail 
of the respective manifestos, it must be conceded that there was an ele-
ment of truth in how the campaign was perceived.
Turnout and the link to ‘Presidential campaigns’
Before addressing the need for an increased divergence between party 
and candidate positions in 2019, one can address some of the positives 
7  Party Financing and Referendum campaigns in the in EU member states page 80, 
73 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519217/IPOL_
STU(2015)519217_EN.pdf
8  Funding of European political parties: Council ready to launch talks with Par-
liament http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/02/21/
funding-of-european-political-parties-council-ready-to-launch-talks-with-parlia-
ment/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Fund-
ing+of+European+political+parties%3a+Council+ready+to+launch+talks+with+Par-
liament
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in the campaign. Chief amongst them is the effect on turnout. While the 
turnout in the European election decreased from 43.09% to 42.54% it 
can be argued that the Spitzenkandidaten process had a positive effect 
(Schmitt et al. 2015). The evidence is there that a presidential, i.e. a per-
sonalized, approach to the election helps mobilize voters in the European 
elections of 2014. Such evidence is a strong argument for pro-Europeans 
as to why the Spitzenkandidaten process should be supported and further 
developed.
The perception of the European Parliament as the two illustrations 
show, can be considered from the perspective of seats won, or a per-
centage of electorate who voted—i.e. turnout. The PES campaign was 
based largely on mobilizing as large a segment of the non-voters as 
possible. Called ‘Knock the Vote’, it was a training programme to mobi-
lize campaign volunteers in PES Member Party ‘traditional’ areas. The 
trainers were the founders of political consultancy Leigey Muller & Pons. 
They went on to be the campaign organizers for Emmanuel Macron’s 
successful French presidential bid. Their approach to election campaign 
and the mobilization of volunteers was influenced by American literature 
on voter mobilization. The distinction between the two campaigns is, of 
course, clear on turnout and on funding, with the French presidential 
election having a turnout of just under 75% and the winning candidate 
spending €16.8 million in total.
Whereas the PES campaign was run across 28 member states on a 
budget just over €1 million, with a turnout for the European elections of 
42%. The point to note for 2019 is that, based on the principles applied by 
Leigey Muller Pons, in both campaigns, and indeed François Hollande’s 
successful 2012 presidential bid, mobilizing traditional party ‘non-
voters’ remains the key. However, to successfully apply this, substantial 
resources are required. Leigey, Muller and Pons commissioned a private 
policy paper for the PES that showed the positive influence of the ‘Knock 
the Vote’ campaign on voter turnout. The study isolated areas where the 
intended volunteer structure worked with similarly profile electoral dis-
tricts where it had not. They found a small but significant increase in 
turnout where the knock the vote field campaign had been implemented 
(Liegey 2014).
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Figure 6.3. European Parliament composition including non-voters
Source: Author’s elaboration from European Parliament data
Debates between the main candidates
The debates have been cited in many publications as a significant part of 
the 2014 campaign.9 The author was directly involved in the preparation 
and negotiations for the three main debates. They were the Maastricht 
University: ‘First European Presidential Debate’10 on 28 April 2014, the 
‘State of the Union’ event here in this Institute in Florence11 on 9 May, and 
the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) partnership with the European 
Parliament on 16 May.12 These three events had three separate processes, 
in terms of negotiations between campaign teams, organization of the 
debate format and media impact.
In terms of negotiation between the candidates for the debates, the 
Maastricht debate, with the agreement of the University of Maastricht and 
Euronews, gave considerable say to the party representatives to decide 
the format. There were no introductory statements, three 30-minute slots 
on the economy, Euroscepticism, and foreign policy, and closing state-
ments. Candidates had only 30 seconds to answer each question and a 
‘time bank’ was used to allocate time fairly at the end of the debate.
9 https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-elections-2014/news/wrap-up-eu-spitzenkandidat-
en-debate-in-brussels/. 
10  ‘Europe’s choice’ First presidential debate, Maastricht University https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=dhafgcPeXes. 
11  State of the Union debate, European University Institute, Florence https://stateoftheun-
ion.eui.eu/2014/ 
12  European Broadcasting Union/ European Parliament debate, Brussels https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=0y-2Nd6mC9M. 
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The event in Maastricht, organized by Euronews, was the most like 
a political event. There was a young and partisan crowd, the questions 
were vague but there was a sense of contrast between the candidates. 
Significantly, they were the only debate to have a traditional ‘spin alley’ 
where the candidates and their surrogates could hone their message of 
the night’s proceedings. There were a significant number of journalists 
present and they had the most open access to the candidates of any of 
the debates.
The State of the Union edition in Florence was substantially, and in 
the author’s opinion, negatively, affected by three factors. The debate 
was part of a wider, if obviously prestigious event, being but one part 
of a wider programme. Secondly, the nature of the questions while of 
merit, were long, academic and based on procedure. This had the effect of 
diluting any sense of contrast between candidates, as they were encour-
aged to respond based on European Union knowledge rather than ideo-
logical differences. And thirdly, the broadcast element, provided by SKY 
TV Italia, was an add-on rather than the central aspect. This gave the 
impression of an interesting conference being transmitted, rather than a 
televisual ‘event’ taking place.
The European Parliament (EP) and EBU debate, held in the plenary 
chamber, was the most well-funded, and logistically impressive. There 
was considerable and high-level organizational coordination. A prepara-
tory committee, chaired by the EP and with the EBU and representa-
tives of the parties present, began meeting some six months in advance. 
The production of this debate and the execution was of a professional 
standard that would have passed muster in any national political context. 
By any objective criteria, the televisual ‘event’ was planned, packaged and 
executed well. The problem was largely in the delivery. While the EBU 
had enthusiastically led the process, and the European Parliament was 
exemplary in preparing a first-class show, each partner had a weakness. 
In the case of the EBU it was in their tactics to engage national broad-
casters. Format, language and in some media markets a lack of recogniz-
able political faces, meant that while following the letter of the agreement 
to show the debate ‘live’ most national public service broadcasters did 
so only on specialized channels. The problem for the European Parlia-
ment lay in institutional obligations—it was not possible, despite national 
broadcaster pressure, to have a head-to-head debate, which in this case 
would have meant Juncker v Schulz. Instead, they were bound by their 
own procedural rules of reflecting the makeup of the parliament.
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Figure 6.4 Twitter and spitzenkandidaten
Source: Third debate, Eurovision, Brussels 15 May—statistics on Twitter
In summary, the debate in Maastricht can be seen as broadcaster-led and 
supported by academics. The Florence debate, meanwhile, was academ-
ic-led and broadcaster supported. In the case of Brussels, the debate was 
characterized by a broadcaster–institutional partnership. The weaknesses 
they shared were in low TV audience and in homogeneity of positions. In 
2019 there needs to be a more strategic approach to the televised debates. 
There needs to be a stronger ‘narrative’ created between the debates. In 
2014, even within the low audience base there was no real connection, or 
template, that illustrated that the debates were part of a wider campaign. 
If there is to be an increased audience, there should be further negotia-
tions between stakeholders to ensure that a recognizable ‘brand’ is built 
regarding the debates. The format of questions, venue, even country can 
change, but there should be a familiar identity to each event. This will 
allow media to discuss which candidate ‘won’ each time—a valuable part 
of the marketing of any political set piece event.
The broadcasters should be in the lead. There are very valuable dem-
ocratic principles regarding participation, institutional and even legal 
obligations. But the base criterion by which to judge any television event 
is by audience figures. For this reason, a clearheaded calculation should 
be made by academic and EU institutions that providing a package that 
delivers the best combination of member state media markets is the pri-
mary goal. A significant increase in audience figures is only a part of the 
picture for 2019. To judge the 2019 debates as a success there needs to 
be identifiable media moments—a clear divergence of opinion. In short, 
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what should be on display is a clearly identifiable political choice. In 2014 
the debates were solemn if not soporific, and collegial if not clubbable. 
In 2019, we should see a clearer division. This is especially important 
between the big parties.
Familiarizing voters with the Spitzenkandidaten process
I’ve often described it as trying to fly a plane when you are building the wings 
at the same time.13 – Catherine Ashton, 2013
Although speaking about the role of the High Representative and EEAS, 
the words of Catherine Ashton can equally be applied to the Spitzen-
kandidaten process in 2014. The task of convincing national parties to 
commit to the procedure and run a European wide campaign was dif-
ficult on its own terms. Adding the need to educate the electorate as 
to the steps of the process made it an even more complicated task. The 
European Commission Recommendation of 14 February 2018 explicitly 
acknowledges the need to continue and develop the ‘education’ of the 
electorate. In the section ‘Support for a candidate for President of the 
European Commission’, it states that:
Sufficiently early ahead of the elections to the European Parliament, ideally 
by the end of 2018, each European political party should make known the 
candidate for the function of the President of the European Commission 
they support. Ideally by early 2019 they should also make known the candi-
date’s own political programme. European political parties and their national 
member parties are encouraged to select their lead candidates in an open, 
inclusive and transparent way. National political parties should ensure that 
their political information, including their political broadcasts, in view of the 
elections to the European Parliament is also used to inform citizens about the 
candidate for the function of President of the European Commission they 
support and about their candidate’s programme.14
 The links between national parties and European parties is a good idea 
from an EU perspective but is difficult to enforce. Tying funding of the 
European parties to an obligatory level of transparency about these links 
13  A Conversation with Catherine Ashton, German Marshall Fund, 16 March 2013, Brus-
sels https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ci0rLgJ8z2w 
14  Page 4 Commission Recommandation https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-po-
litical/files/recommendation-enhancing-european-nature-efficient-conduct-2019-elec-
tions_en.pdf 
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as hinted by Commission President Juncker in the 2017 State of the 
Union Address, is again laudable but difficult to enforce.
However, in this case the devil is not in the details. The mere fact 
of proposals being formally made by the Commission and votes taken 
in the EP invests enough political capital to keep the prospects for the 
Spitzenkandidaten process healthy. Both institutions have skilfully elab-
orated that the process should be continued in the name of democracy. It 
is noteworthy that some members of the European Council tried to use 
the same argument regarding the introduction of transnational lists for 
MEPs. This did not receive nearly as much comment, nor indeed support 
as the Spitzenkandidaten. Such political positioning by the Commission 
and Council is important. As is the logistical support that each institution 
can provide in terms of promotional election material.
However, the political parties also have an important role to play. 
Much like the concept of grassroots mobilization to increase turnout, the 
best manner of convincing is by a familiar face. Such is the case for the 
Spitzenkandidaten. There is a greater chance of the concept being under-
stood, accepted, and maybe embraced, if a familiar political figure, rather 
than a remote Brussels-based politician is the one doing the selling. 
However, there is some resistance to this. A good example is the PES 
congress 2014, which had, as part of the messaging to endorse candidate 
Martin Schulz, a series of leadership videos from national party leaders. 
These videos—almost all under 60 seconds—endorsed both Martin and 
the Spitzenkandidaten process. They fitted the template of a familiar face 
endorsing a new concept.15 And yet none were used by the respective 
member parties in their national campaigns. This was less due to an 
overt political resistance rather than that lack of a programmatic reflex to 
include it in the election strategy. In 2019, national member party leaders 
from all parties will have another opportunity to sell the concept.
Ensuring European Council endorsement of the ‘winning’ 
Spitzenkandidaten
Perhaps the most important criterion for any candidate is to be a member 
of a member state party that is in government. Without this, the simple 
step of the member state government nominating the candidate as that 
countries member of the European Commission is greatly reduced. 
15  See: PES leader video endorsing Martin Schulz as Spitzenkandidaten https://www.you-
tube.com/user/europeansocialists/videos. 
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This consideration is an acknowledgement that the formal procedures 
to ‘guarantee’ the Spitzenkandidaten process still includes considerable 
gaps. It is also an acknowledgement that what is true for member states 
governments is also true when they meet as European Council. Here the 
scepticism regarding the process is well documented. 16
Automaticity is the key word. The formal statement by Council Pres-
ident Donald Tusk stated that; ‘On the issue of lead candidates—the 
so-called Spitzenkandidaten or Spitzenkandidatinnen—there was agree-
ment that the European Council cannot guarantee in advance that it will 
propose one of the lead candidates for President of the European Com-
mission. There is no automaticity in this process. The Treaty is very clear 
that it is the autonomous competence of the European Council to nomi-
nate the candidate, while taking into account the European elections, and 
having held appropriate consultations.’ There was no categorical dismissal 
of the concept. The attitude at the 23 February 2018 European Council 
was resigned rather than fully opposed to the idea (Economist 2018).
The drama of the period 27 May–27 June 2014 provides insight into 
why there was such hedging (Peñalver García and Priestley 2015). Two 
days after the election there was a European Council meeting convened 
for 27 May. The crunch act was the press conference of German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel after the Council had concluded. When asked about 
the prospects of Juncker becoming Commission President she had stated, 
despite the EPP having publically reiterated that Juncker was ‘their’ can-
didate that; ‘the whole agenda could be implemented by him but also by 
many others’. This comment set off a chain reaction that has been well 
documented. German television station ARD, newspaper tabloid Bild, 
Jurgen Habermas, and eventually, albeit behind the scenes, Juncker him-
self, all took stands to protect the integrity of the process. By the next 
morning (28 May) Merkel was publically briefing that Junker was of 
course her candidate.
This instinct, by press and political figures, and the public reaction 
to it, is one of the strongest indications that the process will survive in 
2019. The emotive language ‘fraudulent’, ‘bullet to the heart of the EU’, 
that the EU was at risk of ‘abolishing itself ’, may have seemed over the 
top but it indicates investment in the process. The statement made by the 
16  Remarks by President Donald Tusk following the informal meeting of the 27 heads 
of state or government on 23 February 2018: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/
press-releases/2018/02/23/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-following-the-informal-
meeting-of-the-27-heads-of-state-or-government-on-23-february-2018/ 
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European Council on 23 February garnered headlines as being a nega-
tive assessment. However, there is a clear tacit acknowledgement of the 
process simply in the fact that it was not dismissed. Once candidates are 
selected for parties and profiles built, the democratic impulse will be dif-
ficult to stop beating.
The role of the media
If Spitzenkandidaten there should be, then Spitzenkandidaten there must 
be!17– Rolf Deiter-Krause, ARD Television.
This plaintive cry by a veteran German journalist was perhaps the tip-
ping point for the process.However, for the author, perhaps the most 
gratifying moment of the campaign came on the eve of the vote. The then 
Brussels bureau chief of the Financial Times telephoned to offer congrat-
ulations and admit that his and the Brussels press corps’ scepticism had 
been misplaced, and that the Spitzenkanddiaten process had established 
a credibility. Even if that credibility was as much based on the obvious 
efforts by the European political party to enhance democratic input, as 
the formal procedures thereof. The role of the media, and particularly the 
Brussels-based press corps, was central to the Spitzenkandidaten being 
a success in 2014. The authors observation is that a pro-European con-
sensus amongst those based in the European capital, with the exception 
of certain parts of the UK press, certainly helped to sell the idea. But it is 
important to note that there was no big story, no European wide headline 
that proved that the Spitzenkandidaten process had gained any traction 
amongst general public perception. The debates for example were not well 
covered, the candidate tours rarely had ‘embedded’ journalists, and there 
were no set piece interviews with candidates. However, it was in the cru-
cial period after the election—to defend the principle that a democratic 
promise made as to what a vote ‘means’ transcends an average political 
promise. Even more so, it would seem, in a new democratic experiment 
such as the European Union.
17  http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/01/04/how-the-spitzenkandidaten-process-and-
junckers-reforms-might-shape-the-future-of-the-european-commission/. 
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Conclusion
The 2014 European Election set out the steps of the Spitzenkandidaten 
process. The European political parties and the media have perhaps the 
most significant role. Added to this is the fact that while the European 
election is often referend to as a ‘second-order’ election, it can be more 
positively described as a ‘turnout’ election. The near 60% of ‘dormant’ 
votes, make this election one where the best ‘ground game’ could make 
significant and unpredictable gains. The ‘presidential’ dimension that the 
Spitzenkandidaten brings to the election is a positive factor in this equa-
tion. There is a lot to build on, but it worth noting that often historic 
processes have fragile origins.
For the 2014 story, there is of course the need to acknowledge that 
Jean-Claude Juncker would not have become President of the European 
Commission if a number of factors had not aligned. The fact of his oppo-
nent, Martin Schulz being European Parliament President was almost 
essential. The EP was the organization that stood to gain most from rec-
ognition of the process. Having an ‘activist’ president who could dedi-
cate time and logistical support provided a very solid foundation. The 
personal relationship between Schulz and Juncker was not insignificant. 
They both understood their roles and the need for mutual support to give 
the process credibility and ultimately a chance of succeeding.
Schulz being head of list for his own national party in the election 
and being from the most populous and influential member state was the 
next factor to align. His being the face of the campaign for SPD allowed 
the most effect parallel education of the electorate about the Spitzenkan-
didaten. Essentially, they were ‘primed’ to expect delivery on this basis. 
This trigger that activated this priming was the German media reac-
tion to Merkel’s negative comments regarding Juncker’s prospects to be 
endorsed at the post-election European Council. The effect this ‘media 
backlash’ had on Merkel was the element that brought the 2014 process 
‘over the finish line’. None of these factors can be identified in any formal 
institutional reading of the process, but they are all essential. For 2019 we 
can expect a similar story, but over a longer timeframe and with greater 
coverage.
The media space will be larger, with greater reference points for jour-
nalists and of course the precedent of the 2014 election with which to 
draw comparisons. The debates, if organized more with the TV audience 
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in mind and with TV journalists in charge, will bring a higher level of 
interest. The stories that can be brought from a campaign trail which can 
be traversed for at least three months longer, will help bring richness and 
colour. This will help familiarize the electorate with the process. But it is 
the European parties and their role in persuading their member parties 
to buy-in that will ‘complete the circle’. That circle is one that goes from 
European parties’ candidate selection to European Council post-election. 
The two main political parties have very publically committed to selec-
tion processes to have Spitzenkandidaten. 18 19 The EPP congress was on 
7–8 November 2018, in Finland. This is a full four months ahead of the 
2014 cycle. The PES election congress will take place in early spring 2019.
Ann this is the strongest case for the Spitzenkandidaten process con-
tinuing, even thriving, in 2019. Both parties have fully and publically 
committed, if for different reasons. The EPP sees a very strong probability 
that it will again be the biggest group in the European Parliament. This 
is particularly so with the 20 seat ‘penalty’ that the PES, and its Socialists 
and Democrats (SD) group will incur with Brexit. The EPP by contrast 
have no seats and therefore no penalty from the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom.
The PES on the other hand is preparing for the election as a ‘turnout’ 
election. With a 42% turnout there is huge potential if non-voters are 
reached. The need to reenergize and mobilize its base and progres-
sive pro-Europeans is apparent. The added profile that the presidential 
dimension gives to the 2019 election could be significant. The final point 
is that when the European Council meets to discuss the outcome of the 
2019 election many of the faces who will be tasked with nominating the 
winning Spitzinkandidaten, will be the same ones who have sat in the 
Party Election congresses 6–8 months prior to that moment of truth. 
They will be the very same elected prime ministers and presidents who 
publically championed ‘their’ party candidate and it will be very difficult 
to renege on that backing.
18  EPP urges European Council to commit to Spitzenkandidaten process http://www.epp.
eu/press-releases/epp-urges-european-council-to-commit-to-spitzenkandidaten-process/
19  PES prime ministers discuss Spitzenkandidat and long-term EU budget https://www.
pes.eu/es/news-events/news/detail/PES-prime-ministers-discuss-Spitzenkandidat-and-
long-term-EU-budget/ 
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When the Post-Communist Left 
Succeeds: The 2016 Romanian 
Parliamentary Election
Endre Borbáth
Introduction
There are two ways to characterize the December 2016 election for the 
Romanian parliament. On the one hand, the election represented conti-
nuity. With it came a large-scale victory for the post-communist left, the 
Social Democratic Party (Partidul Social Democrat, PSD). The PSD has 
been the single largest party in the Romanian party system since the tran-
sition, and the significant victory in 2016 reinforced its dominance. In 
this regard, the election served to counter the narrative of Eastern Europe 
drifting to the right and being seen as the breeding ground of nativist and 
Eurosceptic forces (Ban 2016; Constantin 2016; Meredith 2016; Norocel 
2017). On the other hand, this election represented a break with the past. 
Three new organizations entered parliament, and the centre–right Dem-
ocratic Liberal Party (Partidul Democrat Liberal, PDL) merged with the 
National Liberal Party (Partidul Național Liberal, PNL) to compete as a 
single formation.
This chapter presents an analysis of the 2016 parliamentary election, 
embedded in the longer-term evolution of politics in Romania. The anal-
ysis aims to investigate the extent to which 2016 represents continuity or 
a break with previous patterns of party competition. More specifically, 
the chapter explores what explains the large-scale victory of PSD, since 
in similar countries post-communist left parties are in decline. For this 
reason, the analysis of the long-term dynamic is traced back to the eco-
nomic crisis, the legacy of which—as the chapter argues— continued to 
shape the 2016 election. Beyond post-communist left parties, examining 
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the conditions that helped the PSD succeed allows us to assess the rea-
sons behind the resilience of mainstream parties in an era characterized 
by their widespread collapse (Hernández and Kriesi 2015).
The chapter identifies two conditions, which not only allowed PSD to 
survive, but contributed to its success: ideological flexibility, and opposi-
tion status during the economic crisis. Each of these factors are discussed 
in light of an original dataset on the demand and supply sides of politics. 
The 2016 parliamentary election is assessed against the long-term evo-
lution of party competition, going back to the 2008 parliamentary elec-
tion and the start of the economic crisis. The chapter takes stock of the 
developments leading up to 2016 and examines the factors behind the 
overwhelming victory of the post-communist left.
The chapter proceeds as follows. It starts with a short introduction to 
the institutional design and the party system. Then, it introduces some of 
the crucial events shaping the dynamic of party competition prior to the 
2016 election. As the chapter argues, to understand some of the reasons 
behind the Social Democratic victory in 2016, one must grasp the poli-
tics of crisis management in the aftermath of 2008. In the next section, 
the chapter presents the programmatic space of the 2016 campaign, in 
comparison to the two previous elections in 2012 and 2008. The chapter 
concludes by summarizing the results and discussing the implications for 
the long-term dynamic of party competition in Romania.
Institutional design and the electoral system
After 1989, Romania adopted a semi-presidential institutional structure, 
with a directly elected president, who has similar but somewhat weaker 
prerogatives than the French counterpart. Upon consulting with the 
parties in parliament, the president nominates the prime minister who 
shares his or her role as the leader of the executive. The prime minister 
chairs the government which formulates and implements public policies. 
The prime minister is accountable to parliament and most often comes 
from the party with the highest share of mandates. Even though the 
prime minister has the greatest power in formulating public policies, the 
president can veto the parliament’s decisions and make it difficult for the 
government to implement its program. In turn, parliament can suspend 
the president, subject to approval by a popular referendum, which, to be 
valid, requires a turnout of more than 50% of the electorate.
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The system requires close cooperation between the two offices. 
Cohabitations, i.e. when the president and the prime minister come 
from different political parties, considerably sharpen the political con-
flict. In such situations, the partisan conflict penetrates the executive 
branch, with the government and the president often working to under-
mine each other’s position. Driven by the idea of strengthening checks 
and balances, the 2003 constitutional reform extended the length of the 
mandate of the president to five years (Gherghina and Hein 2016). As a 
result of the reform, since 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections 
do not overlap, which increased the chances of cohabitations. Although 
the president is supposed to stand above party lines, all elected presidents 
have tried to help their own party gain power. Therefore, conflicts arising 
from cohabitation tend to escalate beyond regular political debates and 
target the institutions themselves.
Beyond the semi-presidential design, the electoral system is another 
source of controversy. Throughout the history of democratic elections, 
the electoral system has been changed frequently, sometimes driven by 
parties’ perceived self-interest, sometimes due to pressure from ‘below’, 
from civil society actors. Despite frequent changes, all electoral systems 
kept some level of vote redistribution and ensured proportional seat 
allocation. The 2016 election was organized according to rules similar 
to those in place in 2004: closed party lists with 41 electoral districts (all 
counties, plus Bucharest) and a 5 percent threshold.
Historically, both the electoral system and the regulation of political 
parties was successfully used by established parties to facilitate carteliza-
tion and create a legal barrier for outsiders to enter parliament (Popescu 
and Soare 2014). According to the law on parties, to establish a new party 
it was required to collect 25.000 signatures, from citizens residing in at 
least half of the counties. The provision made it extremely hard to register 
new formations, moreover the threshold kept them outside of parliament 
even if they were registered. Therefore, small parties often became sat-
ellite organizations of more established formations and ran in coalition 
with them to ensure they pass the threshold. The law was changed in 
2015 and made it possible to register a new party with three founding 
members. Nevertheless, the reform maintained the high barrier for new-
comers by requiring them to collect the signatures of one percent of the 
electorate to place candidates (180.000 signatures in 2016). Ultimately, 
seven new parties contested the 2016 election (Dumitru and Voicu 2016, 
When the Post-Communist Left Succeeds: The 2016 Romanian Parliamentary Election -  
Endre Borbáth
136
p. 18), three of which entered parliament (USR, ALDE, PMP). In com-
parison to other Eastern European countries, the dynamic created a party 
system with relatively stable party labels (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 
2015) and frequent pre-electoral coalitions.
The party system
Table 7.1 presents the electoral results and the development of the party 
system between 2008 and 2016. As the table shows, parliamentary elec-
tions in Romania have usually had a low turnout. Most of those who 
participate in these elections vote for a restricted number of mainstream 
parties. Until 2016 a relatively small share of voters was willing to vote 
for new parties (volatility A) and around 12% of the electorate fluctuated 
between existing formations (volatility B, see: Powell and Tucker 2013). 
As indicated in the introduction, this changed in 2016 when three new 
parties entered parliament and volatility A radically increased. Neverthe-
less, the effective number of parties stayed low, and vote for mainstream 
parties did not decline.
Table 7.1: Electoral results in parliamentary elections and party 
system indices (2008–16)
Election 2008 2012 2016
Election 
results (vote 
shares)
Mainstream left
PSD 33.1 58.6* 44.1
ALDE - - 5.5
Mainstream right
PNL 18.6 - 19.5
PD/PDL 32.4 16.5** -
PMP - - 5.2
Ethnic Hungarian
UDMR 6.2 5.1 6.2
Radical right
PRM 3.2 1.3 1.0
PNG 2.3  -  -
PRU - - 2.7
PART 2 - Country-Specific Chapters
137
Anti-establishment 
reform parties
PPDD - 14.0 -
USR - - 8.6
Party system 
features
Turnout (Chamber of 
Deputies)
39.2 41.8 39.5
Volatility A 5.9 7.0 26.6
Volatility B 11.6 11.9 4.0
Volatility A+B 17.4 18.9 30.6
Effective no. of parties 3.93 1.6 3.7
Mainstream party vote 90.3 80.2 80.5
Based on their own characterization, mainstream political parties can be 
grouped into four families. Most of them have been present since the 
founding election in 1992: Social Democratic, National Liberal, Chris-
tian Democratic, and ethnic Hungarian parties. Even though these par-
ties organized into all possible governmental coalitions, I discuss the 
National Liberal and Christian Democratic parties as the mainstream 
right, opposing the mainstream left, the Social Democrats. In addition, I 
introduce two types of challenger parties which have never been in gov-
ernment: the radical right and the anti-establishment reform parties.
As Table 7.1 shows, the single most popular party has been the Social 
Democratic PSD in all parliamentary elections examined here. The 
party usually ran in coalition with a small, Conservative Party (Partidul 
Conservativ, PC). In 2016 PC merged with a liberal faction and estab-
lished the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (Alianța Liberalilor și 
Democraților, ALDE), under the leadership of former Prime Minister 
Tăriceanu. Although organizationally new, ALDE served as an electoral 
vehicle of established elites and acted as a satellite organization of PSD, 
representing continuity, rather than change.
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Liberal Union (USL). I include the results of USL under PSD given PNL was the junior 
partner in the coalition
**  PDL ran in coalition with two small parties, FC and PNȚCD
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Several structural conditions contribute to the strength of PSD. Firstly, 
in line with Kitschelt’s (2001) expectation, the patrimonial–communist 
legacy helped the formation of an enduring regime divide, where PSD 
emerged as the representative of the economic and cultural losers of the 
transition (also see: Rovny 2014). Secondly, extreme levels of income ine-
qualities contribute to vastly different opportunities in rural and urban 
areas and lead to the formation of political communities with different 
sets of priorities. Thirdly, a well-developed party organization allows PSD 
to emerge as the only party present in some areas of the country, invest 
in clientelistic linkages, and, nevertheless, remove leaders charged with 
corruption. Therefore, PSD ticks most boxes on the list of predictors of 
successful party survival (Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2018), but since 
these predictors barely change between two elections, they do not explain 
the dynamic over time.
The second largest block is represented by the mainstream right, 
formed by the National Liberal PNL, the Christian Democratic PDL and 
most recently, the People’s Movement Party (Partidul Mișcarea Populară, 
PMP). In 2008 and in 2012 PDL has been the largest formation on the 
right while PNL was usually considered a smaller, ‘20%’ party. In 2012, 
the PNL ran in coalition with PSD, forming an electoral alliance across 
the left–right divide. Despite its popularity, the PSD–PNL coalition did 
not prove stable and by 2016 PNL merged with PDL, re-establishing the 
left–right poles. The merger seems to have ended the existence of PDL, 
with its former leader, the ex-President Traian Băsescu establishing PMP 
and entering parliament as a candidate of this party in 2016. Similar to 
ALDE, despite organizational novelty, PMP acted as an electoral vehicle 
of established political elites. Parties on the right, especially PDL (Fesnic 
2011) have a less clear programmatic profile, but they are associated with 
liberal economic positions, and an anti-communist ideology. There is 
hardly any consistent programmatic difference between parties in this 
block.
The last party considered to be part of the mainstream is the Demo-
cratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (Uniunea Democrată Maghiară 
din România, UDMR), representing—as the name suggests—the 1.2 mil-
lion ethnic Hungarians living in Romania. The party has often been in 
government in coalition with parties from both the left and the right. 
UDMR does not take a position on the left–right axis and represents the 
ethnic Hungarian community on programmatic and clientelistic basis 
(Kiss and Székely 2016). 
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The remaining 10–20% of votes are relatively volatile and served as 
a breeding ground for challenger parties in a new party ‘subsystem’, as 
described by Haughton and Deegan-Krause (2015). Traditionally, rad-
ical right parties managed to secure these votes. As Stanley (2017, p. 
145) notes, Romania experienced the rise of one of the earliest and most 
successful radical right parties, the Greater Romania Party (Partidul 
România Mare, PRM). Over time the strength of radical right parties has 
declined, and they have not entered parliament since 2004. The 2012 and 
the 2016 elections saw the rise of a new type of challenger: anti-estab-
lishment reform parties (AERP) as defined by Hanley and Sikk (2016, p. 
523): (1) the People’s Party–Dan Diaconescu (Partidul Poporului–Dan 
Diaconescu, PPDD) and; (2) the Save Romania Union (Uniunea Salvați 
România, USR). As opposed to the challengers from the radical right, 
AERPs were less nationalistic and competed on fighting corruption. 
PPDD did not manage to endure the test of time, while USR benefitted 
from a wave of anti-corruption protests and survived until the time of 
writing.
From the economic crisis to the 2016 election1
Amongst the legacies which influenced the 2016 parliamentary election, 
the politics of the management of the economic crisis occupies a preva-
lent role. Based on analysis of the long-term effects of incumbency during 
structural adjustment programs in Latin America and in Southern Europe 
by Roberts (2013, 2017), Hutter and Kriesi (2018) argue that a similar 
dynamic played out in Europe during the Great Recession. Namely, in 
countries where social democratic parties implemented austerity pro-
grams, following what Roberts calls a ‘bait-and-switch’ strategy, a long-
term process of programmatic dealignment of the party system followed. 
In the reverse scenario, if similar economic programs were implemented 
by centre–right governments, the party system benefitted from the pro-
grammatic alignment and party positions became more crystalized. The 
current section shows that in the Romanian case a centre–right govern-
ment implemented austerity policies and set the stage for subsequent pat-
terns of interaction. The crisis dynamic benefitted PSD, to the expense 
of centre–right parties, mostly PDL. The legacies of crisis management 
played into the 2016 election and contributed to the historic victory of 
the Social Democrats.
1  I am grateful to the IMAS Marketing și Sondaje agency for providing me with the 
public opinion data on which this section is based.
When the Post-Communist Left Succeeds: The 2016 Romanian Parliamentary Election -  
Endre Borbáth 
140
In Romanian politics the first signs of the economic crisis started to 
appear after the 2008 parliamentary election. As a result of this election, 
the two largest parties decided to form a ‘grand coalition’, and the centre–
right PDL governed together with the centre–left PSD. In June 2009 the 
PSD–PDL government turned to the IMF for a €20 billion credit line but 
postponed any predictably unpopular austerity policy until the presiden-
tial election later that year. Shortly before the presidential election, PSD 
left the government and campaigned from opposition against the re-elec-
tion of President Băsescu, supported by PDL. Băsescu won a second term 
and used his influence to facilitate intra-parliamentary party switching to 
form a majority behind a PDL–UDMR government.
The narrowly supported centre–right, PDL–UDMR government took 
over and stayed in office until 2012, becoming the symbol of draconian 
austerity measures. These measures included a 25% cut of the salary of 
public officials, a cut of thousands of state jobs and an increase of VAT from 
19 to 24%. Most austerity policies were justified by the demands of the 
IMF and implemented in close cooperation between President Băsescu 
and the PDL–UDMR government. In the aftermath of these measures 
the unpopular centre–right government survived seven motions of no 
confidence and continued in office until the beginning of 2012.
As Figure 7.1 shows, during the time the PDL–UDMR government 
was in office, voters were the most disenchanted. The share of those who 
thought the country was heading in the wrong direction peaked (Figure 
7.1A), and trust in all three national political institutions (presidency, 
government, and parliament) plummeted (Figure 7.1B). Generally, more 
citizens tend to think that Romania is heading in the wrong direction and 
they tend not to trust the political institutions. However, even by national 
standards the crisis period stands out, with voters being remarkably neg-
ative between 2009–2012.
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Figure 7.1a: Mood in Romania after the 2008 Parliamentary Elections
Figure 7.1b: Trust in Romanian Institutions after the 2008 Parliamen-
tary Elections 
The change came in May 2012 when amidst heavy street protests and 
social opposition, the new PNL–PSD coalition managed to pass a motion 
of no confidence against PDL–UDMR and took over government. Shortly 
before the parliamentary election, the PSD–PNL organized a referendum 
to suspend President Băsescu. Despite the overwhelming majority voting 
against the president, the turnout criteria were not met and Băsescu 
stayed in office (King and Marian 2014). Given how institutions fell prey 
to parties’ interests, many considered the 2012 events around suspending 
the president a political crisis. Later that year the popular PSD–PNL won 
the election with almost 60% of the vote.
The popularity of PSD–PNL was mostly driven by the collapse of 
PDL. Figure 2 shows the evolution over time of vote intentions for the 
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main Romanian parties. As the figure shows, the flight of PDL voters 
dramatically increased once the party entered government: by May 2010, 
five months into the PDL–UDMR government, most of the voters the 
party lost in 2012 had already left. PDL traded its electoral popularity 
for government participation, a bargain closed by their historic defeat 
in 2012. PDL eventually ceased to exist as an independent organization, 
and what remained of it merged with PNL in 2014. As the figure shows, 
before PNL left the PSD–PNL coalition, the coalition was remarkably 
popular, and it consistently polled above 50%. 
Figure 7.2: Trust in Romanian Institutions after the 2008 Parliamen-
tary Elections 
In line with the framework set out by Roberts, after the deeply unpop-
ular centre–right government, the new PSD–PNL government tried to 
reverse many previously adopted austerity policies. In fact, it was these 
decisions and their mutual opposition to PDL/President Băsescu which 
held the two programmatically distant parties together and drove their 
popularity. Once the antagonism faded, less than two years into their 
government, the PSD–PNL coalition collapsed. The final push came with 
the reluctance of PSD to support the PNL candidate at the 2014 presiden-
tial election. PNL became part of the opposition, while PSD managed to 
secure enough support for a single party government.
The 2014 presidential election proved to be less historic than many 
anticipated. Similarly, to 2009, PSD lost the election, and the PNL can-
didate Klaus Iohannis was elected to succeed Băsescu. As both figures 
7.1A and 7.1B show, the election resulted in unprecedented euphoria: for 
the first time, more people thought the country is heading in the right 
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direction than those who thought it is heading in the wrong direction. 
Moreover, trust in the presidency jumped to 60%, a substantially higher 
increase than in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential election. Most 
of the increase was due to Iohannis being seen as a credible candidate, 
willing and capable to reform politics. Therefore, none of the other insti-
tutions benefitted from increase in the level of trust (Figure 7.1B).
However, most of this euphoria was not grounded in strong pro-
grammatic convictions, but in identifying Iohannis as the person who 
will curb corruption and ‘reset’ politics. Equipped with weak constitu-
tional prerogatives and being faced with a parliament dominated by PSD, 
Iohannis was meant to disappoint in delivering the fast and thorough 
political reforms his electorate was hoping for. Moreover, Iohannis was 
not able to build on his initially broad support to replicate Băsescu’s 
‘achievement’ and form a PNL government. Therefore, PSD managed 
to stay in government until late 2015, when large anti-corruption rallies 
emerged, and Prime Minister Ponta resigned. The euphoria around the 
election of Iohannis proved short lived.
As a result of Ponta’s resignation, Iohannis nominated Dacian Cioloș 
to form a technocratic government, supported by both PSD and PNL. 
By this time, it became apparent that PNL had not managed to capitalize 
on the euphoria around the election of Iohannis (see Figure 7.2), and it 
did not have enough parliamentary or societal support to govern. Given 
that PSD did not wish to continue in office, a technocratic government 
seemed the most viable option for both big parties. The Cioloș govern-
ment was formed and continued in office until the 2016 parliamentary 
election.
Programmatic issue space and the electoral campaign
To understand the extent to which the 2016 election provide the conti-
nuity or a break with previous patterns of party competition, Figure 7.3 
illustrates the issue space and parties’ position in the 2008, 2012 and 2016 
campaigns. The figure has been constructed based on a sample of articles 
from one daily right-wing newspaper (Adevărul) and one daily left-wing 
newspaper (Jurnalul Național). The coding follows the rules of core sen-
tence analysis (Dolezal et al. 2012), with actors aggregated into parties, 
and issues aggregated into 15 larger categories (for additional analysis 
and further details see: Borbáth 2018). The figure has been constructed 
based on parties’ issue positions and salience with the use of multi-di-
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mensional scaling (MDS), weighted by similarities between issues and 
parties (Hutter and Kriesi 2018; Kriesi et al. 2012). Proximity represents 
parties’ support for the respective issue.
Figure 7.3: MDS analysis of the programmatic space and party 
position in the 2008, 2012 and 2016 parliamentary electoral 
campaigns
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
Figure 7.3 shows the high programmatic fluctuation between consecutive 
elections. While the issue repertoire stays relatively constant, with issues 
related to the economy (economic liberalism/welfare), politics (dem-
ocratic renewal/reform, fighting corruption) and culture (anti-com-
munism, nationalism) re-emerging, the dimensionality of the political 
space and party positions change. The only issue disappearing over time 
is anti-communism, still relatively important in 2008.
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The programmatic space of the 2016 election seems to resemble the 
2008 election rather than the election in 2012. Not surprisingly, the 2012 
election was exceptional to the extent to which two blocks, the program-
matically heterogenous PSD–PNL and the largely unpopular PDL com-
peted against each other. In 2012 the two most structuring issues were 
nationalism and Europe. On the one hand, PSD–PNL campaigned on a 
platform of returning Romania to the ‘people’ in the aftermath of what 
they saw as an illegitimate PDL government. On the other hand, the 
PDL campaigned with a program of saving democracy from what they 
labelled the anti-European PSD–PNL coalition. Economic issues pro-
vided a secondary dimension to the extent to which PSD–PNL attacked 
the austerity politics of the PDL.
The 2016 election stands out in several ways. First, during these 
elections, the most salient issue, ‘fighting corruption’ changed its role 
in party competition. As the 2008 and 2012 campaigns show, the issue 
had already appeared before, but its salience gradually increased. In 2008 
‘fighting corruption’ was a small issue associated with the radical right 
PRM, which promised to ‘clean’ the corrupt elite. All mainstream parties 
(PSD, PDL and PNL) were equally distant to the issue. In 2016 the radical 
right disappeared but ‘fighting corruption’ stayed on as the driving force 
of challenger politics. The new anti-establishment reform party, USR 
entered politics on a promise to curb corruption. Unlike in 2008, in 2016 
the fight against corruption became the pole associated with anti-nation-
alist politics and nationalist parties (PRU, PMP, PSD) were the most dis-
tant to the issue
Second, during the 2016 election the structuring capacity of economic 
issues radically declined. In the 2008 and 2012 campaigns PSD claimed 
its traditional pro-welfare position in party competition. Parties on the 
right, as much as they took a position on the economy, were closed to 
economic liberalism. For instance, in 2012, the PDL was forced to defend 
its record in office during the crisis years and was still seen as the party 
of austerity. By 2016, economic issues were only important for PNL. As 
the largest party on the right, PNL took the opportunity to distance itself 
from the legacy of austerity politics and claimed to represent a pro-wel-
fare position. PSD barely addressed economic issues and focused instead 
on attacking the anti-corruption camp with a nationalist agenda.
Third, the 2016 election has shown the U turn of PSD on political 
issues related to reforming/renewing democracy. In 2008 and in 2012, 
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these issues were very salient in the PSD campaigns. Most of the positions 
PSD took on this issue were about limiting or counter-acting what the 
party identified as anti-democratic practices by President Băsescu. Given 
the long-standing animosity between President Băsescu and PSD, the 
president’s willingness to bend the institutional rules to serve his political 
interests, such as during the 2009 government formation (see e.g. King 
and Sum 2011), and PSD’s attempt to use its parliamentary majority to 
suspend/undermine the president. These issues formed a core part of the 
overall programmatic appeal of PSD. After Băsescu left office in 2014—
and PSD was in government between 2012 and 2015—the party did not 
speak anymore about reforming democracy. Following on the promises 
made by Iohannis, and the popular expectations around his election, it 
was parties on the right who mobilized on this issue. The issue appeared 
forcefully in the discourse of the anti-establishment reform party USR, 
but in less clear terms, PNL also promised to reform the democratic pro-
cess.
Conclusion
The chapter started by outlining two perspectives on the 2016 election: 
continuity or break with the past. This election was analysed in the long-
term dynamic of patterns of party competition, with a view on the evo-
lution of the demand and the supply side of politics over time. While 
there were important changes 2016 brought, the election rather provided 
continuity with previous patterns of party competition. The findings can 
be summarized through the following four points.
Firstly, the election represented continuity with regards to the ideo-
logical structure of party competition. Programmatic instability, main-
stream parties’ ability to switch their positions and incorporate new 
issues in their programmatic appeal helped them survive. There are two 
important examples: political issues centred on reforming/renewing 
democracy and nationalism. Whereas in 2012 and 2016 the radical right 
disappeared, its core issue lived on, and the Social Democratic PSD incor-
porated nationalism in its ideological profile. From this perspective the 
2016 election is rather similar to the dynamic in other Eastern European 
countries. Except, the Romanian the post-communist left managed to 
incorporate in its ideological profile its challengers’ demands and thereby 
to avoid electoral decline.
Second, the continuing role of the legacies of crisis management has 
shown the importance of critical periods in structuring party competi-
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tion. The opposition status of PSD during the key period of the economic 
crisis allowed the party to challenge the austerity packages implemented 
by its centre–right competitor. These austerity packages led to disen-
chantment amongst voters, a loss of trust in the most important polit-
ical institutions and above all, the abandonment of the centre–right PDL 
party. PSD managed to capitalize on voters’ disenchantment and—first 
in coalition with PNL, then alone—achieved historically high electoral 
scores. Centre–right parties did not recover from being associated with 
austerity, and after merging into one organization, PNL still struggled in 
2016 to convince voters on its pro-welfare position.
Third, the institutional design reinforced both dynamics. The strong 
role of the presidency shaped the agenda of the parliamentary elections, 
and the personality/decisions of both Băsescu and Iohannis appeared 
in these campaigns. Despite having alternative electoral dates, parlia-
mentary elections are clearly concerned with the presidency. The split 
incumbency that the semi-presidential design creates further blurs the 
programmatic position of parties and makes electoral accountability 
difficult. For instance, Băsescu’s support for the austerity policies of the 
PDL–UDMR, made it possible for PSD to continue some of its opposi-
tion tactics from government and frame the 2012 election as a challenge 
against the ruling president.
Fourth, the 2016 election provided the strongest break with the past 
with regards to the role of anti-corruption politics. The election brought 
the breakthrough of the anti-establishment reform party USR, due to 
the party’s ability to present itself in opposition to what it described as 
corrupt practices associated with all other formations. USR took over 
the discourse on reforming/renewing democracy from PSD and in con-
junction with its anti-corruption rhetoric, the party managed to build 
a ‘progressive’ pole against nationalist formations. Unlike in the case of 
PPDD, the party’s organic link to some of the protest groups helped them 
survive.
The Romanian case stands out in the current volume for two reasons: 
it is the only election from 2016, and it is the only one from a post-com-
munist country. Despite being associated with some of the typical marks 
of post-communist politics (ideological and organizational instability, 
frequent government changes etc.), I believe the election is closer to some 
of the cases from 2017 than it first appears. Namely, in Romania as well 
as in some of the other countries, the election brought the victory of a 
nationalist, culturally conservative platform. Except, in this case, not the 
populist radical right, but the nominal ‘left’ represented these views.
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The Austrian Election of 2017: An 
Election Won in the Long Campaign
Anita Bodlos, Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, Martin 
Haselmayer, Thomas M. Meyer & Wolfgang C. Müller
Introduction
The Austrian election of 15 October 2017 introduced significant change 
to Austrian politics. More precisely, it made the Austrian People’s Party 
(ÖVP) the strongest party and led to a centre–right government coalition 
between the ÖVP and the Freedom Party (FPÖ). It stands out in Austrian 
electoral history comprising 22 elections as one of three that produced 
a new leading party (1970 and 2002 being the others) and one of seven 
that led to (full or partial) alternation in government. The 2017 election 
was notable in that the second government party, which was consider-
ably weaker than the Chancellor’s party, was able to take the helm. The 
election also significantly restructured the parliamentary party system, 
the Greens and Team Stronach exit and adding the brand-new Liste Pilz 
(see Figure 8.1). In sum, the election produced a substantial shift to the 
right with the worst showing for parties of the left in the entire post-war 
period. At the same time this was a mobilizing election, with the strongest 
increase in voter participation (up five percentage points) since 1945, for 
an overall turnout of 80%.
How did this all come about? In this chapter we show that in terms 
of the main contenders of the election, its result seemed settled already 
some time before the ‘official’ campaign kicked off after the summer. This 
is what can be read from voting intentions registered in a multitude of 
surveys. It does not mean, however, that such outcome was taken for 
granted by the actors and that the campaign lacked drama. Indeed, drama 
combined with significant change in voter preferences in the long cam-
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paign, conventionally defined as the year before the election (Norris et 
al. 1999). What happened in the long campaign, however, was triggered 
by yet another upheaval earlier in the inter-election period: the dramatic 
change in voting intentions that followed the ‘European refugee crisis’ 
of 2015. Non-partisan observers have characterized the handling of the 
crisis by the Austrian government as a case of ‘state failure’ and it was 
widely recognized as such within the electorate. The crisis made painfully 
clear the inbuilt tensions and resulting inertia of the incumbent grand 
coalition government under Chancellor Werner Faymann. In any case, 
the crisis highlighted the salience of the FPÖ’s core issue of immigration, 
created additional support for its positions, and made it the leading party 
in the polls. When the long campaign set in, the situation thus was not 
only significantly different from the 2017 outcome but also from the 2013 
starting point (see Figure 3 below).
Figure 8.1: The 2017 electoral result
 Source: Official electoral results: https://wahl17.bmi.gv.at.
The government parties’ slump in the polls of course did not remain 
unnoticed and led to strategic re-orientation and leadership turnover. 
Changes on the supply side, however, were not confined to the SPÖ and 
ÖVP. We discuss these changes in the next section. In separate sections, 
we then analyse the role of the leaders and issues in the 2017 election. 
Much of this focuses on the three main contenders: the SPÖ, ÖVP, and 
FPÖ. We devote a separate section to the main loser of the elections, the 
Greens, trying to understand why this party failed. In the final substan-
tive section, we examine the Silberstein affair, the one event that stood 
out in the short campaign and that put many observers in doubt about 
how it might affect the election result. A brief conclusion follows.
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The supply side restructured
Put simply, electoral volatility can originate from changes in voter 
demand or changes in party supply. The Austrian parliamentary election 
of 2017 clearly represents a case of substantial changes in the supply of 
parties, party policy, and party personnel. What is more, one could plau-
sibly argue that the election itself was triggered by supply side changes 
(more specifically, the change in the ÖVP leadership in May 2017).
All relevant changes to the political supply side happened months 
(some even years) in advance of election day (see Table 8.1). After a tur-
bulent year of intra-party conflict, near collapse of the government, party 
split-offs, and party leader changes between mid-2016 and mid-2017, 
the political events during the short campaign in September and early 
October 2017 pale in comparison. As we will show further below, aggre-
gate public opinion held remarkably steady during the short campaign in 
September and October.
Table 8.1: Supply side changes in Austrian parties, 2013–2017
Party 2013 Role during leg. 
period
Leadership 
changes
Entry/exit?
SPÖ 27 % Senior coalition 
party
à C. Kern 
(May 2016)
ÖVP 24 % Junior coalition 
party
à R. Mitter-
lehner (August 
2014)
à S. Kurz (May 
2017)
FPÖ 21 % Opposition
Greens 12 % Opposition à U. Lunacek 
& I. Felipe (May 
2017)
Team 
Stronach
6 % Opposition à No 
candidacy
Neos 5 % Opposition
BZÖ 3.5 % Extra-parlia-
mentary
à No 
candidacy
Liste Peter 
Pilz
- (founded in July 
2017)
à New 
entry
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
The Austrian Election of 2017: An Election Won in the Long Campaign  - Anita Bodlos, Laurenz 
Ennser-Jedenastik, Martin Haselmayer, Thomas M. Meyer and Wolfgang C. Müller
154
Most importantly amongst all supply side changes, two parties that had 
together received almost one in ten votes at the 2013 election, were basi-
cally defunct by October 2017. The Team Stronach, founded by Austro–
Canadian billionaire Frank Stronach to stir up Austria’s political class 
in 2013, proved to be little more than a collection of political fortune 
hunters with no coherent party structures or policy profile. It practically 
imploded within a year of the 2013 election. The BZÖ, founded in 2005 
by Jörg Haider as a break-away from the FPÖ, had failed to clear the four 
percent threshold in 2013 and subsequently descended into oblivion. 
Together, Team Stronach and BZÖ had captured around 434,000 votes in 
2013 (equivalent to 8.6 percent of the vote in 2017). The disintegration of 
these two parties alone thus guaranteed high levels of electoral volatility. 
However, in addition to these party exits, there were important changes 
in the top personnel of three other parties.
As Table 8.1 shows, both government parties, SPÖ and ÖVP, experi-
enced party leader turnover between the 2013 and 2017 elections—the 
ÖVP even twice. The first one was just an echo of the frustrating elec-
toral result of 2013. In 2014, the ÖVP replaced Michael Spindelegger, an 
honest but at times stiff conservative, with the somewhat more energetic 
and liberal Reinhold Mitterlehner, minister for science, research, and 
economic affairs. Mitterlehner prescribed his party a strategy of mod-
ernization and liberalization and at the same time banked on his and his 
team’s economic competence. While it seemed quite successful initially, 
the refugee crisis shock put an end to it and called for another re-orien-
tation. 
This also holds for the SPÖ. The first stage of strategic re-orientation 
is often internal bewilderment, debate, and conflict, and this is what hap-
pened here. Driven by the real problem load of the asylum crisis and ÖVP 
pressure, Chancellor Faymann hoped to get away with policy adaptation. 
Consequently, government stalemate gave way to changes toward a more 
restrictive asylum policy. This, however, mobilized the left in the SPÖ 
the protest of which fed into the general discomfort that had built up in 
the party regarding Faymann’s leadership. He was driven into head-over-
heels resignation by public embarrassment and only lacklustre support 
amongst the party grandees. A coalition of some party grandees recruited 
Christian Kern, the then-CEO of the state-owned Austrian Federal Rail-
ways, to succeed Faymann at the helm of both, the party and the cabinet. 
This process and the deliberate break of the new leader with the Faymann 
legacy left considerable fissions in the SPÖ.
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Under its new leader Chancellor Christian Kern, the SPÖ fundamen-
tally renewed its government team, introduced programmatic innovation 
(Kern’s ‘Plan A’), and even made an attempt to open up to the FPÖ—a 
party it had categorically rejected as a potential coalition partner since 
1986. The FPÖ overture met with internal resistance and got stuck quite 
early. Without a credible coalition alternative, Kern relinquished the idea 
of early elections and settled for a renegotiation of the coalition deal, bet-
ting his money on a rejuvenating of the grand coalition.
Such a rejuvenation was also in the interest of Mitterlehner. How-
ever, by mid-2017 the ÖVP leader had been severely damaged due to 
his lack of authority in the notoriously factionalized party (Müller and 
Steininger 1994), and in May decided to call it quits. This paved the way 
for the ÖVP’s best hope, the 31-year-old foreign minister, Sebastian Kurz, 
to take over the party leadership. Kurz did so on the condition that there 
would be substantial centralization of intra-party power in the hands of 
the party leader. Within days he called for new elections to secure a man-
date for himself and his policy program.
Amongst the opposition parties, only the Greens experienced turn-
over in party leadership. Eva Glawischnig who had been party leader 
since 2009 (acting since 2008) quit in May 2017, citing health reasons. 
The Greens then installed Ingrid Felipe, deputy-governor of the state of 
Tyrol, as the new party leader, and MEP Ulrike Lunacek as their top can-
didate for the election (all other parties cumulated both positions in one 
person). Glawischnig’s sudden retreat did not mean the end of bad news 
for the Greens, though. When long-time MP Peter Pilz failed to secure 
a safe position on the party’s federal election list at the party congress in 
June 2017, he left the party and founded his own list, taking with him not 
only several established Green politicians but also a large share of Green 
voters, thus contributing strongly to the party’s disastrous election result. 
After 31 years of continuous parliamentary representation as one of the 
most electorally successful Green parties in Europe (Dolezal 2016), the 
Greens failed to clear the four percent hurdle in October 2017.
As the subsequent sections of this chapter will show, many of these 
supply side ‘shocks’ induced substantial responses by voters. Party leader 
turnover as well as the exit and entry of parties into the political arena 
strongly shaped the Austrian political landscape in the run-up to the 
2017 election.
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Leaders do matter
Even in an archetypical party democracy such as Austria, party leaders 
have grown more important in determining parties’ electoral success. 
Two correlates of this trend are the continued erosion of party identifi-
cation (Plasser and Sommer 2018) and the increased use of personalized 
campaign communication (Hayek 2016). The 2017 election is perhaps 
the most remarkable manifestation of the impact of party leaders on 
voters’ party preferences in Austria to date.
Figure 8.2: Net trust in party leaders, 2016–2018
Note: Net trust in party leaders. Source: OGM/APA-Vertrauensindex (www.ogm.
at).
The most relevant party leader change happened when ÖVP leader Rein-
hold Mitterlehner stepped down in May 2017 and was replaced by Sebas-
tian Kurz. Kurz had been the leader-in-waiting for many in the party, not 
least due to his high popularity levels and his advocacy of a more restric-
tive immigration and asylum policy. As Figure 8.2 shows, Kurz had net 
trust levels (calculated as the difference in the proportion of respondents 
who trust a person and the proportion who do not trust them) between 
20 and 25 percentage points higher than his predecessor’s. He also main-
tained higher ratings than his direct opponent, the SPÖ’s Christian Kern.
The massive gap in popularity between Mitterlehner and Kurz mate-
rialized when Kurz took over the party in May 2017. While the ÖVP 
had hovered around 20% in the polls for a year, the transition from Mit-
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terlehner to Kurz proved to be a shot in the arm for the party. Within a 
few weeks, the party was propelled to the number one position, gaining 
somewhere between ten and 12 percentage points. Prior to that, the 
installations of Kern (SPÖ) in May 2016 and Mitterlehner (ÖVP) in 
August 2014 had themselves produced significant upticks in their parties’ 
poll numbers (see Figure 8.3).
Figure 8.3: Polling averages over the course of the legislative period, 
2013–2017
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on polling data collected by neuwal.com.
When Reinhold Mitterlehner took over the party leadership from 
Michael Spindelegger in August 2014, the ÖVP rose by about six points 
in the polls until the end of the year. An increase of similar size can be 
detected in the SPÖ’s numbers after the transition from Werner Faymann 
to Christian Kern, although these gains took longer to materialize.
While party leaders and their popularity clearly shaped the parties’ 
polling performance throughout the legislative period, there was not 
much movement induced by party leaders during the short campaign. 
Figure 8.4 shows that, amongst the leaders of the three major parties, 
Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP) remained ahead of Christian Kern (SPÖ) and 
Heinz-Christian Strache (FPÖ). However, the gap between the leaders 
narrowed somewhat in the run-up to the election. Thus, once the gains 
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from installing Kurz were realized for the ÖVP, not much further pro-
gress was made.
Figure 8.4: Party leader sympathy during the short campaign
Source: AUTNES Online Panel 2017 (Wagner et al. 2018).
The changing issue landscape
Another remarkable element of the 2017 national election was its issue 
focus, which differed sharply from the previous election in 2013. As in 
many other European countries, the ‘European refugee crisis’ shaped 
Austrian politics between 2013 and 2017. At the peak of the wave in 2015, 
asylum seekers had filed 88,340 applications in Austria, more than four 
times as many as in the average year between 2000 and 2014.1 This ‘shock’ 
not only affected ‘asylum’ as a rather narrow issue. Rather, other migra-
tion-related topics, such as whether family allowances should be cut for 
children living outside Austria, also gained prominence in the long cam-
paign. In other words, in light of the European refugee crisis many issues 
related to the economy, education, and social welfare were framed as 
immigration issues in the public, the party, and the media agenda.
1 All figures on asylum applications are taken from: Statistik Aus-
tria (2018): Asylanträge 2000–2016 nach Staatsangehörigkeit, avail-
able at: http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_ 
gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/wanderungen/asyl/index.html, accessed: 14.05.2018.
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Figure 8.5: The public issue agenda in the long campaign
Note: Proportion of voters naming inflation, unemployment, the economy, 
or immigration as one of the two most important issues facing Austria. 
Source: Eurobarometer.
The changing public issue agenda in the long campaign is shown in 
Figure 8.5. Based on Eurobarometer data, it shows the share of respond-
ents naming the respective issue as one of the ‘two most important issues 
facing Austria at the moment’.2 Between 2013 and 2017, classic economic 
issues such as inflation, unemployment, and the state of the economy 
became less important in the voters’ eyes. In contrast, concerns about 
immigration increased significantly until November 2015 when 56% of 
the respondents indicated that immigration was one of the top two con-
cerns for the country.
Along with a decrease in asylum applications in 2016, voter percep-
tions of immigration as one the most pressing challenges for Austria 
decreased again according to the Eurobarometer surveys. Yet despite the 
decline between 2015 and 2017, the immigration issue still figured prom-
inently in the 2017 election campaign (see also Bodlos and Plescia 2018; 
Plasser and Sommer 2018; IMAS Report 22 2017). Data from the 2017 
Online Panel (Wagner et al. 2018) suggests that ‘asylum’ and ‘immigra-
tion’ were still amongst the most salient issues in the electorate, reaching 
combined a salience of about 20%. In comparison, respondents consid-
ered issues of the welfare state as less important: pensions (11%), health 
and care (9%) as well as families (6%), employment (8%) or the economy 
(4%) were named less often as dominant current problems.
2  All figures relating to Eurobarometer data are taken from Eurobarometer (2017), avail-
able at: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/
themeKy/42/groupKy/208, accessed: 14.05.2018.
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The increased salience of immigration was also reflected in Austrian 
media coverage: the share of newspaper articles referring to immigration 
almost doubled compared to the previous general election in 2013. Nev-
ertheless, immigration was substantially less salient compared to other 
issues (like economy and budget, employment and welfare state, educa-
tion or corruption).3
How did the Austrian parties deal with the ‘European refugee crisis’? 
After the initial wave of readiness to welcome asylum seekers or ease their 
journey toward other European countries in 2015, the government soon 
became more reluctant when security concerns were raised. Sebastian 
Kurz, then minister for foreign affairs and integration, became—along 
with other ÖVP ministers—one of the most critical voices demanding 
strict controls at EU borders and European solidarity4 as well as com-
pulsory community service for unemployed refugees and a legal ban 
on the niqab.5 During the campaign, Kurz managed remarkably well to 
communicate his strategy, to stay ‘on message’. Borrowing a formulation 
from Norris et al.’s (1999, p. 53) analysis of Tony Blair’s 1997 campaign: 
‘he stayed ruthlessly on message to the point of near-robotic incarnation 
of key themes and slogans’. In particular, he constantly proclaimed his 
leading role in the closure of the ‘Balkan route’ of migration, continuously 
took critical stances concerning immigration, and stressed demands on 
immigrants for the purpose of integration (Bodlos and Plescia 2018).
Data from party press releases issued during six weeks of election 
campaigns from 2006 to 2017 illustrate this shift to the right (Figure 8.6). 
The ÖVP took almost perfectly neutral stances on immigration between 
2006 and 2013, but exclusively issued press releases with critical positions 
concerning immigration in 2017, resulting in a similar position as the 
far-right FPÖ. Like the ÖVP, the SPÖ also took substantially more critical 
stances in their press releases in 2017 compared to the previous election. 
3  Galyga, Sebastian; Rettenegger, Gregor; Eberl, Jakob-Moritz; Boomgaarden, Hajo 
(08.05.2018): Themenverschiebungen in der Berichterstattung im Vorfeld der Wahl 
2017, available at: http://viecer.univie.ac.at/blog/detail/news/themenverschiebun-
gen-in-der-berichterstattung-im-vorfeld-der-wahl-2017/, accessed 25.05.2018.
4  ÖVP Bundesparteileitung (21.09.2015): ÖVP-Aktionsplan Asyl 3–Kurz: Nur sichere 
EU-Außengrenzen ermöglichen ein Europa ohne innere Grenzen–FOTO, available at: 
https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20150921_OTS0141/oevp-aktionsplan-asyl-
3-kurz-nur-sichere-eu-aussengrenzen-ermoeglichen-ein-europa-ohne-innere-grenzen-
foto, accessed 25.05.2018.
5  ÖVP Parlamentsklub (16.11.2016): Werteenquete (2)—Kurz: Integrationsgesetz um-
setzen, available at: https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20161116_OTS0178/
werteenquete-2-kurz-integrationsgesetz-umsetzen, accessed 27.08.2018.
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Nevertheless, the SPÖ and especially the Greens are located closer to the 
supporting pole of the scale.
Figure 8.6: Party positions on immigration (based on press releases), 
2006–2017
Note: Positions on immigration in the four latest Austrian election campaigns. The 
right pole indicates a critical position toward immigration, the left pole a supporting 
position.
Sources: AUTNES coding of press releases (Müller et al. 2017a, 2017b, 2017c; Müller 
et al. forthcoming).
The positional shift by the ÖVP was accompanied by an increase in sali-
ence dedicated to immigration, a trend also observable for the FPÖ and 
the Greens, but not for the SPÖ (not shown). Despite this increase in 
salience, immigration was still one of many issues in party press releases: 
The FPÖ emphasized immigration the most with about 13% of press 
releases dedicated to this issue, hence, leaving considerable leeway for 
other issues (Bodlos and Plescia 2018).6
The ÖVP and Sebastian Kurz thus chose an accommodative strategy 
(Meguid 2005) vis à vis the radical right FPÖ concerning immigration 
and asylum policies. The ÖVP shifted to the right by adopting several 
6  See also Bodlos, Anita; Haselmayer, Martin; Haudum, Teresa (06.03.2018): War 2017 
ein „Ausländerwahlkampf ’? available at: http://viecer.univie.ac.at/blog/detail/news/
war-2017-ein-auslaenderwahlkampf, accessed 28.05.2018.
The Austrian Election of 2017: An Election Won in the Long Campaign  - Anita Bodlos, Laurenz 
Ennser-Jedenastik, Martin Haselmayer, Thomas M. Meyer and Wolfgang C. Müller
162
FPÖ demands and hence undermining FPÖ support by offering a sim-
ilar policy position backed up with the credibility of being fit for govern-
ment and without the stigma of extremism lingering upon the FPÖ. The 
FPÖ reacted by means of a poster campaign claiming to be the original 
defender of native Austrians and confronted the ÖVP with pro-immi-
grant statements of the past.
Despite the accommodative strategy pursued by the ÖVP, the issue 
ownership (Petrocik 1996) of the immigration issue remained firmly 
in the hands of the FPÖ. About 37% of the respondents in a survey by 
the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) perceived the FPÖ as 
the party ‘most competent’ on immigration, whereas only 22% named 
the ÖVP. Amongst those considering immigration or asylum as impor-
tant issue(s), a whopping 52% judged the FPÖ as the most competent 
party while the ÖVP share remained unchanged (Wagner et al. 2018). 
A different question format and a more fine-grained breakdown of the 
‘immigration’ issue, however, show that the ÖVP was the much more 
credible party regarding issue-related international diplomacy (Plasser 
and Sommer 2018, 89). In effect, the ÖVP had succeeded with adding a 
new sub-dimension to the ‘immigration’ issue and managed to reduce its 
overall competence gap toward the FPÖ.
Demise of the Greens
The main losers of the election were the Greens. In December 2016, they 
had celebrated the election of their former party leader, Alexander van 
der Bellen, as Austrian president. Only ten months later and for the first 
time ever since they entered parliament in 1986, the party failed to pass 
the 4% threshold (Bodlos and Plescia 2018). This is even more surprising 
as the party had obtained 12% of the votes in the 2013 general election 
and was constantly polling above ten percent until spring 2017.
How could one of Europe’s most successful Green parties (Dolezal 
2016) lose so many voters in such a short period of time? We argue that 
the reasons are a series of intra-party conflicts in the long campaign 
and—as a consequence of one of those—the formation of a new party led 
by one of the Greens’ founding members, Peter Pilz. Changing leaders 
to a rather unpopular top candidate five months before the election was 
another obstacle to the party’s success. Finally, campaign dynamics, such 
as a focus on the three main contenders, and the threat of a right-wing 
coalition promoted strategic voting at the expense of the Greens.
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Intra-party conflict and Liste Peter Pilz
In early spring 2017, the Greens’ party leadership clashed with the Green 
youth organization over the support for a Green student list. A bounded 
dispute escalated when the Young Greens asked the party leader, Eva 
Glawischnig, to step down.7 The issue was battled in the media arena, 
peaking with a round table on the country’s most prominent political 
talk show on the intra-party conflict. When the party leadership sought 
to terminate the conflict by excluding the dissident youth organization, a 
scathing critique of Glawischnig from several high party officials leaked 
to the media. Glawischnig’s image and leadership suffered severely during 
the conflict. Moreover, the party lost a group of motivated activists that 
could have been valuable during the campaign.
Roughly at the same time, trouble arose from the city of Vienna, 
home to the party’s largest and electorally most relevant regional party 
branch. As a member of the regional government, the Greens supported 
a skyscraper project in the city centre that faced severe criticism from 
within and beyond the party. A group of dissidents urged for a binding 
ballot vote amongst Vienna’s party members to determine the Greens’ 
position on this delicate issue. The result of this vote was at odds with the 
party leadership, who refused to follow the rank and file despite earlier 
commitments. To preserve the government coalition, the Green regional 
parliamentary party group approved the project in early June. Again, 
media extensively reported on the issue and the intra-party conflict.
7 Junge Grüne (22.3.2017): Offener Brief an Eva Glawischnig: Fürchtet euch nicht; avail-
able at: https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20170322_OTS0069/offener-brief-
an-eva-glawischnig-fuerchtet-euch-nicht, accessed: 22.05.2018.
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Figure 8.7: Voter moves 2013–2017 (Green party)
Note: Values based on vote recall question in the 2013 election and the vote choice 
in the forthcoming election. Source: AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017 (Wagner et 
al. 2018) (n = 2467–3,016), using population weights.
By the end of June, the Greens held their national party congress to elect 
the party’s national candidate list for the upcoming elections. Amongst 
others, Peter Pilz, one of their most experienced MPs with a national rep-
utation as a corruption fighter, failed to make it onto the list. Pilz first 
announced his resignation, but soon reconsidered his choice. Supported 
by a group of MPs (from the Green and SPÖ parliamentary party group), 
he was able to present a self-named party on all tiers across the country. 
Liste Peter Pilz had neither an election manifesto nor a distinct policy 
profile. However, its leader was more strongly associated with the issue 
of fighting corruption (Plescia et al. 2018) than the prior issue owner, the 
Greens. The new party ran a successful low-budget campaign and—in 
contrast to and largely at the expense of the Greens—obtained parlia-
mentary representation. Figure 8.7 shows that Green voters in the 2013 
national election evenly opted for Liste Peter Pilz and the Greens in 2017.8
Despite votes lost to the new party, the figure reveals an even greater 
voter drain to the Social Democrats. This likely reflects strategic voting in 
8  Studies based on other surveys report similar results, see Plasser and Sommer 2018: 85; 
Unterhuber 2018.
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the face of the party’s losses in the polls (see Figure 8.3 above), a strong 
campaign focus on the three main contenders and the threat of a right-
wing coalition of ÖVP and FPÖ.
Leadership change
A week after Sebastian Kurz took over the ÖVP leadership and rallied 
for early elections, the Green party leader, Eva Glawischnig, announced 
her retirement from politics for personal reasons. Thus, a few months 
ahead of the elections, the party had to choose a new party leader. The 
Greens opted for a separation of powers and presented MEP Ulrike 
Lunacek as top candidate; Tyrol’s party leader, Ingrid Felipe, took over 
the national party office. Lunacek had gained a reputation amongst her 
peers at the European parliament. She became vice-president of the 
Green parliamentary party group in 2013 and was elected vice-president 
of the parliament one year later. However, she did not receive the same 
level of appreciation in her home country—this was a drawback, as top 
candidates are increasingly important in party competition (Poguntke 
and Webb 2005; Karvonen 2010; Costa Lobo and Curtice 2015). Figure 
8.8 shows that Ulrike Lunacek had the lowest sympathy scores of all the 
party leaders during the entire campaign, which indicates that leadership 
change was another ingredient for the Greens’ electoral decline.
Figure 8.8: Mean sympathy scores for top candidates in the 2017 
Austrian election
Note: Values based on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all likeable) to 10 
(very likeable). Source: AUTNES Online Panel Study 2017 (Wagner et al. 2018) (n 
= 1833–2,235), using survey weights.
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Campaign effects: much ado about nothing?
The short 2017 campaign started around the beginning of September, 
when several of the parliamentary parties launched their campaigns offi-
cially. As the publicly available polling indicates (see Figure 8.3 above), 
there were hardly any changes in aggregate party support after Sebastian 
Kurz took over the ÖVP leadership and Peter Pilz split from the Greens. 
The polls thus predicted a clear victory for the ÖVP and a neck-to-neck 
race between the SPÖ and FPÖ for second place.
Figure 8.9: Average absolute error in election polls
Note: Mean absolute deviation from election result for six parties: ÖVP, SPÖ, FPÖ, 
Neos, Liste Pilz, and the Greens. Source: Polls collected from neuwal.com. Two 
polls conducted in early May (i.e. before the leadership change in the ÖVP) were 
discarded.
Note that the polls were already quite predictive of the election result 
by July 2017 (see Figure 8.9). The mean absolute deviation between the 
election results and a simple average of all polls in a month was 1.5 per-
centage points in July—not much higher than the 1.1 percentage points in 
the final pre-election polls fielded during the first two weeks of October.
While, in hindsight, the polls paint the picture of a less than exciting 
election campaign, the perception of many observers during the cam-
paign was quite different. Attention focused in particular on a scandal 
involving the SPÖ’s chief campaign advisor, Tal Silberstein, and fake 
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Facebook pages that used dirty campaign tactics against ÖVP lead can-
didate Sebastian Kurz (inter alia the pages mimicked attacks from a far-
right source and also contained anti-Semitic material) (Tóth 2017; Thal-
hammer 2018). Apparently, some resourceful SPÖ campaign strategists 
had considered the gap in the polls too large to be closed even with a 
good ‘normal’ campaign and had decided to ‘go dirty’.
In late September, two media outlets broke the story that the Face-
book pages—whose operators had previously not been disclosed—could, 
in fact, be linked to the SPÖ’s campaign (allegedly unbeknownst to party 
leader Christian Kern). This not only triggered the resignation of the SPÖ 
party manager, but it also generated a flurry of media reports, focusing 
a disproportionate share of public attention on the so-called Silberstein 
affair (see Figure 8.10).
Figure 8.10: Daily share of newspaper reports and party press releases 
mentioning ‘Silberstein’
Source: AUTNES analyses of press releases 2017 (Müller et al. forthcoming) and 
media reports 2017 (Eberl et al. forthcoming).
Since the Silberstein affair became the dominant media topic in the last 
weeks of the campaign, many observers thought it possible that this 
would hurt the SPÖ’s chances in the election and boost support for the 
ÖVP. However, according to data from the AUTNES Online Panel, no 
such thing happened (Figure 8.11).
As Figure 8.11 demonstrates, neither the propensity to vote for the 
Social Democrats, nor sympathy for the party leader, Christian Kern, 
took a hit between the third and fourth panel wave that were conducted 
before and after the scandal broke, respectively. Nor was the probability 
to turn out amongst SPÖ sympathizers affected in any significant way.
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Figure 8.11: The non-impact of the Silberstein affair on SPÖ support
Source: AUTNES Online Panel 2017 (Wagner et al. 2018).
As Figure 8.12 shows, the SPÖ even retained more of its voters between 
early to mid-September (before the Silberstein scandal broke) and elec-
tion day in October than most other parties. Further analyses demon-
strate that many of the last-minute movements in the electorate may even 
have been to the advantage of the Social Democrats.
Figure 8.12: Voter loyalty between early/mid-September and election 
day
Note: Graph shows the percentage of party voters in the September wave of the 
AUTNES Online Panel that stayed loyal to the party on election day. Source: 
AUTNES Online Panel (Wagner et al. 2018).
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Conclusion
The 2017 election brought significant change to Austrian politics. This 
chapter has argued that the election was decided quite some time before 
the campaign. In particular, the ‘European immigration crisis’ in 2015 
had been a focusing event that caused significant change in the elec-
torate. While it shifted the odds of winning the election toward the FPÖ 
it caused the SPÖ and ÖVP to select new leaders and change their strat-
egies. Because of these supply side changes, the outcome of the election 
was not only significantly different from the 2013 result but also from 
what an election in the fall of 2015 or in 2016 most likely would have 
resulted in. This stresses the importance of the supply side for elections 
but it also highlights the importance of the election date. The Austrian 
constitution offers several ways to early elections and coalition contracts 
have regularly contained a rule that de facto allowed each partner to call 
for early elections. While such moves are always risky, in this case the 
gamble worked and allowed Kurz and the ÖVP to drive home what the 
polls promised. This was helped by a very streamlined and well executed 
campaign on the ÖVP side.
The introduction characterized the 2017 election in the context 
of Austria’s post-war elections. The true significance of the election, of 
course, will flow from its impact on how the country is governed. Being 
based on 113 of 183 seats (61.7%) and facing an opposition which largely 
still needs to accommodate to its new role in the government system (the 
SPÖ), to resolve internal problems (Liste Pilz), or to reorganize and prove 
their indispensability from outside parliament (the Greens), the incum-
bent ÖVP–FPÖ coalition has reason to look into the future with some 
optimism. In the first eight months of their reign, this has led to some 
ambitious policies and winner-takes-all behaviour in making appoint-
ments. Projecting such behaviour into the future could make the 2017 
election a significant turning point in Austria’s post-war politics. 
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Portfolio Allocation and the Selection 
of Ministers After the 2017 National 
German Election
Ferdinand Müller-Rommel
Introduction
After the collapse of Angela Merkel’s three-way (‘Jamaica’) coalition talks 
(with the Greens and the Liberal party) in November 2017, the Social 
Democrats discussed the prospect of a third coalition government under 
a conservative chancellor. As the deal for a new government began to take 
shape, the chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Martin Schulz, pub-
lically announced that he had ‘decided’ to join the new Merkel cabinet as 
foreign minister (‘Ich habe entschieden in die Bundesregierung einzutreten 
und zwar als Außenminister’). This statement shocked not only party 
members but also the public since the respective political parties had 
not even approved the coalition agreement nor allocated the ministerial 
portfolios. The statement also opened a new public debate about two of 
the oldest questions in politics: ‘who gets what’ (Lasswell 1936) and ‘who 
gets in’ (Matthews 1960).
This chapter poses two general questions that are often raised by prac-
titioners and scientists in German politics: Which political parties allo-
cate which ministries for what reasons? Who are selected for a ministerial 
position amongst the pool of potential candidates? We will answer these 
questions in light of the existing theoretical and empirical approaches on 
portfolio allocation and ministerial selection. The allocation of ministries 
and the selection of ministers is in practice a sequential process whereby 
coalition parties first bargain amongst each other over ministerial posts. 
In a second step, each coalition party selects the person who will fill the 
ministerial post. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the mechanisms 
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of these processes, taking the government formation in Germany 
from January to March 2018 as a case study.
Sequence I: The allocation of ministerial portfolios
Theoretical approaches and empirical findings
Coalition formation in parliamentary democracies is usually based on 
three processes. First, the coalition partners negotiate and agree on a 
policy program for the governmental period (coalition agreement). Sec-
ondly, coalition partners specify the share of ministerial offices amongst 
them (portfolio allocation). Finally, coalition partners nominate and agree 
on individuals who then become ministers (ministerial selection and 
appointment).
The literature on coalition agreements is rather limited. Only Müller 
and Strom (2008) have provided a systematic empirical record of the 
different forms of coalition agreements in Western Europe. They have 
identified significant variations across countries and consistent national 
trends, e.g. informal agreements (in Italy); formal and short (Finland); 
formal and long (Belgium); exclusively policy documents (Austria and 
Denmark). The observed differences amongst the coalition agreements 
are explained by six clusters of variables: 1) the effect of time and space; 2) 
structural attributes of cabinets and party systems; 3) the preferences of 
the players; 4) political institutions; 5) features of bargaining situations, 
and finally; 6) exogenous ‘critical’ events (Müller and Strom 2008, p. 187).
The literature on portfolio allocation is more extensive and divided 
into two main strands: a quantitative and a qualitative explanation of the 
allocation of ministries amongst coalition partners (DeWinter 2002, p. 
190f). The former approach simply investigates the number of ministerial 
posts for each coalition party while the letter approach asks why different 
parties get different ministries.
The quantitative portfolio approach dates to the early 1960s and has 
been inspired by game theoretical assumptions. Gamson (1961, p. 376) 
was the first to argue that any ‘participant will expect others to demand 
from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of 
resources which they contribute to a coalition’. Put differently, political 
parties receive the same percentage of portfolios as the percentage of 
seats they hold in the national parliament. Browne and Franklin (1973) 
PART 2 - Country-Specific Chapters
175
have tested this assumption on a data set of 13 European parliamen-
tary democracies from 1949 to 1969. They found that there was nearly 
a one-to-one correspondence between party’s seat contribution to the 
coalition and the number of portfolios it received in cabinet (r=.93) 
whereby a deviation is attributed to small parties and to the party of the 
prime minister. Small parties might get ‘bonus portfolios’ due to the piv-
otal positions they often occupy. These extra portfolios are also meant 
to assure their loyalty to the coalition and avoid potential defection to 
another coalition offering a better payoff.
Three decades later, Warwick and Druckman (2001) suggested the 
idea that not all portfolios are of equal value. The finance ministry might, 
for instance, have a much greater political weight than the ministry of 
social affairs (see also Larsson 1993; Laver and Shepsle 1994). Based on 
expert interviews the authors have identified the relative weight of dif-
ferent ministries. A few years later they reproduced basically the same 
results for Western and Central Eastern European countries (Warwick 
and Druckman 2005, 2006). Although the largest coalition party (forma-
teur) and the small pivotal parties seem to receive more payoffs than their 
weight would mandate, ‘seat share is by far the strongest determinant of 
portfolio allocations’ (Warwick and Druckman 2006, p. 653f). Hence, 
‘Gamson’s iron law of proportionality’ (DeWinter 2002, p. 190) is still the 
strongest predictor of portfolio allocation even when taking the ‘political 
weight’ of different ministries into account.
The qualitative portfolio approach investigates the portfolio pref-
erences of coalition parties. It assumes that different parties are likely to 
have different interests—and, as a result, different preferences—in the 
allocation of portfolios. Once a party controls a portfolio, it has the power 
to implement its ideological preferences in overall governmental policy, 
which might reinforce the electoral support of its clientele groups. Thus, 
party ideology is supposed to influence portfolio allocation.
Budge and Keman (1990) introduced the first empirical analysis on 
the preferences of political parties for specific ministries. Based on the 
party family approach (conservative, liberal, religious, socialist, and sin-
gle-issue party families), they calculated the distribution of all ministries 
in 440 coalition governments in 13 European countries from 1945 to 
1984. In a nutshell, they found that party families have substantive pref-
erences for those ministries that are thematically close to their ideology 
and policy concerns. For instance, if conservative and religious parties 
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(i.e. Christian Democrats in Germany) are the largest parties in the 
coalition (formateur), it is expected that they will take the prime minis-
terial portfolio as well as the interior, foreign, and defence ministries. If 
there is no liberal or socialist party is the coalition, the conservatives are 
also expected to take the economic or the finance ministries as well as 
the education ministry. They also take the justice ministry, if no liberal 
party is in coalition and the ministry of agriculture if no agrarian party 
in coalition.
Twenty years later, Bäck et al. (2011) conducted a similar policy sali-
ency theory of portfolio allocation. Based on a new dataset combining 
party manifesto data with the ministerial appointments of political par-
ties in 12 parliamentary democracies, they found a positive and signifi-
cant effect of the saliency variable. As they note: ‘our results give support 
to the idea that parties prefer, and aim to gain control over, ministries 
with a policy area of competence that was stressed in their electoral man-
ifesto.’ (Bäck et al. 2011, p. 466)
Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) suggested another 
qualitative measure to examine the portfolio allocation. They differentiate 
between three ‘prestige types’ of ministries (high, medium, low prestige) 
and investigate the portfolio preference of coalition parties within these 
types. ‘High-prestigious ministries’ are those with significant control over 
government policy and that are highly visible. Amongst them are the 
ministries finance and economics, foreign affairs, interior and defence. 
‘Medium prestige ministries’ control significant financial resources, but 
have lesser visibility and policy impact, encompassing agriculture, edu-
cation and science, labour, justice, health, transport, and economic devel-
opment. ‘Low-prestigious ministries’ (such as the ministry for family and 
youth) have hardly any public visibility and are characterized by a lack of 
resources for patronage.
Who gets what in Germany?
After the election, leading members of the prospective coalition parties 
first negotiate on the policy program of the forthcoming government. 
Only after this step was completed did the coalition partners decide on 
the distribution of the portfolios. Both the governmental policy program 
as well as the distribution of portfolios is part of a written coalition agree-
ment. On February 7, 2018, the three coalition parties (the Christian 
Democrats or CDU/CSU—these parties have formed an uninter
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rupted electoral alliance since 1953—and the Social Democrats, SPD) 
formally approved the coalition agreement which contains 177 pages. It 
summarizes differentiated proposals of the coalition parties in the fol-
lowing policy fields: family and children (8 pages); education, science 
and digitalization (9 pages); labour and social policy (14 pages); eco-
nomic, finance, energy, traffic, and agriculture (34 pages); social security 
(12 pages); migration and integration (7 pages); housing, development 
of cities and regions (14 pages); modern state, justice (14 pages); envi-
ronment (7 pages); foreign policy, military, human rights, and the armed 
forces (20 pages); citizen participation, democracy (10 pages); working 
mode of the government and the parliamentary factions, and executive–
legislative regulations (2 pages); distribution of portfolios (1 page).
The portfolio allocation took place after the policy issues of the gov-
ernment had come to an end. As predicted in the literature the CDU/
CSU, which holds the majority of the parliamentary seats, received the 
prime ministerial post. Furthermore, the CDU gained six, the CSU three, 
and the SPD another six ministerial positions. Thus, the new German 
cabinet (Merkel IV) consists of 16 members (including the prime min-
ister). The size of the new government does not differ for the Merkel III 
cabinet which served in office from 2013 to 2018.
Does this distribution of cabinet seats represent the parliamentary 
strength of the coalition parties as has been suggested in the above-men-
tioned literature by Gamson (1961) and Brown and Franklin (1973)? 
Although both coalition partners (CDU/CSU and SPD) lost a substantial 
number of parliamentary seats in the 2017 national election (down 105), 
we find that the parliamentary representation of both governing parties 
predicts 100% of their portfolio payoffs. We can also confirm that small 
parties (like the CSU as junior partner) receive a slightly better payoff 
than the major party (CDU) within the conservative party alliance. Thus, 
the relative impact of the CSU on government policy might be stronger 
than their share of seats in parliament. Overall, our findings are con-
sistent with ‘Gamson’s law’ for both the Merkel III and IV cabinets (see 
Table 9.1). 
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Table 9.1: Who gets what? The ‘quantitative’ approach
Merkel III
2013–2018
Merkel IV
2018–
Party Seats in 
cabinet
Seats in 
parliament
Seats in 
cabinet
Seats in 
parliament
N % N % N  % N %
CDU/CSU
CDU
CSU
10
7
3
62.5
43.7
18.8
311
255
56
61.7
50.5
11.1
10
7
3
62.5
43.7
18.8
246
200
46
61.8
50.1
11.5
SPD 6 37.5 193 38.3 6 37.5 153 38.3
Total 16 100 504 100 16 100 399 100
Comparative research suggests that the numerical calculation of portfolio 
allocation might not be as fruitful as the qualitative distinction between 
portfolios. Thus, we shall examine the policy saliency of party families in 
cabinet. Interestingly enough, both large parties (SPD and CDU/CSU) 
in Germany have developed similar portfolio preferences over time—at 
least with regard to the most important ministries. This contradicts to 
the empirical findings by Budge and Keman (1990) on Western Euro-
pean parties in the 1980s. Obviously, the policy saliency and the portfolio 
preferences are less deviant between the new ‘cartel parties’ than between 
those of the old ‘catch-all party’ (Katz and Mair 1995). During the SPD/
FDP coalitions (1969–1980), the Social Democrats continuously held 
the ministry of finance, defence, family, labour, and justice while during 
Helmut Kohl’s cabinets (1982–1994) the ministries of finance, defence, 
interior, family, and labour were allocated to the CDU. The foreign min-
istry was always under control of the minor coalition party (FDP and 
the Greens). Thus, in a ‘grand coalition’ these major portfolios had to be 
distributed equally between the CDU/CSU and the SPD.
A closer look at the portfolio allocation after the 2017 national election 
in Germany provides the following descriptive findings (see Table 9.2). 
First, in both cabinets (Merkel III and Merkel IV) the denomination and 
the number of portfolios remained the same. There have been only minor 
changes between the two Merkel cabinets (e.g. the interior ministry is 
now referred to as ‘interior, construction, and homeland’). Second, with 
one exception the portfolio allocation between the two governing parties 
did not change from the cabinets of Merkel III and Merkel IV. Only the 
ministry of economics switched from SPD to CDU/CSU and the finance 
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ministry from CDU/CSU to SPD. Put differently, the overall portfolio 
allocation between the two major political parties remained stable from 
Merkel III to Merkel IV. This clearly indicates that Chancellor Merkel 
wanted to signal ‘governmental stability’ after a six month period of 
extremely difficult coalition negotiations. Third, within the CDU/CSU 
the responsibility for two portfolios changed. The agriculture ministry—
which has always been a domain of the Bavarian CSU—is now in the 
hands of the CDU, while the interior ministry switched from the CDU 
to the CSU. The later implies a major impact of the junior partner within 
the Christian Democratic Alliance since the interior ministry is defined 
as one of the ‘core’ ministries to which the CSU had no access for a long 
time in the past.
Fourth, the responsibilities in particular policy fields have been sen-
sibly divided up between the coalition partners (the ‘heterogeneity prin-
ciple’). Thus, the high-prestigious ministries are distributed amongst all 
three parties. The allocation of medium and low-prestigious ministries 
reflects the policy saliency of the different party families in cabinet. For 
instance, the ministries of labour, family, justice, and environment are 
in the hands of the SPD while the CDU/CSU controls the ministries of 
agriculture, health, transport, economic development, and science and 
education.
Fifth, the distribution of the three ministries with competences cut-
ting across departmental boundaries has significantly changed from the 
Merkel III cabinet to Merkel IV. In the former cabinet (2013–2017) both 
the prime minister’s office and the finance ministry were in the hands 
of the CDU/CSU while the justice ministry was held by the SPD. In the 
new cabinet both finance and justice ministries are under the control of 
the SPD although the Social Democrats have lower parliamentary rep-
resentation than the Christian Democrats. Both ministers play a key role 
in cabinet. The minister of justice screens all government legislation prior 
to the political decision-making processes in parliament and cabinet. A 
similar function is served by the finance minister. He can interfere in any 
decisions with financial implications in all cabinet portfolios. Thus, con-
trolling the ministries of finance and justice will clearly strengthen the 
impact of the SPD on overall government policy.
Sixth, in most important overlapping policy areas, the allocation of 
ministries remains divided between the coalition partners. This is par-
ticularly true for the finance ministry (SPD) and the economics ministry 
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(CDU), but also for interior (CDU/CSU) and justice (SPD). In these 
two overlapping policy domains both coalition partners need to coordi-
nate the drafting of policy proposals before sending them to cabinet.
In sum, there has been little change in the quantitative and the qual-
itative allocation of portfolios from the Merkel III to the Merkel IV 
cabinet. One major exception is the exchange of the finance ministry 
(formerly CDU, now SPD) and the economics ministry (formally CDU, 
now SPD). Thus, Chancellor Merkel, has successfully forced a consensus 
process amongst the coalition partners that ensures the stability of the 
German government for the next legislature.
Table 9.2. Who gets what? The ‘qualitative’ approach
High-prestigious ministries Distribution of ministries by prestige type
Merkel III
2013–2018
Merkel IV
2018–
Change in 
allocation
Finance CDU SPD yes
Economics SPD CDU yes
Foreign SPD SPD no
Defence CDU CDU no
Interior CDU CSU party  
internally
Chancellor’s office CDU CDU no
Medium prestigious ministries
Agriculture CSU CDU party  
internally
Environment SPD SPD no
Health CDU CDU no
Justice SPD SPD no
Labour SPD SPD no
Transport/Traffic CSU CSU no
Economic cooperation CSU CSU no
Low-prestigious ministries  
Family SPD SPD no
Science and Education CDU CDU no
For the classification of ministries see Escobar-Lemmon and  
Taylor-Robinson (2005)
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Sequence II: The selection of ministers
Theoretical and empirical findings
The literature on ministerial selection suggests that in parliamentary sys-
tems a small group of party leaders decide on the cabinet composition. 
They choose their government personnel according to the personal and 
competence characteristics of ministerial candidates, while constrained 
by constitutional, party and political considerations (Dowding and 
Dumont 2009). Overall, the analysis of ministerial selection focuses on 
two aspects: 1) the effects of the institutional conditions in selecting cab-
inet ministers and; 2) the individual characteristics of potential ministers.
The institutional approach to analysing the selection of ministers is 
based on principal–agent theory (Strom 2003). Scholars who have exam-
ined Westminster systems argue that prime ministers are agents of the 
parliament and principals of the line ministers. The collective govern-
ment needs to govern well in order to maximize the parliamentary rep-
resentation of the governing party after the next election. Thus, the cab-
inet serves as an agent of its party in parliament, delivering policy outputs 
that promise electoral success. In a one-party government constellation, 
prime ministers therefore usually select ministers who carry out policies 
that she strongly prefers (Berlinski et.al 2012). Yet the process becomes 
more complicated in coalition governments, where different parties have 
the same goals (i.e. vote maximizing) but different policy preferences 
and different intra-party factions. In these governments, all sorts of stra-
tegic in come into play. Empirical studies on coalition governments have 
therefore stated that it is not at all clear how principal–agent models can 
explain the selection of ministers under these complex strategic con-
siderations. Furthermore, they argued that the selection of ministers is 
hemmed in by constitutional, party and strategic considerations (Dow-
ding and Dumont 2009, p. 6ff). 
Constitutional constraints are, for instance, given by formal rules 
about: 1) the size of a cabinet; 2) dual membership in parliament and 
cabinet; 3) specific denominations of certain portfolios; 4) the role of the 
head of state in cabinet appointment and; 5) the organization of the state 
(e.g. the existence of federal systems may dry the pool of ‘ministerable’ 
politicians at the national level). Party political constraints are basically 
due to different types of party governments. In a one-party government, 
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choosing ministers might be easier than in coalition governments 
where several parties with strong party leaders and various intra-party 
factions compete for ministerial positions. Strategic issues of the prime 
minister might also constrain the selection of ministers. For instance, 
the composition of cabinet needs to be balanced between ambitious and 
dynamic politicians who deal with policy issues that are in the public 
spotlight and more statesman-like ministers who focus on more tradi-
tional issues.
The individual approach to analysing ministerial selection dates 
to the early comparative studies by Blondel (1985), Dogan (1989), and 
Blondel and Thiébault (1991). The later study is the most comprehensive 
and examines the profession of ministers in 13 Western European coun-
tries from 1945–1994. The authors found that a long parliamentary back-
ground is the main career path to ministerial office. Similar findings have 
been identified for the political careers of ministers in Southern Europe 
(Tavares de Almeida et.al. 2003). One trait that has most recently received 
attention is the increasing selection of ‘technocrats’ and ‘outsiders’ for 
cabinet governments. A comparative longitudinal study covering 14 
European countries found that ‘technocrats’—who do not usually belong 
to the group of party politicians—increasingly occupy key executive 
positions in cabinet and have therefore emerged as powerful actors in 
government decision-making processes (Costa Pinto et al. 2018).
Although these studies provide important information about the 
socio-demographic and political background of individual ministers, 
they do not provide sufficient answers as to why these ministers (and no 
others with similar background characteristics) have been recruited into 
cabinet. Thus, our knowledge on why individual ministers are selected for 
office is still limited.
Who receives a ministerial post in Germany?
Formally, the appointment of ministers is exclusively in the hands of 
the German chancellor. In practice, however, the selection of ministers 
rests with a small group of influential party leaders within the governing 
parties. While the chancellor may select the ministers of her own party 
after consultation with CDU and CSU party officials, she cannot choose 
the ministers of the coalition partner. In the SPD, the ‘nomination com-
mittee’ for ministerial position consists of the party leader and deputies 
of the party executive. Those who select the ministers in both coalition 
parties will look for a mix of different types of ministers to maximize the 
overall representative requirements (e.g. parliamentary faction, age, 
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gender, geographical origin) and of political competence (e.g. experience 
in national and state parliament and ministries).
In both parties, the selection of ministers is constrained by several 
political and strategic issues. Usually, the parliamentary factions lay claim 
to an acceptable share of seats in cabinet for reasons of strengthening 
executive–legislative relations and for organizing an effective governing. 
Second, members of the regional party executives (Landesvorstand) ask 
for representation of their states in cabinet, because this assures major 
impact of state interests on governmental policies. This is particularly 
true for highly populated, large states and for the states in East Ger-
many. Finally, the political experiences of ministerial candidates matter 
for obtaining a cabinet position. Politicians who have served over a long 
period in the national parliament, or former ministers or junior ministers 
at the state and/or national level have a higher chance of being selected 
as a minister. The recruitment of outsiders, on the other hand, is usually 
not attractive for coalition parties since it may cause conflicts with the 
parliamentary faction and with the state executives. 
Immediately after the coalition parties agreed on the government 
program, a small group of influential party leaders from the CDU/CSU 
party executive and the parliamentary faction decided on the names 
of their nine cabinet members. The decision on SPD ministers was not 
taken before the end of the intra-party popular vote of the coalition pro-
gram in March 2018. The ministerial profile of the new Merkel IV cabinet 
reflects the representation of diverse interests of national parties and state 
governments as well as the individual political experiences of cabinet 
ministers. It also shows that there are more differences in the selection of 
cabinet ministers between the Merkel III und the Merkel IV cabinet than 
in the portfolio allocation of the coalition parties. More precisely a com-
parison between both Merkel cabinets provide the following empirical 
findings (see Table 9.3).
First, only three out of 16 ministers kept their portfolio from the 
Merkel III to the Merkel IV cabinet. Put differently, 81% of the ministers 
in the Merkel IV cabinet hold their portfolios for the first time. Second, 
only six out of 16 ministers served in both Merkel cabinets. In other 
words, more than half of all ministers (61%) in the Merkel IV cabinet 
are newcomers (see overview in Appendix A9). Third, many new minis-
ters are also younger than their predecessors. Thus, the average age of all 
cabinet members has decreased from 54 to 52 years. Fourth, the propor
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tion of female ministers has increased from 38 to 43%. In the Merkel 
IV cabinet, 7 out of 16 ministers are female. Fifth, all cabinet ministers are 
members of the national parliament. Thus, there is indeed a strong execu-
tive–legislation component in the selection of German cabinet members. 
Yet we find a higher proportion of former ministers and state secretaries 
represented in the Merkel IV cabinet, which indicates that governmental 
experience became a more important precondition for getting into cab-
inet. Sixth, political experience in local and regional governments are a 
further—albeit less important—factor for the selection of cabinet min-
isters. Finally, we find more ‘newcomers’ in the Merkel IV cabinet com-
pared to the one before.
In a nutshell, the executive–legislative relation is still the strongest 
explanatory factor for the selection of ministers in Germany, but pro-
fessional experiences in national governments becomes a more impor-
tant reason for getting a cabinet office. Thus, our data confirm that the 
majority of German ministers are selected on grounds of their profes-
sional experience in politics. ‘Technocrats’ and ‘outsiders’ from the busi-
ness world have—over the past decades—not been selected as cabinet 
ministers in Germany. 
Table 9.3. Who gets in? The institutional and the individual approach
Merkel III Merkel IV
(2013–2017)
(N=16)
(2018– )
(N=16)
Political experiences
Member of parliamentary faction
(national level)
81% 75%
Former minister or state secretary
(national level)
62% 69%
Former member of local/regional 
government
(subnational level)
25% 31%
Newcomers 19% 25%
Age and gender
Average age 54 years 52 years
Female ministers 38% 43%
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the portfolio allocation in the Merkel III and 
Merkel IV cabinets from both a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. 
It has also described the major characteristics that explain the selection 
of ministers to cabinet. Overall, we did not find any major changes in the 
portfolio allocation between the Merkel III and Merkel IV: the number 
of cabinet seats remained the same. There was no change in the denom-
ination of ministerial portfolios and in the distribution of seats amongst 
the coalition partner. Furthermore, there was also no change in the pay-
offs for the coalition parties and in the portfolio allocation between the 
coalition parties (except for one). Finally, with only one exception, we 
observed no change in the allocation of high, medium, low-prestigious 
ministries amongst the coalition partners. Regarding the selection pro-
cess, we find that being a member of parliament and having professional 
governmental experiences still predicts more than 70% of the selection to 
cabinet. ‘Newcomers’ are still rare and ‘outsiders’ as well as ‘technocrats’ 
have not generally found a place in German cabinets.
So far, the bulk of theoretical approaches and empirical findings on 
the allocation of ministries and the selection of ministers in parliamen-
tary democracies have developed in mutual isolation. What we need is 
a more systematic view on the linkage between portfolio allocation and 
ministerial selection. It would, for instance be interesting to examine 
under which conditions political parties negotiate for specific ministe-
rial portfolios precisely because they have identified own party members 
who provide the necessary political experiences and skills for running 
that particular ministry. Future research should therefore seek to connect 
these different research traditions into a unified framework.
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Appendix A9
Ministries Merkel III
(2013–2018)
Merkel IV
(2018–)
Prime Minister Angela Merkel Angela Merkel
Prime Minister’s 
Office
Peter Altmeier Helge Braun
Foreign Walter Steinmeier Heiko Maas
Finance Wolfgang Schäuble Olaf Scholz
Economics Sigmar Gabriel Peter Altmeier
Justice Heiko Maas Katarina Barley
Interior Thomas de Maizière Horst Seehofer
Defence Ursula von der Leyen Ursula von der Leyen
Labour/Social Affairs Andrea Nahles Hubertus Heil
Health Hermann Gröhe Jens Spahn
Agriculture Hans Peter Friedrich Julia Klöckner
Economic Develop-
ment
Gerd Müller Gerd Müller
Environment Barbara Hinricks Svenja Schulze
Transport/Traffic Alexander Dobrindt Andreas Scheuer
Science/Education Johanna Wanka Anja Karliczek
Family  Manuela Schwesig Franziska Giffey
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Pariah Parties, Policy Profiles and 
Party Politics in a Multilevel System: 
Coalition Formation in Germany, 
2017–2018
Marc Debus
Introduction
The outcomes of government formation processes in modern democra-
cies depend on the interplay of many factors. These variables have their 
origins in party-specific incentives like the expected payoffs in terms of 
offices and policies, incentives that emerge from institutional factors like 
the power of the head of state, the existence and competencies of the 
second chamber, or the multilevel structure of the political system, as 
well as contextual factors like the pre-electoral commitments of parties, 
intra-party conflict and the coalition preferences of voters and party 
supporters (for an overview see Laver and Schofield 1998; Müller 2009; 
Andeweg et al. 2011; Clark et al. 2013, pp. 465–524).
These general findings also apply to the government formation pro-
cess in Germany on all levels of the political system. That is, political 
parties and their representatives on the national, regional and even the 
local level try to maximize their office and policy payoffs and consider 
incentives or restrictions that emerge from the respective institutional 
setting (e.g. Downs 1998; Pappi et al. 2005; Bräuninger and Debus 2008, 
2012; Bäck et al. 2013; Debus and Gross 2016; Gross and Debus 2018). 
These patterns are also observable in the recent government formation 
processes in Germany on the state and federal levels. However, the elec-
toral success of the ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD)—a right-wing pop-
ulist party with a wide ideological spectrum ranging from market-liberal 
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orientations to racist–nationalist positions (see, e.g., Arzheimer 2015; 
Franzmann 2018)—altered matters considerably. The AfD, which has 
won parliamentary representation in 14 of the 16 state parliaments, in the 
European parliament and in the Bundestag in the time period since 2014, 
decreased dramatically the chances that a ‘traditional’ coalition between 
centre–left or centre–right parties could win a majority in the respec-
tive parliaments. The parties on the state level were—at least in terms of 
the government formation process—able to cope with the parliamentary 
presence of the AfD, which is excluded by the other parties from the gov-
ernment formation process, by forming ‘unusual’ coalition governments. 
These have included in 2016, for instance, the Christian Democrats 
(CDU), the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens in Saxony–Anhalt 
and the SPD, the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) and the Greens in Rhine-
land–Palatinate. However, on the national level the parties have failed to 
form a more complex coalition government. Negotiations between the 
representatives of the CDU, its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, the FDP 
and the Greens failed in November 2017. The formation of another coali-
tion between the CDU/CSU and the SPD—also because of pressure from 
the German president whose role as an indirect formateur came into 
play in the fall of 2017—emerged as the only remaining coalition option 
because a minority government was rejected by Chancellor Merkel and 
the party leadership of the CDU and CSU.
This contribution seeks to explain why the government formation 
process in Germany after the 2017 Bundestag election was so compli-
cated. The focus in the chapter is on institutional and contextual con-
straints and their impact on the coalition negotiations after the Bunde-
stag election on 24 September 2017. The following section will therefore 
give an overview on the development of party competition in Germany 
after 2013 and discuss how the election campaigns, election results and 
government formation processes on the state level influenced the parties’ 
coalition strategies and the coalition negotiations after the 2017 Bunde-
stag election.
Before presenting the policy profile of German parties in 2017, the 
third section presents the data in more detail. The findings show that a 
coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD was ideologically more 
cohesive than a so-called ‘Jamaica coalition’ between the CDU/CSU, the 
FDP and the Greens. Immigration was the key sticking point and was 
for the CSU and the Greens the most salient policy issue in 2017. While 
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the CDU, the FDP and the CSU (especially) favoured a more restrictive 
immigration policy, the Green party preferred a more permissive immi-
gration policy. Furthermore, the distance on economic issues between 
the FDP on the side and CDU/CSU and the Greens on the other was 
remarkable, especially considering the economic policy dimension 
was highly salient for the liberal party. The conclusion summarizes the 
findings and discusses the role of additional factors that influenced the 
German government process of 2017 and 2018, in particular patterns of 
intra-party conflict.
Party competition and coalition politics in Germany after 
2013
Two global processes have had a major impact on the development of the 
German party system, the parties’ programmatic profile and, therefore, 
the patterns of coalition politics in Germany since the 2013 Bundestag 
election. The first was the European economic and sovereign debt crisis 
(e.g. Grande and Kriesi 2015), which resulted in the founding of the AfD 
initially as a Eurosceptic political party. The party almost won parliamen-
tary representation in the 2013 parliamentary election. The second factor 
has been the ongoing European migrant crisis, which erupted in 2015. 
The latter saw integration and migration become the most important 
policy issue amongst German citizens (e.g. Kortmann and Stecker 2017) 
and resulted in the transformation of the AfD into a right-wing populist 
party with a strong emphasis on anti-migration and anti-Islam positions 
(Arzheimer 2015; Franzmann 2018).
While the AfD won parliamentary representation in 2014 in three 
East German state parliaments (it took between 9.7 and 12.2% of the 
votes) and won 7.1% of the vote share in the election for the European 
Parliament, the election results in early 2015 saw the parties’ vote share 
decline. The then still predominantly Eurosceptic party won 5.5 and 6.1% 
of the votes for the state parliaments in Hamburg and Bremen, respec-
tively. Polls indicated that the support for the party was decreasing up 
to summer 2015,1 when the party split and the moderate wing amongst 
former party chair Bernd Lucke left the AfD and founded a new, mar-
ket-liberal and Eurosceptic party which, however, was not successful 
1  For a compilation of monthly and weekly polling results for the time period between 
2013 and 2017, see for instance http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/politbarometer.
htm (accessed on 31 January 2018).
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in any election. The remaining part of the AfD, which now adopted a 
clear socially conservative, nationalist and anti-immigration policy pro-
file (Decker 2017, p. 59), benefitted from the waves of mass migration in 
the late summer and fall of 2015 and from the decision by the German 
federal government, led by Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU), to allow 
migrants to cross the border from Hungary into Austria and onward to 
Germany (for an overview, see Bieber et al. 2017).
Since there was no opposition in the Bundestag against the decision 
by the CDU/CSU–SPD coalition government, the AfD with its clear 
anti-immigration profile won support amongst citizens who did not feel 
represented by the migration policy of the federal government or the two 
opposition parties in the Bundestag, the Greens and The Left. This sense 
heightened in the wake of the New Year’s Eve sexual assaults in several 
German cities (Schwarzbözl and Fatke 2016; Schmitt-Beck et al. 2017). 
While support for the AfD was already at 9% amongst likely voters before 
Christmas 2015, in 2016 the number reporting they would consider 
voting for the AfD in a hypothetical Bundestag election rose to between 
11 and 13%.2 Even more important, in March 2016 the AfD won parlia-
mentary representation with more than 24% of the vote in another East 
German state (Saxony–Anhalt), but also in two important West German 
states: Baden–Wuerttemberg (15.1%) and Rhineland–Palatinate (12.6%). 
These election outcomes were an early signal that the AfD could not only 
win strong support amongst important segments of the electorate in the 
East German states, where electoral volatility is rather high, but also in 
Western Germany where traditional cleavage structures still exist and 
affect voting behaviour, albeit less so than in the past (see, e.g., Elff and 
Rossteutscher 2016; Arzheimer 2016).
The AfD is considered by the other parties represented in parliament 
as a pariah and is therefore excluded from the government formation 
process. Its electoral success therefore decreased the chances that a two-
party coalition amongst centre–left parties (i.e. the SPD and the Greens) 
or centre–right parties (the CDU/CSU and the FDP) could win a parlia-
mentary majority. Being aware of this scenario, the parties represented in 
the Bundestag elected in 2013—the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the Greens and 
The Left—as well as the FDP, which lost parliamentary representation 
in the German federal parliament for the first time, were more cautious 
to explicitly reject coalition options in the election campaigns of 2016 
2  http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/politbarometer.htm.
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and 2017. For instance, the Free Democrats formed a coalition govern-
ment with the SPD and the Greens in Rhineland–Palatinate in spring 
2016 while in Saxony–Anhalt the Greens joined the incumbent coalition 
CDU–SPD government, which lost its parliamentary majority because 
of the electoral success of the AfD in this state. The Left, the SPD and 
the Greens formed a left-wing coalition government in Thuringia after 
the 2014 state election, and—with the SPD as the strongest party—in the 
state of Berlin in the fall of 2016. Given the existence of a broad range 
of party combinations that formed state governments in Germany, 
including coalitions between the CDU and the Greens in Hesse and (with 
the Greens as the strongest party) in Baden–Württemberg, there was a 
widely shared expectation that—with the exclusion of the AfD—several 
coalition options could be realistic scenarios for the federal government 
formation process after the 2017 Bundestag election.
However, the 2017 Bundestag election campaign and the parties’ 
coalition strategies were significantly influenced by three state elections, 
which took place in March and May 2017. After nominating Martin 
Schulz as their candidate for chancellor and party chair in January 2017, 
the SPD saw its support amongst voters grew, so much so that the Social 
Democrats closed the gap with the CDU/CSU and in some polls even 
polled above the Christian Democrats.3 Because no poll gave a coali-
tion between the SPD and the Greens a majority, the Social Democrats 
became more open toward a coalition with The Left and did not rule 
out a coalition between themselves, the Socialists and the Greens during 
the Saarland state election campaign in February and March 2017.4 The 
SPD’s strategy was that replacing the CDU/SPD coalition government 
in the Saarland with a SPD-led coalition government that could include 
The Left and the Greens as junior partners would mobilize SPD mem-
bers and supporters and would be an optimal start to the election year. 
Furthermore—and importantly for legislative decision-making on the 
federal level—the only chance a left-wing majority could win in Germa-
ny’s second chamber, the Bundesrat, whose consent is needed for about 
40% of all legislation (Stecker 2016), was to replace the coalition between 
the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in the Saarland with a 
coalition that would exclude the CDU and the FDP. If the SPD together 
3  See http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/politbarometer.htm.
4 See http://www.handelsblatt.com/my/politik/deutschland/vor-der-landtagswahl-im-
saarland-rot-rot-gruen-die-neue-machtoption/19547456.html?ticket=ST-31022-aHT-
6KLbwYoDjWyFukcyo-ap1 (accessed on 31 January 2018).
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with the Greens had retained control over the state governments in North 
Rhine–Westphalia and Schleswig–Holstein (there with the support of the 
party of the Danish minority), which elected their state parliaments in 
May 2017, left-wing state governments in the Bundesrat would have con-
trolled 37 of 69 seats before and after the federal election. Such a situ-
ation would have made life easier for a potential coalition government 
between the SPD, the Greens and The Left at the federal level. Yet, the 
Christian Democrats won the election clearly. This was not only because 
of their popular top candidate, the incumbent state premier, Annegret 
Kramp-Karrenbauer, but also because they played on voters’ concerns 
about the possibility of a coalition between the SPD, The Left and the 
Greens after the state election and its consequences for policy outcomes 
in the Saarland.5
The Saarland state election not only marked the end of the ‘Schulz 
effect’—and thus also the SPD’s stellar performance in public opinion 
polls—but also set the stage for the defeat of the SPD-led state govern-
ments in Schleswig–Holstein and, more importantly still, in the former 
social democratic stronghold of North Rhine–Westphalia. While in the 
northern state of Schleswig–Holstein, the CDU, the FDP and the Greens 
easily came to an agreement and formed a so-called ‘Jamaica coalition’, 
the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats won enough seats in 
the North Rhine–Westphalian state parliament to form a majority gov-
ernment despite the AfD having won parliamentary representation. The 
Social Democrats fell back to 25% in the polls and all hopes of becoming 
the strongest party—or even of closing the gap with the CDU/CSU in 
terms of vote share—evaporated, before the critical phase of the Bunde-
stag election campaign even started.
As indicated above—and because of the expectation that the chances 
for a conservative–liberal or ‘red–green’ two-party coalition government 
are low in a Bundestag that consists of six parliamentary party groups—
the number of pre-electoral coalition rejections was significantly lower 
compared to previous Bundestag elections. Neither the CDU/CSU or the 
FDP ruled out a coalition with the Greens. Nor did the Social Demo-
crats reject cooperation with The Left. The Christian Democrats and the 
Liberals refused a coalition with the Left, and all five established par-
liamentary parties—the CDU/CSU, the FDP, the SPD, the Greens and 
5  See http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/martin-schulz-nach-saarland-wahl-
aergern-abhaken-weitermachen-a-1140525.html (accessed on 31 January 2018).
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The Left—explicitly ruled out a coalition or cooperation with the AfD. 
It is important to note that the state of Lower Saxony scheduled an early 
election for 15 October 2017, which is decisive for the explanation of the 
outcomes of the coalition negotiations after the Bundestag election on 24 
September 2017. The early election was due to the defection of a Green 
parliamentarian to the CDU, so that the incumbent coalition between 
the SPD and the Greens in Lower Saxony lost its parliamentary majority.
The outcome of the Bundestag election confronted the parties, as 
expected, with both a parliament of six parliamentary groups and one 
in which none of the traditional coalition formations—i.e. between the 
CDU/CSU and the FDP or between the SPD and the Greens—was able 
to command a majority. In contrast to the Bundestag elected in 2013, 
there was no longer a majority available for a ‘red–red–green’ coalition 
(see Table 10.1)—principally because the Social Democrats interpreted 
their result of 20.5% of the votes as a signal to end the ‘grand coalition’ 
and to become the main opposition party. Thus, the only possible option 
was a so-called ‘Jamaica coalition’ between the Christian Democrats, the 
FDP and the Greens. Representatives of these parties agreed to launch 
a discussion rounds after the state election Lower Saxony. There—sur-
prisingly—the Social Democrats emerged as the strongest party, but the 
incumbent SPD–Green coalition lost its majority. While, at the federal 
level, the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the Greens held coalition negotia-
tions for almost four weeks and drafted a discussion paper containing 
the agreed and partially agreed policy goals, in Lower Saxony the SPD 
and the CDU smoothly charted a coalition agreement after two weeks of 
negotiations, even though they had not worked together in coalition in 
Lower Saxony since 1970 (Koß and Spier 2008). On the federal level, the 
Free Democrats pulled out of coalition negotiations with the CDU/CSU 
and the Greens on 19 November because they were unable to obtain a 
commitment on their key electoral pledges like tax rate reductions.
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Table 10.1 Vote share and distribution of seats in the 2017 Bundestag 
election
Party Vote share (%)
(list votes)
Number of seats Seat share (%)
CDU/CSU 32.9 246 34.7
SPD 20.5 153 21.6
AfD 12.6 94 13.3
FDP 10.7 80 11.3
The Left 9.2 69 9.7
Greens 8.9 67 9.4
Others 5 - -
Total 100 709 100
Source: https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse.html.
Because the SPD had decided not to be part of the government formation 
process directly after the election, the most likely scenario seemed to be 
new elections in spring 2018. The German constitution, however, requires 
several rounds for a chancellor’s support to be tested in a new parlia-
ment before fresh elections can be called. On the third such round, only 
a plurality of votes is required—the German president must then decide 
whether to appoint the winning candidate or to call for fresh elections. 
Given this complicated procedure, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
(SPD), who had been the candidate of the grand coalition and assumed 
office in spring 2017, appealed to his party and its chair to revisit the 
hard-line stance and consider again joining a governing coalition with 
the CDU/CSU. The Social Democrats followed the president’s advice 
and began discussions with the Christian Democrats, which resulted in 
a draft paper of the negotiated compromises. On that basis, a majority of 
56% of the delegates of a special SPD congress voted in favour of starting 
official coalition negotiations. The coalition policy agreement finally won 
the support of a majority of CDU and CSU delegates in special party con-
gresses, and of almost two-thirds of SPD members in a direct vote and 
the coalition government took office in March 2018.
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Data and methods
To show how the policy profile of German parties influenced the com-
plexity of the German government formation process in 2017 and 2018, 
we build on a dataset that includes not only information on the parties’ 
positions on the relevant policy dimensions, but also on the salience 
attached by a party to policy dimensions (Bräuninger and Debus 2012; 
Bräuninger et al. 2018). The policy space is assumed to be two-dimen-
sional, comprising a socio-economic left–right dimension and a conflict 
line differentiating permissive and restrictive positions on immigration 
(e.g. Kriesi et al. 2006). The selection of this second dimension is also 
based on the fact that immigration and integration issues were at the top 
of the political agenda in Germany since 2015 (Kortmann and Stecker 
2017). To get an expert judgement on the policy positions of the German 
parties in 2017, we replicated the Benoit and Laver (2006) expert survey 
and performed a new expert survey amongst German political scientists 
in November 2017, in which almost 120 political scientists participated 
(see Bräuninger et al. 2018 for an overview). Just like in the Laver and 
Hunt (1992) and Benoit and Laver (2006) expert surveys, we refer to the 
average score of the expert judgements to estimate the party positions 
and the party-specific policy dimension saliency.
To measure the positions of the negotiation papers between the 
CDU/CSU, the FDP and the Greens from November 2017 and between 
the CDU/CSU and the SPD, published in January 2018, as well as of the 
coalition agreement between the Christian Democrats and the Social 
Democrats, we apply the Wordscores technique (Laver et al. 2003). The 
Wordscores method provides—at least for the German parties—reliable 
information and shows a high correlation with other estimates on party 
positions like the ones of the Comparative Manifesto Project (see, e.g., 
Bräuninger et al. 2013; Hjorth et al. 2015). The positions of the two nego-
tiation papers and the coalition agreement were estimated by including 
their full text into a Wordscores analysis that estimated the policy posi-
tions of election manifestos and coalition agreements in Germany on 
the state and federal level (Bräuninger and Debus 2012; Bräuninger et 
al. 2018). Reference texts are the manifestos of the CDU/CSU, the SPD, 
the FDP and Greens for the Bundestag elections in 1990, 2002 and 2017, 
the manifesto of the socialist PDS and The Left for the Bundestag elec-
tions in 2002 and 2017, and the AfD 2017 Bundestag election manifesto. 
Reference scores that provide information on the policy positions of the 
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respective parties in 1990, 2002 and 2017 stem from the expert surveys 
by Laver and Hunt (1992), Benoit and Laver (2006), and Bräuninger et al. 
(2018), respectively.
The distances between parties on the two selected dimensions are 
weighted by the party-specific relative saliency of the respective dimen-
sion. Parties with a focus on economic policy, for instance, will concen-
trate more on that issue when searching for their coalition partners while 
the programmatic distances between the parties on other policy dimen-
sions should be less important (Hinich and Munger 1997). The applied 
measure of the programmatic heterogeneity of a party combination 
therefore takes the party-specific dimension saliencies into account (see 
Debus 2009, pp. 48–52).
The policy profile of German parties and coalition policy 
agreements after the 2017 Bundestag election
Figure 10.1 presents the positions of German federal parties on an eco-
nomic left–right dimension and on a policy dimension that differentiates 
between permissive and restrictive positions on immigration. In addi-
tion, Figure 10.1 shows the estimated positions of the negotiation papers 
that the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the Greens as well as the CDU/CSU and 
the SPD drafted and published after the negotiation rounds in November 
2017, January 2018, and March 2018, respectively.
In terms of simple policy distances, there are two coherent blocs. The 
first consists of the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Socialists, which 
adopted not only economic policy positions that favour a strong state 
which intervenes in economic, financial and labour issues, but also prefer 
more permissive migration and integration policies. The second group of 
parties consists of the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the AfD. While all three 
parties, especially the Free Democrats, prefer market-liberal approaches 
to economic issues, they also share a common view on migration—pre-
ferring a more restrictive policy, especially the AfD and the CSU. This 
group of three parliamentary parties—the CDU and CSU are separate 
parties but have formed a common parliamentary party group at the fed-
eral level since 1953—with cohesive policy positions would have formed 
a comfortable majority in the parliament. But since the AfD is excluded 
by all other parties from the government formation process, neither the 
centre–right parties nor the parties located to the left of the centre on 
both policy dimensions under consideration controlled a majority in the 
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newly elected Bundestag. This simple illustration of the party positions 
on two key policy dimensions already demonstrates why the government 
formation process was so thorny in 2017. The pariah status of the AfD 
means a majority coalition needs at least one party from the other ideo-
logical camp.
Figure 10.1. Policy positions of German federal parties and coalition 
negotiation papers, 2017–2018
Note: Coalition negotiation papers are from: CDU/CSU–FDP–Greens (‘Jamaica’); 
and CDU/CSU–SPD (‘grand coalition’) Source: Bräuninger et al. (2018).
Finding a policy compromise thus becomes much more complicated, 
in particular when also taking the party-specific dimension saliencies 
into account (see Table 10.2). With the ‘Jamaica’ partners, immigration 
policy was more important for the CDU/CSU—and even more so for 
the Greens—compared to economic policy. For the Free Democrats by 
contrast, economic policy was clearly more important than immigration 
policy. It is therefore no surprise that the negotiation rounds between 
these three parties took more than four weeks and failed in the final 
instance. The distance between the position paper that emerged from the 
Jamaica negotiation rounds and the position of the FDP on the economic 
policy dimension—for the Free Democrats very important—was very 
large. In addition, the Greens would have had to accept rather restrictive 
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immigration policies although this dimension is of high salience to the 
Greens.
Based on the party positions and policy dimension saliencies, finding 
a policy compromise between the CDU/CSU and the SPD should have 
been much easier compared to the Jamaica constellation. Not only was 
the policy distance between the Christian and Social Democrats smaller 
on the two policy dimensions, but both dimensions are also of similar 
importance for the parties. The negotiated policy compromises, which 
CDU/CSU and the SPD published in a paper in January 2018 and in the 
coalition agreement in early February 2018, are located almost on the 
Pareto surface between the positions of the election manifestos of both 
parties and approximately reflect the arithmetic mean of the positions 
of both parties. The ideological heterogeneity—weighted by party-spe-
cific policy dimension saliency—was smaller for the CDU/CSU–SPD 
coalition (4.87) than the Jamaica one (5.26, see Table 10.3). A CDU/
CSU–FDP coalition would have been the most homogeneous one in pro-
grammatic terms with a score of 1.36. These results indicate that neither a 
‘grand coalition’ nor a ‘Jamaica coalition’ was the optimal outcome of the 
government formation process in terms of ideological cohesion within 
the coalition. However, the ‘grand coalition’ was the ‘lesser evil’ since an 
ideologically more compact coalition between the CDU/CSU and FDP 
did not win a majority in the Bundestag and a coalition between the 
Christian Democrats, the Liberals and the AfD was rejected by former 
two parties. 
Table 10.2. Relative salience of economic and immigration policy for 
German federal parties in 2017
Party Economic policy Immigration policy
CDU/CSU .479 .521
SPD .541 .459
AfD .327 .673
FDP .582 .417
The Left .552 .448
Greens .428 .572
Source: Bräuninger et al. (2018).
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Table 10.3. Ideological heterogeneity of selected party combinations
Party combination Weighted ideological heterogeneity 
within coalition
CDU/CSU–SPD 4.87
CDU/CSU–FDP–Greens 5.26
CDU/CSU-AfD-FDP 3.17
CDU/CSU–FDP 1.36
SPD-Greens-Left 2.19
Note: Figures weighted by party-specific policy dimension saliency. Source: 
Bräuninger et al. (2018).
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been to analyse the government formation 
process in Germany after the 2017 Bundestag elections. Based on a 
description of the development of German party competition after 2013, 
the findings indicate that the policy profile of German federal parties on 
economic and immigration policies—in terms of positions and dimen-
sion saliencies—mattered for the outcome of the government formation 
process. A coalition between the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the Greens 
was ideologically very diverse, and neither the Liberals nor the Greens 
could enforce their policy positions on the dimensions that are of high 
importance to them (and their voters). Negotiations between the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Social Democrats only started after the German 
president acted as a formateur and convinced the leadership of his party 
to start negotiations with the CDU/CSU.
The initial unpopularity within the Social Democrats of again forming 
a coalition government with the CDU/CSU under the chancellorship of 
Angela Merkel might have had a positive effect on the bargaining poten-
tial of the party in the negotiations (Baumann et al. 2017). However, 
looking to the future it might lead toward the breakup of the third grand 
coalition cabinet under her leadership. The positions of the SPD and the 
CSU on integration policy differ widely as Figure 10.1 has shown, and 
both parties have to stick to their electoral pledges in order to win back 
a clear policy profile, also in the lead up to elections for the state parlia-
ments in Bavaria and Hesse in the fall of 2018. An open question, which 
needs to be discussed in future research, concerns the implications of the 
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contention in intra-party debates on the outcomes of the coalition nego-
tiations, both in terms of government formation and policy.
An early dissolution of the parliament was not likely to result in an 
easier government formation process. If AfD and The Left were to receive 
a similar share of votes in a fresh election and the CDU/CSU did not win 
more than 35%, the members of the Bundestag would be in the same 
situation as in fall and winter of 2017/2018. It seems that German par-
ties will have to get used to governing either in ideologically more het-
erogeneous coalitions (like in the Netherlands)—which requires party 
supporters and voters to accept and welcome policy compromises—or in 
minority governments like in Scandinavian countries. The latter is not as 
perilous as it sounds, as it could give either the Social Democrats or the 
Christian Democrats the chance to develop a new policy profile while in 
opposition.
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A Transformation from Within? 
Dynamics of Party Activists and the 
Rise of the German AfD
Julia Schulte-Cloos & Tobias Rüttenauer
Introduction
In contrast to many other Western European countries, post-war Ger-
many has historically lacked an established, populist, radical right party 
(Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen 2011). One reason for the virtual absence 
of such a party1—despite clear mobilization potential within the elec-
torate—is Germany’s ‘fascist legacy’, which still stigmatizes a vote for the 
populist radical right (Decker 2013). In 2013, a group of former liberal–
conservative party members and economics professors founded a policy 
platform which tapped into the public’s discontent about the repeated 
bailouts for Europe’s crisis-ridden debtor countries. Even though it was 
founded only seven months prior to the federal election in 2013, the 
party won 4.7 percent of votes and came close to entering the Bundestag. 
Subsequently, the party succeeded to achieve parliamentary representa-
tion in all following state elections as well as in the European Parliament.
While gradually gaining ground in the German multiparty system, 
the party also experienced an influx of members, leading to a factional 
struggle between the original neoliberal Eurosceptic segment and the 
more radical, culturally conservative wing of the party. In July 2015, the 
most visible and charismatic of the three original party leaders, Bernd 
Lucke, an economics professor, failed to achieve re-election at a party 
convention that was open to all current dues-paying party members and 
1  Prior to the establishment of the AfD none of the populist radical right parties, which 
occasionally succeeded in state elections, could also persist in the federal electoral are-
na.
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even to activists who applied for membership at the convention (Alter-
native für Deutschland 2015d; Alternative für Deutschland 2015a). In 
the following period, the party faced an internal split. This split not only 
brought about the former leader’s resignation from the party (Franzmann 
2016b; Arzheimer 2017) but also a 20% drop in the number of party 
members (Hensel et al. 2016, p. 8). Along with roughly 3,000 party mem-
bers, the full ‘scientific advisory board’ left, which was made up exclu-
sively of economists who belonged to the earliest group of party members 
(Franzmann 2016a; Arzheimer 2015). However, following this period of 
membership withdrawal immediately after the split, the party saw a rapid 
influx of new party activists. Just ten months later, the party had recov-
ered from the fission and membership figures were even exceeding the 
numbers prior to the internal split, amounting to a 60% increase at the 
end of the year following the drop split.
We argue that these entry–exit dynamics within the young party, 
which had yet to institutionalize, brought about a compositional change 
of its membership base. Carefully specifying different hierarchical and 
spatial models, we show that: (1) the density of party members fluctuated 
substantially over time and; (2) this fluctuation significantly changed the 
compositional profile of party activists engaging in decision-making on 
party affairs. By relying on socio-contextual data and a novel dataset on 
the spatial density of AfD members across Germany, we estimate a pre–
post design and demonstrate that post-fluctuation activists come largely 
from lower-income regions whereas pre-fluctuation activists were largely 
from more affluent areas. This finding is highly robust across different 
model specifications and geo-spatial scales of analysis. In light of the 
party’s gradual shift to the populist right and the adoption of an Islam-
ophobic party manifesto—which was developed and approved by party 
activists post-fluctuation—the findings suggest that the altered activist 
composition contributed to the party’s radicalization.
Membership dynamics over time
Just like many other new parties and political entrepreneurs across 
Europe (Scarrow 2014, p. 193), the AfD granted decision-making power 
to the wider party base to incentivize membership enrolment. Those 
party members were deemed crucial for several reasons. In the initial 
stages of party set-up, the AfD depended on members to finance its cam-
paigns, to create linkages with the wider electorate, and to build local 
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strongholds. Growing numbers of party members initially also served to 
prove the increasing political importance of the party, helping the AfD to 
gain some legitimacy within the German political system by indicating 
broad public support.
The early issues of the party’s print magazine ‘AfD Kompakt’ illustrate 
that the original leaders were actively engaging in member recruitment. 
An increase in party members appeared beneficial for four reasons. The 
leaders were first trying to find candidates for local and municipal elec-
tions (see Alternative für Deutschland 2014a). Second, they wanted to 
attract activists who were willing to campaign for the party within the 
different regions of Germany. Third, the rapidly increasing member 
base of the party was widely covered by the media, adding to the public 
visibility of the party (Alternative für Deutschland 2015c). Finally, the 
party wanted to access public funding, which in Germany operates on a 
matching basis. According to the German party financing law, parties are 
only entitled to state funding up to the amount of annual revenue raised 
by themselves (see Federal Ministry of the Interior 2009, section 18 (5) 
Act on Political Parties; see also Alternative für Deutschland 2014b, p. 
3). To access more than €5 million of state funding after the electoral 
successes of 2014, the young party needed a large number of fee-paying 
members. Consequently, in late 2014, the AfD attempted to recruit more 
than 2000 members within only three months (‘Mitgliederoffensive’). 
While their recruitment strategy was effective in attracting the desired 
number of new activists, a close reading of the party’s documents also 
reveals that the party lost more than 500 members, i.e. a quarter of those 
who had newly joined within the same period of time (Alternative für 
Deutschland 2015b, p. 3). Considering its as yet incomplete institution-
alization, this volatility reflects the fact that only a fraction of activists 
retained stable ties to the young party.
Figure 11.1 illustrates the development of the net number of party 
members over time, linking the numbers to the internal party fission 
that the party experienced in its early phase. The graph also indicates 
the two points in time that we use to measure the composition of the 
respective members (first and second party convention). While mem-
bership figures need to be treated with caution (Heidar 2006, p. 303), we 
cross-validate the numbers reported by the party’s print magazine with 
the annual reports by the president of the German Bundestag according 
to the federal law on political parties (see also Niedermayer 2017). The 
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graph visualizes the local minimum of member density stemming from 
the exit of many original members after the resignation of the party’s 
founder. It is evident that member density fluctuated substantially over 
time. The aggregate numbers of membership density still conceal the 
entry–exit dynamics on the individual level as they present net-numbers 
of change. Party documents and statements from party officials, however, 
suggest that the fluctuation over time was even greater (Neuerer 2014). In 
view of the party’s inclusive procedures of candidate nomination, leader 
selection and adoption of policy platforms, the composition of active 
party activists can be considered important for the evolution of the par-
ty’s positional profile, its policy shifts, and its electoral competitiveness.
Figure 11.1: Development of AfD party members over time
Source: AfD Kompakt/ annual report according to federal law on political parties
We test whether the entry–exit dynamics changed the composition of 
the party activists by analysing the socio-spatial context of AfD activists 
at two different points in time. The first measure relates to the party’s 
activist distribution prior to its largest membership fluctuation while the 
latter relates to the distribution afterwards. As discussed, this aggregate 
member density loss only reveals net changes of party members. Relying 
on those two measures, thus, presents an underestimate of the impact of 
fluctuations as the actual entry–exit dynamics over time were even larger 
in size. We now move to describe the data and method used to analyse 
whether the entry–exit dynamics had an impact on the compositional 
profile of party members engaging in party affairs.
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Socio-spatial changes in the membership composition
Previous research uses population surveys to study changes in member-
ship numbers (e.g. Ponce and Scarrow 2016) or cross-sectional surveys 
amongst party members (Seyd and Whiteley 2004; Kölln and Polk 2017; 
Webb, Poletti and Bale 2017). As we focus on the initial period of the par-
ty’s existence, population surveys do not contain sufficient cases of AfD 
members. To the best of our knowledge, there are also no cross-sectional 
surveys amongst AfD party members available. Hence, we choose an 
innovative strategy to study the dynamic distribution of activists within 
the AfD by analysing the socio-economic context of party activists at 
two different points in time (for a similar design, see Goodwin, Ford and 
Cutts 2013). Though we do not have any information on the individual 
socio-economic status of party members, this contextual approach allows 
us to exploit the large regional disparities across Germany and analyse 
the changing membership composition of the party over time. The anal-
ysis draws on data of party activists of the German AfD attending the 
party convention in January 2015 and in April 2016. This data has been 
publicly released by an independent news organization (Indymedia 
2016a; Indymedia 2016b). We used a completely anonymized version of 
this dataset to compute AfD activist density per spatial unit and link this 
information to socio-economic and cultural indicators. In drawing on 
socio-economic data on activists’ neighbourhood composition and ana-
lysing dynamic changes thereof, we present a novel research design over-
coming some of the problems emerging when surveying party members, 
like selective non-response amongst members or data truncation due to 
missing data on party leavers.
The number of AfD members for each geographical unit is calculated 
on two spatial scales. First, we conduct a federal level analysis by linking 
party members to 299 federal electoral districts. Second, to strengthen 
the robustness of our results and to further increase the between-vari-
ance of spatial clusters while minimizing the within-variance, we ‘zoom’ 
into the socio-economic context of activists. We move to a much smaller 
unit of analysis and study the change in the activists’ neighbourhood 
composition on a micro-spatial level (city subdistricts).
The outcome of interest is the change in the number of AfD activists 
within each spatial district, which is computed as the difference between 
the number of AfD members from the first and the second convention. 
The independent variables are socio-cultural indicators of their regions 
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and neighbourhoods (Bundeswahlleiter 2017). We measure regional dis-
parities across Germany by including the average income in each district, 
the unemployment rate, the percentage of non-native inhabitants as well 
as the share of people in old age. Exploiting the regional variation of low- 
and high-status settings, we examine whether the contextual composition 
of the German AfD has changed in the course of the density fluctuation.
In a first step, we regress the change in party members for each district 
on the socio-cultural covariates by using state-fixed OLS regression. Due 
to the inclusion of state dummies, the analysis relies only on the with-
in-state variance of the dependent and independent variables. This con-
trols for the different distances of states to the two locations of the con-
ventions.2 Figure 11.2 visualises the change in density of AfD activists on 
the federal level. Using absolute numbers without state-level ‘de-meaning’ 
(left panel), the number of AfD members decreased most strongly within 
those electoral districts that are geographically close to the location to 
the first (northern) and distant to the second (southwestern) convention. 
Yet, when accounting for different state means (right panel), the change 
in member density does no longer follow this distance-pattern.
Figure 11.2. Geographical Distribution of Δ in AfD members across 
Germany
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
2  This is based on the assumption that within a given state, the number of AfD members 
would have decreased randomly with increasing geographical distance (and vice versa) 
between the two conventions if the composition would not have changed selectively by 
the socio-economic context.
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In a second step, we estimate two different multilevel models to take the 
clustered data structure into account: a random intercept and a state/city-
fixed intercept random slope (FI–RS) model. While the former controls 
for the hierarchical data structure (districts nested in states and cities, 
respectively), the latter additionally allows for varying slopes between 
the different clusters and an individual intercept.3 Though the multilevel 
models account for the hierarchical nature of the data, these models 
ignore the geographical position of units within the respective cluster. 
Moran’s I statistic reveals highly significant and positive autocorrelation 
between neighbouring sub-units (values of 0.618 / 0.230 for the change 
in members and 0.682 / 0.539 for income on the federal and city level), 
indicating that observations are autocorrelated on a more fine-grained 
level. Thus, we also estimate a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) to account 
for this interdependence of observations by controlling for the values of 
the response variable as well as the covariates from neighbouring spatial 
units (e.g. LeSage and Pace 2009; Halleck Vega and Elhorst 2015).4
Figure 11.3 plots the coefficients of the socio-economic indicators on 
the change in the density of AfD party members across Germany (see 
also Table 11.1). All variables are standardized; hence, the effects can be 
interpreted in terms of standard deviations. Neither the unemployment 
rate, nor the share of citizens from non-native origin have a significant 
influence on the difference in AfD members between both conventions. 
The only socio-economic variables that significantly correlate with the 
change in AfD party members in a given spatial district, are the average 
income level and the age structure. The income effect is significant on 
the 5% level in three out of our four model specification accounting for 
the hierarchical nature of the data and the spatial clustering and signifi-
cant on the 10% level in the fixed intercept and random slope model (see 
column 3 of Table 11.1), which mainly results from a loss of efficiency 
(as can be seen by the increased standard error). The income coefficient 
is negative, indicating that post-fluctuation significantly fewer AfD party 
members come from districts with a high-income level. 
3  Note that the model we specify includes not one fixed intercept but an individual 
intercept for each higher unit (electoral district / city). This is essentially similar to 
fixed-effects panel models or within-group demeaning (e.g. Enders and Tofighi 2007).
4  The formal model is given by y=αι+ϱWy+Xβ+WXΘ+ε, where y is response vector, 
X the matrix of covariates, β the standard coefficient vector, ϱ a spatial parameter, Θ 
a second spatial parameter vector and ε the error vector. W specifies the N×N spatial 
weights matrix (all  for neighbouring i and j≠i, and  otherwise). Throughout this chap-
ter we use a row-normalized contiguity weights matrix, which defines all observations 
as neighbours that share at least one common border.
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Figure 11.3. Socio-economic indicators predicting change in density 
of AfD party members (federal level, N= 299).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
The size of this effect appears also relatively large. For each standard 
deviation in income the districts experience a 0.143 to 0.184 stronger 
decrease in AfD members between the conventions. When increasing a 
region’s income by two quartiles from the 25th percentile to the 75th per-
centile (this corresponds to around one-and-a-half standard deviations) 
and keeping all other variables constant, the density of AfD members 
observed post-fluctuation decreases by two members as compared to the 
density of activists observed pre-fluctuation. At the same time, there is a 
significant shift in the age structure of the districts where AfD members 
come from. In districts with a higher percentage of people in old age 
the density of AfD members increases in the course of the entry–exit 
dynamics (the size is comparable to the income effect).
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Table 11.1: Effect of socio-economic indicators on change in density of 
AfD party members (federal level)
State-fixed 
OLS
RI Mixed FI–RS 
Mixed
SDM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income  -0.143**  -0.157**  -0.184*  -0.161** 
 (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.100)  (0.073) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 -0.060  -0.118  -0.119  0.020 
 (0.103)  (0.098)  (0.107)  (0.102) 
Migration Back-
ground 
 0.054  0.078  0.070  -0.127 
 (0.099)  (0.095)  (0.099)  (0.107) 
Old Age  0.163**  0.186**  0.184**  0.161* 
 (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.076)  (0.083) 
Constant  1.538***  -0.279  1.372***  -0.011 
 (0.159)  (0.223)  (0.450)  (0.039) 
Observations 299 299 299 299
Adjusted R2 0.551
Log Likelihood -335.047 -313.004 -312.750
Akaike Inf. Crit. 684.094 674.009 647.500
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Units of analysis are federal electoral districts. 
SDM: not the coefficients itself but direct impacts are reported.
These results support the idea that the party experienced a compositional 
change in its membership profile in terms of the members’ socio-spatial 
context. Following the withdrawal of activists after the party’s internal 
fission and the influx of new party members thereafter, party affairs were 
decided upon by members coming from districts with a lower average 
income and a higher percentage of people in old age than before.
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Figure 11.4: Socio-economic indicators predicting change in density 
of AfD party members (city level, N= 485).
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
In an attempt to strengthen these findings, we ‘zoom’ into spatially much 
smaller units and predict the density of AfD members within city dis-
tricts by taking the different neighbourhood compositions into account. 
The model specifications mirror the previous ones, only the spatial scale 
of the geographical units is much smaller (median number of inhabitants: 
7,232), leaving us with N = 485 observations. We include both the two 
respective host cities (Bremen and Stuttgart) of the party conventions as 
well as two additional Western German cities (Frankfurt, Hamburg) and 
two Eastern German cities (Leipzig, Dresden). The associated socio-eco-
nomic characteristics were obtained from the local statistical offices upon 
request. The coefficients for these models are shown in Figure 11.4. All 
coefficients support the findings from the federal analysis but the share of 
people in old age, which turns insignificant (see Table 2). The percentage 
of people in old age can be considered to measure ‘low status settings’ 
on the federal level as the young working population tends to move into 
economically strong regions. Yet, within the spatially smaller units of city 
subdistricts this selective out-migration of the young does not take place. 
Thus, while a high percentage of people in old age may indicate that a 
German region is socio-economically speaking disadvantaged (Untiedt 
2016), this does not hold on the city level.
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Table 11.2: Effect of socio-economic indicators on change in density of 
AfD party members (city level)
State-fixed 
OLS
RI Mixed FI–RS 
Mixed
SDM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income  -0.251***  -0.233***  -0.448**  -0.184*** 
 (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.178)  (0.065) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
 -0.034  -0.030  -0.065  -0.015 
 (0.062)  (0.060)  (0.064)  (0.062) 
Migration Back-
ground 
 -0.058  -0.038  -0.064  0.015 
 (0.093)  (0.084)  (0.093)  (0.104) 
Old Age  0.001  0.003  -0.016  0.029 
 (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.056) 
Constant  -0.396***  -0.055  -0.543*  0.005 
 (0.111)  (0.168)  (0.288)  (0.042) 
Observations 485 485 485 484
Adjusted R2 0.154
Log Likelihood -661.897 -648.558 -655.710
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,337.793 1,325.116 1,333.420
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Units of analysis are city neighbourhoods. 
SDM: not the coefficients itself but direct impacts are reported. One case omitted 
because of an empty neighbours set.
As already observed on the federal level, post-fluctuation—even within 
the six cities considered here—the density of AfD members decreases 
significantly in high-income neighbourhoods. The magnitude of this 
effects is even slightly stronger, ranging from 0.184 in the SDM to 0.251 
in the fixed-effects OLS model, and even 0.448 in the city-fixed intercept 
model with random-slopes for the predicting coefficients.5
5  The large effect in the FI–RS model is the results of varying slopes between cities.
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the composition of AfD activists engaging in 
party affairs has changed during the party’s formative period. In relying 
on a pre–post design, we show that the young party actor experienced 
substantial entry–exit dynamics owing to a rapid influx of new members 
and the withdrawals of others following an internal party split. Assessing 
the effects of the pronounced member fluctuation, we provide evidence 
that later party members significantly differ from their early counterparts 
regarding the socio-contextual characteristics of the regions they come 
from. By proposing a novel approach to study party members, our study 
overcomes some of the problems that emerge when surveying members, 
most importantly selective non-response amongst members or data 
truncation due to missing data on party leavers. The results of our anal-
ysis indicate that the AfD was subject to substantial alternations of its 
membership composition over time.
The compositional profile of the member base substantively changed 
in the process of the party’s institutionalization. Post-fluctuation, signifi-
cantly fewer AfD members come from high-income areas than pre-fluc-
tuation. It is important to note that the design of our study does not allow 
us to draw conclusions regarding the individual characteristics of party 
members. Yet, we show that post-fluctuation activists come from statis-
tically different social contexts. This result is very robust across model 
specifications and across different spatial levels of analysis. Evidently, the 
fluctuation of party members in the aftermath of the party fission and 
resignation of the original neoliberal party leader Bernd Lucke changed 
the overall composition of party activists engaging in internal party 
affairs and contributing to the party’s formation of policy preferences.
At the member-based party convention relating to our post-fluctu-
ation measure, the party adopted a highly culturally conservative and 
Islamophobic manifesto, which was developed and approved by the activ-
ists present at the convention (Alternative für Deutschland 2016). The 
adoption of the manifesto marked the end of the previous single-issue 
focus on neoliberal Euroscepticism (Hensel et al. 2016, p. 8). Franzmann 
(2017) offers a systematic analysis of the programmatic change of the AfD 
by relying on quantitative text analysis of every press release the party has 
issued during its existence (Franzmann 2017). His study finds a substan-
tive change in the programmatic focus of the young party post-fluctu-
ation. Prior to the party fission, the challenger actor emphasized both 
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economic and ‘new cultural’ issues, with a bias toward economic issues 
during the first months of its existence. Only after July 2015, when many 
of the original party members had left, did the party significantly shift 
its focus from a balanced composition of both cultural and economic 
issues to a virtually exclusive focus on the former set of issues. In light of 
the results of our analysis, this suggests that the compositional change of 
the member base that the AfD witnessed during its institutionalization, 
contributed to the party’s programmatic change and to its radicalization.
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Associative Issue Ownership and Can-
didate Preferences in the 2017 French 
Presidential Election
Romain Lachat
Introduction
The 2017 presidential election marked an important break in the French 
partisan landscape. Previous presidential contests have been dominated 
by the competition between candidates of two mainstream parties: the 
Socialists on the left and the Republicans (or its predecessors) on the 
right. However, in 2017 their respective candidates, Benoît Hamon 
and François Fillon, did not gather sufficient votes to qualify for the 
runoff. Instead, Emmanuel Macron of the new political movement En 
Marche!—who campaigned on a centrist platform—and Marine Le Pen 
of the right-wing populist Front National faced off in the final round. She 
confirmed her very strong standing in the polls, reaching the highest vote 
share the Front National had ever received in the first round of a presi-
dential election, with 21%. The election was also characterized by a very 
strong result for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the far-left movement 
La France Insoumise, who outperformed by far the Socialist candidate 
Hamon, gathering almost 20% of first-round votes. The strengthening 
of populist candidates on both sides of the ideological spectrum, and the 
weak results of mainstream parties’ candidates, have profoundly altered 
the traditional patterns of party competition in France.
These unexpected electoral results have prompted important ques-
tions about the determinants of citizens’ candidate preferences. The 
decline of established parties—the candidates of the Socialist party and 
of the Republicans won together less than half of the cumulated vote 
shares they had received in the first round of the previous presidential 
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election in 2012—signals a weakening of the role of traditional partisan 
allegiances in anchoring citizens’ votes. Also, the qualification of Macron 
and Le Pen for the second election round suggests that the traditional 
left–right divide, which has structured party competition for decades, has 
become less relevant. This may herald an important realignment process 
and the creation of new lines of partisan divide in France. Finally, the 
strong results of populist parties—which articulated fears linked with the 
economic and political consequences of globalization and European inte-
gration—underline the growing importance of issues that do not align on 
the traditional economic left–right divide.
Given this background, one might expect political issues, in par-
ticular those linked to the cultural dimension of the political space, to 
have played an important role in driving citizens’ candidate preferences. 
This chapter will thus focus on the role of issue preferences in the expla-
nation of citizens’ candidate preferences in the 2017 French presiden-
tial election, and it will address two main questions. The first is which 
issues, and which underlying ideological divides, played a central role 
in explaining citizens’ preferences. How strong was the impact of issues 
such as immigration and European integration, in comparison to the tra-
ditional economic issues? Second, this chapter will investigate the extent 
to which the impact of issue preferences varied between candidates.
Drawing on recent literature in the field of spatial models (Lachat 
2018; Lachat and Wagner 2018; Mauerer et al. 2015; Wagner 2014), the 
chapter suggests that the impact of issue preferences on voting propen-
sities may vary from candidate to candidate. In particular, it suggests 
that this expected variation in the impact of issue preferences should be 
related to associative issue ownership. This concept refers to the percep-
tion that a candidate is particularly engaged on a certain issue (Stubager 
2017; Van der Brug 2017; Walgrave et al. 2012). A key hypothesis pre-
sented in this chapter is therefore that the electoral utility of a candidate 
will depend more strongly on those issues with which that candidate is 
associated in citizens’ minds than on issues for which there is no such 
association.
Associative ownership as a moderator of issue voting
The role of issue preferences in the voting decision process is often 
analysed in a spatial modelling framework (Downs 1957; Merrill and 
Grofman 1999). It assumes that voters will evaluate the electoral attrac-
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tiveness of the various candidates or parties based on how their policy 
proposals compare to their own issue preferences. Citizens’ expected util-
ities for the various candidates in competition should thus be a function 
of the voter–candidate distances in a political space defined by one or 
several issue dimensions (Adams et al. 2005; Enelow and Hinich 1984). 
In this approach, the importance of issue preferences as determinants 
of voting choice can vary between respondents. Typically, citizens with 
a higher degree of political sophistication will, for instance, rely more 
strongly on issue preferences to evaluate parties (e.g. Rivers 1988; Singh 
2010). However, it is usually assumed that the importance of issues does 
not vary between parties or candidates for a given voter. That is, spatial 
models expect citizens to have a fixed set of criteria with which all can-
didates are evaluated and compared. For instance, in a proximity model 
(Merrill and Grofman 1999) with K issue dimensions, the utility of cit-
izen i for candidate j can be defined as:
1)
That is, the expected utility () will depend on the distance between the 
voter’s position () and the corresponding candidate’s position () on the 
various issue dimensions, as well as on a candidate-specific constant (), 
which captures variation in the popularity of candidates due to other fac-
tors. In that model, the impact of voter–candidate distances (the  param-
eters) is allowed to vary from issue to issue, but not between candidates.
However, some scholars have suggested that this assumption of spa-
tial models may be too restrictive. Several studies have shown how the 
determinants of electoral utilities may vary between different parties or 
candidates (e.g. Lachat 2014; Lachat and Wagner 2018; Mauerer et al. 
2015). In this chapter, I consider in particular the role of issue ownership 
as a potential moderator of issue voting. The issue ownership concept has 
long been recognized as a central factor in explaining party competition 
(Budge and Farlie 1983; Meguid 2005; Petrocik 1996). Parties or candi-
dates may develop a reputation for attention and competence in dealing 
with specific political issues. They should seek to increase the perceived 
importance of these issues, as voters are expected to be more likely to 
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support the party that owns the issues that dominate the political agenda 
(Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Petrocik et al. 2003).
More recently, scholars have suggested to distinguish between two 
facets of the original issue ownership concept, arguing that its associative 
and competence dimensions are conceptually and empirically distinct 
(Bellucci 2006; Stubager 2017; Van der Brug 2017; Walgrave et al. 2012, 
2015). Competence ownership refers to the perceived ability to handle a 
given issue, while associative ownership points to the perception that a 
party is the one that attaches the highest priority to the corresponding 
problem. Furthermore, their role in the voting decision process should 
also differ. While citizens are expected to be more likely to support a party 
they deem most competent on a given issue (Bélanger and Meguid 2008; 
Walgrave et al. 2012), associative ownership is not expected to not have 
such a direct impact on the propensity to support a candidate (Stubager 
2017; Walgrave et al. 2015). Rather, it may play an indirect role, influ-
encing the importance of an issue as an evaluation criterion (Lachat 2014, 
2018). A voter’s support for a candidate is expected to be more strongly 
related to the voter’s preferences on issues with which the candidate is 
perceived to be associated. For instance, attitudes toward the welfare state 
should play a stronger role in the evaluation of the electoral attractiveness 
of left-wing candidates, such as Hamon or Mélenchon. In contrast, the 
probability of support for the far-right candidate Le Pen is expected to 
depend more strongly on preferences in the domain of immigration, an 
issue which is often associated with right-wing populist parties.
This expected variation between candidates in the determinants of 
electoral utilities can be considered by modifying the standard prox-
imity model. In that revised model, the utility of voter i for candidate j is 
defined as:
2)
In contrast with the standard model of equation 1, the parameters  are 
now allowed to vary across both issue dimensions (k) and candidates (j). 
I expect these parameters, which capture how strongly voter–candidate 
distances on a given issue influence electoral utilities, to be related to 
associative issue ownership.
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Data
The main source of data on which I rely is the 2017 French Election 
Study. This is a panel study that started in late 2015 and ran for more 
than one-and-a-half years, covering both the May 2017 presidential elec-
tion and the June 2017 legislative election. The dependent variable is a 
measure of a citizen’s electoral utility for a given candidate. These were 
measured in wave 13, which was conducted in April 2017, shortly before 
the first election round. Respondents were invited to rate each candidate 
on an 11-point like–dislike scale, ranging from 0 (‘do not like at all’) to 
10 (‘likes a lot’). Note that while this question was asked for all 11 candi-
dates, the analyses in this chapter will be limited to the main five candi-
dates (Mélenchon, Hamon, Macron, Fillon, Le Pen).
Citizens’ issue preferences were measured in the preceding wave 
(conducted in late March–early April). I rely for that on a battery of ques-
tions on policy preferences, which included the following items:
• The state budget deficit
• The ease with which firms can lay off workers
• The minimum wage
• The number of foreigners in the country
• Gay rights
• The harshness of criminal sentencing
• The participation of France in the European Union
• axes on polluting activities
All of these questions asked respondents whether the corresponding item 
should, in France, be (strongly) increased or (strongly) decreased, and 
answers were coded on five-point scales. To compute distances between 
voters and candidates on these issues, I rely on the candidates’ positions 
that were coded as part of the Voting Advice Application ‘La boussole 
présidentielle’. This included a longer list of issues on which candidates’ 
positions were coded based on their electoral programme and public 
statements. Matching items could be found for each of the eight issues 
mentioned above, on which candidates’ positions were also coded using 
five-point scales.
A key variable for testing this chapter’s central hypothesis is associ-
ative issue ownership. To determine these candidate–issue associations, 
I rely on survey questions about voters’ perceptions. In wave 13 of the 
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panel, the same in which candidates’ ratings were measured, respond-
ents were asked about which candidate cares most about a give policy 
domain.1 The list of policy domains corresponds closely to the positional 
issues on which voters’ and candidates’ positions are measured. Such 
questions about associational issue ownership allow determination of 
which candidate is most often associated in voters’ minds with a given 
policy domain. However, the distribution of answers may also be influ-
enced by the overall popularity of candidates. This may be a problem 
for the present analysis, as the goal is to determine, for each candidate, 
the issues which are associated with him or her in citizens’ minds. The 
starting point should thus be candidates, rather than issues. For that 
reason, answers to the battery of questions on associative ownership are 
transformed, in order to better capture which issues are linked to a spe-
cific candidate. For each issue, the strength of the candidate–issue asso-
ciation is expressed as the number of respondents who consider that this 
candidate is the one that cares most about the corresponding problem, 
as a ratio of the average number of respondents who see this candidate 
as caring most, across all issue domains. The corresponding association 
measures are presented in Table 12.1.
Table 12.1. Candidate–issue associations
Mélenchon Hamon Macron Fillon Le Pen
Public finances 0.4 0.3 1.9 2.7 0.4
Workers’ protection 2.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4
Minimum wage 2.2 2.2 0.6 0.4 0.4
Immigration 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 3.2
Gay rights 0.8 1.6 1.0 0.3 0.3
Crime 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.6 2.0
EU 0.5 0.7 2.2 1.5 0.9
Environment 1.1 1.7 0.7 0.5 0.3
Average N 465 413 477 396 635
Notes: all ratios equal to or larger than 2.0 appear in bold.
1  Note that two different question wordings were used. Half of respondents were asked 
about which candidate ‘cares most’ about a policy domain, while the others were asked 
about which candidate ‘spontaneously comes to mind’ when thinking about this policy 
domain. In the analyses of this chapter, both samples are merged. 
PART 2 - Country-Specific Chapters
229
In the case of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, for instance, for each of eight policy 
domains an average of 465 respondents see him as caring most about it. 
On the specific question of public finances, the number of respondents 
who see Mélenchon as caring most is much lower—204 respondents—
corresponding to a ratio of 0.4. In the domain of workers’ protection, 
in contrast, 953 respondents think he is the one who cares most, which 
results in a ratio of 2.1. Based on these data, two measures of associative 
ownership are computed. First, I create a dummy variable to identify the 
ratios equal to or larger than 2.0 (printed in bold in Table 12.1). This 
variable leads to seven cases of associative ownership, one or two for each 
candidate. There are no particularly surprising results in this list of issue 
owners. The far-left candidate Mélenchon is associated with two tradi-
tional left-wing economic issues: workers’ protection and the minimum 
wage (sharing ownership of the latter with the socialist Hamon). The 
conservative candidate Fillon is associated with reduction of the public 
deficit. The far-right candidate Le Pen is very strongly linked to immi-
gration, and also to the issue of crime. Macron, finally, has the strongest 
association with the question of European integration. Note also that no 
candidate is deemed to own the issues of gay rights and environmental 
protection.2 While this first measure captures the strongest associations 
between candidates and issues, it ignores a lot of information by simply 
dividing all candidate–issue pairs into two categories. A second measure 
will thus rely on the exponential value of the ratio. I take the exponential 
rather than the ratio itself, in order to give more weight to increases in the 
strength of the association at large values.
To estimate the impact of issue preferences on candidate evaluations, 
as well as the moderating role of associative ownership, I proceed in two 
steps. First, I estimate the equation 2 model, separately for each of the 
five main candidates. By running candidate-specific models, the impact 
of issue distances is allowed to vary from candidate to candidate. The cor-
responding  parameters are generally expected to be negative, showing 
that the likelihood to vote for a candidate should be negatively related 
to voter–candidate issue distances. Yet, the magnitude of these effects 
may vary in strength from issue to issue. As the dependent variable is 
2  The candidate most strongly associated with the issue of gay rights is Hamon, but the 
ratio is below the threshold set for issue owners. Environmental protection is tradition-
ally associated with Green parties. But they did not field a candidate in the 2017 race. 
Amongst the 11 candidates, the strongest association for environmental issues is with 
Jean Lassalle, a political outsider who campaigned mainly on the protection of rural 
regions.
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a scale, this first series of models will be estimated with linear regres-
sions. In a second step, I pool the estimated  coefficients of the various 
issues and candidates and regress them on associative issue ownership. 
As the dependent variable of this second model is the value of an esti-
mated parameter, the model will be estimated with a feasible generalized 
least squares (FGLS) regression, in which observations are weighted to 
account for the varying degree of uncertainty of the first-step model esti-
mates (Lewis and Linzer 2005).
Results
I first present the results of the candidate-specific models. Table 12.2 
shows the estimated effect of absolute candidate–voter distances on the 
electoral utility of the five main candidates, and Figure 12.1 presents the 
same results in graphical form. Remember that the dependent variable is 
coded on a 0–10 scale, and that issue positions are measured on a 5-point 
scale, meaning that the distances can range from 0 to 4.
Table 12.2. Effect of voter–candidate issue distances on electoral 
utilities
Mélenchon Hamon Macron Fillon Le Pen
Deficit –0.54*** –0.42*** –0.13** –0.51*** –0.11*
Workers 
protect.
–0.72*** –0.59*** –0.50*** –0.91*** 0.12*
Minimum 
wage
–0.56*** –0.45*** –0.05 –0.31*** –0.14**
Foreigners –0.53*** –0.73*** –0.31*** –0.32*** –1.14***
Gay rights –0.29*** –0.35*** –0.14*** –0.46*** –0.40***
Crime –0.45*** –0.40*** –0.08 –0.20*** –0.32***
EU –0.20*** –0.22*** –0.74*** 0.07 –0.97***
Environment –0.22*** –0.24*** –0.30*** –0.28*** –0.22***
Constant 9.49*** 9.70*** 7.57*** 8.10*** 8.01***
R2 0.20 0.27 0.13 0.21 0.35
N 6,534 6,539 6,538 6,538 6,532
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Coefficients estimated with OLS regressions.
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Figure 12.1. Effect of voter–candidate issue distances on electoral 
utilities
Note: Estimates based on Table 12.1. Source: Author’s own elaboration.
With a few exceptions, all issues have a significant impact on the can-
didate utilities. This is perhaps not surprising given the large size of the 
sample, with more than 6,500 respondents in each model. More impor-
tant, however, is to stress that the magnitude of these effects is quite large, 
and they vary substantively between both issues and candidates. Across 
all issues and candidates, the average issue distance effect is –0.38. To 
illustrate the magnitude of this effect, consider a candidate who wants 
to strongly increase or decrease a given policy. If a voter moves from the 
candidate position to the middle position (a two-unit change), the pre-
dicted utility for this candidate will decrease by 0.76, which is about a 
quarter of the standard deviation of candidate utilities. As preferences 
on several issues are related, the cumulative impact of typical changes in 
cultural or economic issue preferences will be even larger.
Turning now to the question of the variation between candidates, the 
above results clearly show that they are not all evaluated based on the 
same issue criteria. The strongest contrast is between Le Pen and the left-
wing candidates, Mélenchon and Hamon. While the electoral utilities for 
the latter are most strongly related to economic preferences and to immi-
gration, the degree of support for Le Pen stands in a very strong relation 
to immigration and EU-related preferences, while it is virtually unrelated 
to economic attitudes. Contrary to the standard assumption of spatial 
models, citizens do not appear to rely on the same criteria to evaluate all 
candidates.
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This can be illustrated by computing how predicted candidate utili-
ties vary as a function of citizens’ positions. Based on the results of the 
Table 2 models, I compute the predicted electoral utilities for four candi-
dates (omitting Hamon), as a function of respondents’ attitudes toward 
workers’ protection, EU integration, and immigration. These predictions 
are computed while keeping the other issue positions constant, at their 
average values. As shown in Figure 2, citizens’ preferences regarding 
workers’ protection are strongly related to their evaluation of Mélenchon 
and Fillon, who correspond best to the polar opposites of the economic 
left–right divide.3 The evaluation of Le Pen, in contrast, is unrelated to 
these economic preferences.
Figure 12.2. Predicted electoral utilities as a function of attitudes 
toward workers’ protection
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
The observed patterns are quite different when considering non-eco-
nomic attitudes. Issue preferences in the domains of both European inte-
gration (Figure 12.3) and immigration (Figure 12.4) have a very large 
impact on the evaluation of Marine Le Pen. Attitudes toward the EU also 
have a strong impact on the evaluation of Macron, while being only very 
weakly related to the level of support for Fillon or Mélenchon. The effect 
of attitudes toward immigration, finally, is much weaker for the oppo-
nents of Le Pen, particularly for Fillon and Macron.
3  Note that I do not include confidence intervals in these graphs. Given the large num-
ber of observations, these intervals are always quite small. And including them would 
make reading the graphs more difficult.
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Of course, such differences in the impact of issue preferences are not 
equally strong for all issues or candidate pairs. Some issues seem to be 
equally important in the evaluation of all candidates. This is particularly 
the case for attitudes toward environmental protection and gay rights, 
which are also amongst the issues with the lowest average effect on party 
utilities, and which are not owned by any of the five main candidates.
Figure 12.3. Predicted electoral utilities as a function of attitudes 
toward European integration
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
Figure 12.4. Predicted electoral utilities as a function of attitudes 
toward immigration
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
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So far, these results have offered much evidence in favour of the gen-
eral hypothesis that the determinants of candidate utilities are not all 
explained by the same issue preferences—or at least that the impact of 
these preferences varies strongly in magnitude between candidates. This 
puts into question a central assumption of spatial models, which are usu-
ally based on the premise that a given citizen will compare the various 
choice alternatives with a fixed ‘vote function’.
The second main question raised in this chapter is linked with the 
explanation of such differences. I suggested that this variation in the 
effects of issue preferences should depend on the perceived associa-
tions between candidates and issues. To test this hypothesis, I turn to 
the second stage of the analysis, in which the estimated effects of candi-
date-specific models are regressed on candidate–issue associations. These 
results, presented in Table 12.3, confirm that associative ownership has a 
significant effect on the strength of the spatial component. In model 1, 
in which issue ownership is captured by a dummy variable, the relation 
between voter–candidate issue distances and electoral utilities is about 
twice as strong for the issue owner than for non-owners. The constant is 
equal to –0.28, which corresponds to the estimated impact of preferences 
toward budgetary rigor, for a candidate that does not own that issue. The 
effects for non-owners vary somewhat from issue to issue, as shown by 
the corresponding issue dummies. The average effect of voter–candidate 
distances on non-owners is equal to –0.33. When a candidate is the asso-
ciative owner of an issue, however, the impact of citizens’ preferences is 
twice as large.
Table 12.3. Impact of issue ownership on the strength of the relation 
between voter–candidate issue distances and candidate utilities
Model 1 Model 2
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Ownership
Dummy –0.32** 0.10
Exp(ratio) –0.02** 0.01
Issue dummies (ref. Deficit)
Workers protect. –0.18 0.15 –0.23 0.16
Minimum wage 0.10 0.15 0.02 0.15
Foreigners –0.26 0.15 –0.24 0.15
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Gay rights –0.05 0.15 –0.05 0.16
Crime 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.16
EU –0.07 0.15 –0.10 0.15
Environment 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16
Constant –0.28* 0.11 –0.21 0.12
R2 0.37 0.35
N 40 40
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Models estimated with FGLS regressions.
In model 2, which replaces the ownership dummy by a more encom-
passing measure, the effect is also significant. Remember that the ratio 
variable indicates how many voters view the candidate as owning the 
corresponding issue, in relation to the average number of respondents 
who consider this candidate as owning any issue. A ratio of 2, which cor-
responds for instance to the value observed for Le Pen on the crime issue, 
means that twice as many respondents consider that she is the one caring 
most about crime than the average number of respondents who think 
she cares most about any issue. When the ratio is equal to 0.5, corre-
sponding to a case of a weak candidate–issue association, the predicted 
spatial coefficient is equal to –0.33. The predicted effect becomes stronger 
with higher values of the ratio, with a predicted effect of –0.47 for a ratio 
of 2, and of –0.79 for a ratio of 3. Here again, the effect of associative 
ownership is not only statistically significant, but also substantially large.
To be more confident about this issue ownership effect, I performed 
a number of robustness checks, by changing the specification of the 
individual-level models: using quadratic rather than linear voter–party 
distances, controlling for political sophistication, and controlling for a 
variety of socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, 
social class, religiosity). Also, to minimize the risks that voters’ issue 
positions are influenced by their candidate evaluations, I re-estimated the 
models with voters’ issue positions measured in the first wave of the panel 
(that is, in November 2015). All these additional tests confirm the stated 
conclusions, by showing that the effect of issue distances is about twice 
as large for issue owners than non-owners. The corresponding results 
are presented in Table 12.4 for models based on the ownership dummy. 
Robustness tests conducted instead with the ratio variable lead to similar 
conclusions.
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Table 12.4. Robustness tests. Models estimated with FGLS regressions.
Squared 
distances
Control so-
phistication
Control 
socio-dem.
Wave 
1 issue 
positions
Ownership
Dummy –0.08** –0.31** –0.30** –0.25*
Issue dummies (ref. 
Deficit)
Workers protect. –0.04 –0.16 –0.16 –0.25
Minimum wage 0.03 0.09 0.07 –0.05
Foreigners –0.10* –0.26 –0.28 –0.38
Gay rights –0.02 –0.05 –0.03 –0.20
Crime 0.00 0.05 0.04 –0.01
EU –0.01 –0.06 –0.08 –0.02
Environment 0.01 0.02 0.01 –0.04
Constant –0.06 –0.28* –0.26* –0.17
R2 0.41 0.36 0.37 0.38
N 40 40 40 40
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Discussion
The 2017 French presidential election, like other recent electoral contests 
in Western Europe, was characterized by a rise of populist parties, intense 
debates on the national economic consequences of globalization, and an 
important transformation of the partisan landscape. These developments 
suggest that we may witness a phase of higher volatility and of weakening 
partisan attachments. This new political environment could also signal 
changes in the role of issue preferences and in the type of political divides 
that structure citizens’ electoral choices. For that reason, this chapter has 
focused on the impact of issue preferences in the explanation of voters’ 
candidate preferences. Such effects are most often analysed within the 
spatial modelling framework, which plays a central role in the study of 
electoral competition. It emphasizes the importance of issue preferences 
and policy proposals as determinants of candidate preferences. This 
relates to core aspects of theories of political representation, for which 
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issue or ideological congruence between citizens and their representa-
tives is seen as a central characteristic of a well-functioning system of 
democratic representation (Mair 2008; Powell 2000). The various spatial 
models of voting choice which have been suggested in the literature share 
a key assumption about the determinants of party and candidate evalua-
tions. It is normally assumed that a given citizen will compare the various 
contenders based on a fixed set of criteria.
This chapter has suggested that we rethink this assumption. The key 
hypothesis of the model introduced here is that citizens, when evaluating 
the electoral attractiveness of the various candidates, are more strongly 
influenced by the issues with which a given candidate is perceived to be 
associated. The results of the empirical analyses offer a lot of support for 
this hypothesis. Voter–candidate distances are more strongly related to 
the electoral utility for the issue owner than to the utilities for the other 
candidates. These differences are also substantively large, as the effect 
of citizens’ preferences on their electoral utilities was found to be about 
twice as large for the issue owner. Rather than a unique vote function 
used to compare all candidates in competition, citizens rely on evaluation 
criteria that vary in importance from candidate to candidate. Further-
more, the results appear to be robust across various specifications of the 
candidate utilities models.
These results have important implications for the way we conceive 
the process of candidate evaluations. They also reveal substantial dif-
ferences in the issues that explain the perceived electoral attractiveness 
of the five main contenders of the last French presidential election. The 
unprecedented support for Le Pen could suggest that her core issues—
immigration, European integration, and the fight against criminality—
have become more important in explaining citizens’ choices generally. 
While these issue preferences play indeed a central role in explaining the 
perceived electoral attractiveness of the far-right candidate, their impor-
tance is far less for her opponents. Attitudes toward the EU, for instance, 
are strongly linked to support for Macron, but not for the left-wing can-
didates or Fillon. Similarly, voters’ views on immigration matter a lot in 
explaining the electoral utilities for Mélenchon and Hamon, but not for 
Macron or Fillon. At the same time, the success of Macron and the weak 
scores of the Socialist and Conservative candidates could be interpreted 
as a decline in the role of the traditional left–right divide. But the results 
have shown that economic preferences remain central to explain the sup-
port for Fillon and the left-wing candidates.
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The Front National in the 2017 French 
Election: An Electoral Impasse?
Elie Michel
Introduction
In the first round of the 2017 French presidential election, Marine Le 
Pen finished in second position with 21.3% of the votes. With a record 
7.6 million votes, a Front National (FN) candidate accessed the runoff 
for only the second time in history. Marine Le Pen lost the second round 
in the election, taking 33.9% of the votes—Emmanuel Macron obtained 
roughly the double the number of votes as the FN candidate. These results 
constitute an unprecedented success for the FN, yet they are, at the same 
time, rather disappointing. Indeed, the FN had enjoyed a favourable con-
text in the year preceding the election and was benefitting from a posi-
tive electoral dynamic in the multiple second-order elections of 2014 and 
2015. The most salient and mediatized issues of the months leading to the 
campaign seemed to coincide with the FN’s traditional political agenda: 
the 2015 (ongoing) migration crisis in Europe, the 2016 Brexit and the 
election of Donald Trump, and the wave of terrorist attacks of 2015–2016 
in France. In addition, Marine Le Pen entered the 2017 presidential race 
building on the historical successes of the FN in the intermediate elec-
tions, and she regularly claimed that the FN was ‘France’s number one 
party’. In point of fact, the FN had ranked in first position in the 2014 
European elections (24.9%), and in the 2015 departmental (25.2%) and 
regional (27.7%) elections.1 However, the FN did not manage to con-
solidate these results, as the Parti Socialiste (PS) perpetuated its elec-
toral strategy of constructing a ‘front républicain’ to block the FN from 
gaining any sizeable local executive power. For months before the elec-
1  These first-place wins were for FN as an individual party; some party coalitions gar-
nered more votes overall.
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tion, opinion polls had expected Marine Le Pen to win the first round of 
the 2017 election with between 22 and 29%, yet she underperformed in 
both rounds of the presidential election. The 2017 legislative elections 
occurred about a month after the presidential contest and they confirmed 
this half success. Because of the two-round, single-member district elec-
toral system, parliamentary elections are conventionally unfavourable for 
the FN, and the radical right party finished third in terms of total votes. 
With 13.3% of the votes the FN gained only 8 seats out of 577 in the 
National Assembly—while this number is too low to constitute a parlia-
mentary group, it is also the party’s best performance in terms of seats 
since 1986.2
The 2017 French presidential election was exceptional from the cam-
paign through to the final results, and the election marks, possibly, the 
‘making of a new party system’ (Gougou and Persico 2017). However, 
this chapter takes a closer look at a paradoxical—and less visible—aspect 
of the 2017 election: while achieving its electoral record, the FN seems to 
have hit a glass ceiling. In particular, the strategic reorientations of Marine 
Le Pen’s campaign—and more widely the programmatic shift she intro-
duced in the FN—show signs of ‘strategic deadlock’ (Evans and Ivaldi 
2018). In order to understand the extent to which the 2017 presidential 
election was critical for the FN, it is important to put it in perspective 
with the party’s previous results and campaigning strategies. This chapter 
observes the strategy of the FN has been to adapt to changing constitu-
encies, which has consequently led the party to a strategic impasse. The 
remainder of this chapter: (1) gives an overview of the ongoing trans-
formation of the FN’s constituency in 2017 and over time; (2) describes 
the recent institutional transformation of the FN; (3) analyses the main 
issues of the 2017 presidential campaign; and (4) concludes on the stra-
tegic failure and possible re-orientation of the FN.
The transformation of the FN constituency
The following description of the FN constituencies is based on secondary 
analysis of survey data extracted from the post-electoral studies con-
ducted by the CEVIPOF (Centre de Recherche Politiques de Sciences Po) 
and the CEE (Centre d’Etudes Européennes). Notably, these data have 
constituted the core for analyses of each presidential campaign since 
2  1986 is the FN’s most successful legislative election, mainly due to the proportional 
representation system.
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1988 and are published in the collection Chroniques Electorales.3
Studies of the FN’s electorate have long pointed to a process of ‘pre-
carization’ of FN voters over time. More precisely, the important work-
ing-class composition of the FN constituencies has been long established: 
the core of the FN’s voters is found amongst the lower classes (‘électorat 
populaire’, Perrineau 2013) and blue-collar workers. Indeed, Betz argued 
of the proletarization of the radical right voters has its roots in the early 
1990s, and the working-class dimension of the FN constituencies is a 
long-term phenomenon (Betz 1994). Based on 1995 results, Perrineau 
has already identified the ‘second lepénisme’ (as an opposition to a more 
traditional petty bourgeois electorate, Perrineau 1997), or more pre-
cisely described the working-class vote for the FN as ‘ouvriero-lepénisme’ 
(Perrineau and Ysmal 1995). These authors argued that the sociological 
profile of the FN voters had consequences in terms of political prefer-
ences, which they labelled ‘gaucho-lepénisme’ to stress the economically 
left oriented preferences of these voters. The working-class tint of the 
FN constituencies is also observable at the aggregate level. Industrial 
regions—with higher proportion of workers and long established heavy 
industries—tend to support the FN in higher proportions than others. 
Whether they are urban or rural, the regions with established industrial 
traditions—mainly located in Northeastern France—have become the 
FN’s strongholds (Schwengler 2003, Perrineau 2018).
Figure 14.1 shows the evolution of the FN vote of four occupational 
groups between 1988 and 2017, following Oesch’s (2006) classification 
of occupational classes. As expected, blue-collar and routine service 
workers vote for the FN in higher proportions than other social classes. 
Conversely, the middle class is increasingly less supportive of the FN. 
Th e political distinctiveness of the working class (the proportion of 
voters for a specific party amongst each of the different social classes) is 
increasingly in favour of the FN. The increase of the working-class vote 
for the FN is also steady over time: the gap between the working-class 
vote for the FN and the total vote is higher at every presidential election 
from 1988 to 2017. In 2017, 35% of blue-collar workers supported the 
FN, an overrepresentation of 14 points compared to the constituency at 
large. Notably, the overrepresentation of blue-collar workers in the FN 
constituencies increases independently of the party’s electoral results. 
3  Data for elections between 1988–2007 and 2017 are extracted from the CEVIPOF 
post-electoral survey, and data for 2012 from the Enquête électorale française of the 
CEE). 
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Indeed, the FN’s electoral progression suffered from Sarkozy’s victory in 
the 2007 presidential election. Yet the gap between blue-collar FN voters 
and the rest of FN voters is constant, which indicates that Sarkozy did not 
manage to attract the working-class voters of the FN any more than other 
occupational classes (as commentators had assumed).
Figure 13.1. The political distinctiveness of the FN constituencies 
(1988–2017)
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
Figure 14.1 does not report the farmers’ vote due to statistically limited 
samples, yet the FN enjoys increasing support amongst farmers and rural 
populations (see Barone and Négrier 2015). This support peaked in 2017, 
with 23% of farmers voting for Marine Le Pen, while they had only been 
8% to do so in 2012 (Perrineau 2018). Thus 2017 marks an important 
adjustment toward the FN amongst a constituency which is generally 
aligned with the mainstream right.
The occupational class structure of the FN vote provides an indication 
of its proletarization, yet it does not uncover the entire transformation 
of the FN’s electorate. An individual’s level of education is shown con-
sistently to be a strong predictor of the radical right vote (Mayer 2002; 
Arzheimer 2009). Figure 2 complements these results by showing that the 
educational gap in support for the FN is growing over time. Compared 
to individuals with higher education, the less educated tend to support 
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the FN in much higher proportions, and increasingly so over time. In the 
first round of the 2017 election, 33% of the less educated who turned out 
to the polls voted for Marine Le Pen. Note that it does not imply that the 
FN is the first party amongst less educated voters, since the less well-off 
tend to abstain rather than vote (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013).
Figure 13.2. Vote for the FN according to educational attainment
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
The constituency of the FN stands out in terms of sociological compo-
sition, but also in terms of issue priority. More than any constituency, 
the FN voters are concerned with fighting terrorism, limiting immigra-
tion and law and order. Yet, they also consider fighting unemployment 
and increasing wages more important than the average voter (Perrineau 
2018). This trend confirms that, in addition to ‘cultural threat issues’, FN 
voters are also concerned with economic issues. Before looking at how 
the FN transformed its political preferences to mirror more closely those 
of its constituents (section 3), the next section deals with how the party 
institutionalized under Marine Le Pen’s lead.
Professionalization, institutionalization  
and de-demonization
The recent literature studying the FN on the supply side is unanimous 
in describing the radical transformation the party has undergone in the 
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2010s. Assuming the party leadership in 2011, Marine Le Pen initiated 
transformations that have affected most aspects of the party. Its organiza-
tion has been modernized—with a clearer hierarchy of party leaders, and 
a wider integration of activists—and somewhat normalized: it resembles 
more the functioning of mainstream political parties as opposed to the 
‘one-man organization’ of former charismatic leader Jean-Marie Le Pen 
(Dézé 2016). Arguably, the FN has transformed from an anti-system 
party to a mainstream conservative party (although this process is still 
ongoing according to Shields 2014). One manifestation of this modern-
ization is the capacity to better organize and present candidates in all 
local elections, which the FN had failed to do beforehand (Brouard and 
Foucault 2014). Indeed, thanks to its electoral results between 2012 and 
2015, the FN has been able to build a ‘local power base of party cadres 
and grassroot network which would be key to Le Pen’s presidential bid 
in 2017’ (Evans and Ivaldi 2018, p. 87). Notably, the party has been able 
to rely on over 1,500 local council seats and over 400 departmental or 
regional councillors mainly elected in the 2010s. These elected officials 
have brought experience, greater professionalism, local relay, and (not 
the least important) significant financial contributions to the FN—
through state subsidies and councillors’ party subscriptions. Marine Le 
Pen herself has claimed that her intention was to transform the party—
she referred to this as a strategy of ‘de-demonization’ in order to break 
with the party’s reputation of scandals. This self-proclaimed process of 
dédiabolisation targeted particularly Jean-Marie Le Pen’s use of provoca-
tion and racial slurs.
This transformation is highly visible in how the FN professionalized its 
campaigns, arguments, and electoral propaganda. In the later campaigns 
of 2012 and 2017, the FN produced comprehensive manifestos, which are 
far more evolved than the electoral propaganda used by former candidate 
Jean-Marie Le Pen. Even though Marine Le Pen bears the same name as 
the founder and historical party leader of the Front National, she repre-
sented herself as a candidate of ‘political rupture’, breaking away from the 
‘awakeners’ of the party, and announcing the time of the ‘builders’. Her 
arguments are also strengthened by the extensive use of ‘official reports’ 
and ‘expert reports’ and the abundant use of public sources and statistics 
to increase the credibility of her program, which is another contrast to 
the discursive style of Jean-Marie Le Pen (Eatwell 2002). This detachment 
with her father climaxed with his expulsion from the party in 2015 (for 
repeated revisionist comments on gas chambers).
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The 2017 campaign: inflexion of the 2012 strategy?
The FN’s electoral success has been extensively studied, and a majority of 
contributions have explained the FN vote on the basis of the socio-cul-
tural preferences of its voters, and chiefly their anti-immigration atti-
tudes. On the supply side, consequently, the FN is often considered as a 
single-issue party, focused on immigration (Rydgren 2003). Yet, recent 
studies suggest this party—and its constituency—has been undergoing 
substantial transformations since its breakthrough in the 1980s, par-
ticularly with regards to socio-economic issues (Ivaldi 2015a). This is an 
incentive to study closer the actual political positions of the FN, and their 
evolution until 2017. Arguably, the Front National is not a single-issue 
party anymore, and it positions itself—and campaigns—on a wide variety 
of issues. To re-examine the Front National’s political preferences this sec-
tion first looks at the salience of issues, relying on the Comparative Mani-
festo Project (CMP) database. It consists of quantitative codes generated 
from counts of sentences and quasi-sentences where parties position 
themselves on policy issue. These have been collected and coded by the 
CMP and include political programs of parties from around 50 countries 
since 1945 (Volkens et al. 2013). The quantitative codes of party positions 
on policy issues is essentially salience-based. These therefore rely on the 
assumption that the more salient the issue, the more important it is for 
the party, and the more vehement the party is on this issue (Laver 2013).
In terms of socio-cultural preferences, the FN is arguably a charac-
teristic radical right party—if not the typical case in Western Europe. It 
holds very conservative views on cultural issues, and especially a strong 
anti-immigration agenda. However, the FN is not a single-issue party, 
and promotes highly conservative positions on all cultural issues. Figure 
14.3 shows that more than 25% of the 2017 manifesto was devoted to 
the ‘National Way of Life’ (as opposed to multiculturalism) and ‘Law and 
Order’. However, the FN’s positions on cultural issues at large have also 
evolved. For instance, references to ‘Traditional Morality’ have almost 
disappeared from the 2017 manifesto (referring to conservative positions 
on religion, family and morality). This evolution was very visible in the 
lack of investment by Marine Le Pen in the campaign against same-sex 
marriage in 2013, and it has been embodied by the more culturally liberal 
positions of Florian Philippot, her top advisor in 2017.
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Figure 13.3. Salience of cultural issues in the manifestos of the FN 
(1986–2017)
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
Betz had described the ‘proletarization’ of radical right constituencies, 
and particularly that of the FN (Betz 1994). Indeed, the working class has 
become the core electoral clientele of the FN, particularly since the 2000s 
(Oesch 2008; Gougou 2015). On the other hand, there is evidence that 
the FN has operated a radical programmatic shift of its socio-economic 
positions (Ivaldi 2015a, 2015b), and particularly so with regards to posi-
tions on the welfare state (Lefkofridi and Michel 2017). However, both 
trends are rarely linked directly to each other in recent studies on the FN. 
The same Florian Philippot has turned into the symbol of this ‘social turn’ 
of the FN and he has largely influenced the FN in this direction.
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Figure 13.4. Salience of economic issues in the manifestos of the FN 
(1986–2017)
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
Indeed, the ‘economic issues play a minor role in the Front National’s 
ideological discourse’ in the 1980s, but it shifts sensibly to address the 
blue-collar workers (potential voters) in the 1990s (Rydgren 2003). With 
Marine Le Pen’s presidential bids in 2012 and 2017, the party promotes 
significantly more the expansion of welfare benefits (although strictly 
excluding migrants) and preferences for a (nationally) planned economy. 
By blaming unemployment on immigration and promoting chauvinist 
welfare policies because of the competition over scarce resources, the FN 
engages with welfare politics. Yet, Rydgren argued that these issues served 
as anti-immigration frames, in which the FN could develop its core ide-
ology. On the basis of the dramatic increase of salience of welfare related 
issues in the 2012 manifesto—and of Marine Le Pen’s repeated claims to 
‘transform’ and ‘adapt’ the party (analyses of her campaign discourses)—I 
argue that the FN has operated a genuine programmatic shift. I would 
suggest that the relation underlined by Rydgren in the 2000s is reversed. 
The FN does not use welfare issues to frame their anti-immigration rhet-
oric anymore, but rather develops positions on the welfare state—and 
more broadly on the economy—using an anti-immigration frame, which 
it the party’s trademark, the issue ‘they own’. Yet, the promotion of more 
‘left-wing’ economic policies is not as important in 2017 as in 2012. This 
may be the sign that the party had already tried, prior to the 2017 cam-
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paign, to get closer to its original base of traditionally more economically 
right-wing petty bourgeois voters.
The remainder of this section confirms that the FN’s political posi-
tions consist of a mix of cultural and economic preferences by analysing 
Marine Le Pen’s campaign on Twitter, which shows the most salient issues 
for the FN’s candidate. All the Tweets of the candidates of the 2017 presi-
dential election have been collected in the 3 months prior to the election 
by the ICCP research project (led by Lorenzo de Sio at LUISS). Around 
2,000 tweets were therefore manually coded on 24 issues, which were 
either valence of positional issues (the actual position of the parties was 
also coded for the latter). The tweet data excludes retweets and non-is-
sue-based tweets and includes 401 individual tweets of Marine Le Pen in 
the three months before the first round of the presidential election. This 
data provides a comparative advantage over manifesto data (and particu-
larly the CMP) because it is more dynamic (it evolves with the campaign 
while manifestos do not change) and because the coding categories can 
be redefined if necessary.4 This approach was successfully piloted during 
the 2014 EP elections in Italy (De Sio et al. 2018).
During the 2017 campaign, over 70% of Marine Le Pen’s tweets con-
cerned four issues: ‘terrorism’, ‘immigration’, ‘economic globalization’, 
and ‘breaking with the EU’ (Figure 14.5). The first two issues tap into the 
conventional cultural agenda of the FN: anti-immigration and law and 
order. It is to be noted that, in the context of the Islamic terrorist wave of 
2014–2016 in France, the issue of ‘fighting terrorism’ is not solely linked 
to a security concern. Indeed, Marine Le Pen has consistently linked ter-
rorism to immigration, the opening of borders, and Islam in general.
4  This is particularly relevant when relying on CMP data to study the Front National, 
since this dataset does not include a specific coding category for immigration related 
issues (Ruedin and Morales 2017). 
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Figure 13.5. Top issue tweeted by Marine Le Pen in 2017
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
However, Marine Le Pen has also extensively addressed the issues of eco-
nomic globalization and called consistently for economic protectionism. 
The ‘social’ dimension of the FN’s positions can be interpreted as a 
direct address to the ‘losers of economic globalization’ who constitute an 
increasingly important share of her voters (as shown in the previous sec-
tion). Marine Le Pen has remained rather vague on her anti-EU stances, 
calling for a referendum on France’s membership in the EU—without 
directly calling for a ‘Frexit’. Marine Le Pen’s call to ‘break with the EU’ 
does not include membership to the Eurozone, which was coded sepa-
rately. Marine Le Pen has campaigned little on the latter, entertaining a 
confusion about her position on the Euro, which peaked in her inability 
to explain her stance on the common currency in the debate with Emma-
nuel Macron days before the second round of the election.
Table 13.1. Positional and valence issues of candidates in the 2017 
French election (share of tweets)
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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Overall, Marine Le Pen’s tweeting campaign shows that she adopted a 
confrontational style, typical of more radical challenger candidates. 
Indeed, over 65% of her tweets dealt with positional issues—that is con-
frontational ones—whereas Emmanuel Macron had a similar share of 
valence issues, i.e. conventional issues for which most of the electorate 
shares a similar goal.5 Table 14.1 shows that Marine Le Pen adopted the 
most confrontational campaign style on Twitter compared to the other 
candidates of the 2017 presidential campaign.
Electoral impasse: the failure of the left-wing shift?
The analysis of the issue and campaign salience of Marine Le Pen’s 2017 
presidential bid suggests that Marine Le Pen confirmed the ‘left-wing 
turn of the FN’. Although to a lesser extent than in 2012, the FN candi-
date ranked the economy and globalization amongst her top priorities, 
and generally promoted preferences somewhat associated with the left, 
such as limiting economic globalization. I argue that this transforma-
tion of the socio-economic agenda of the FN is largely resulting from 
the increasing importance of blue-collar workers, and so-called ‘losers of 
globalization’ in the party constituency. Incidentally, conservative can-
didate François Fillon called Marine Le Pen a ‘radical leftist’ on several 
occasions. However, this programmatic strategy has proven electorally 
insufficient. Remarkably, Marine Le Pen addressed a direct message to 
the voters of radical left candidate Mélenchon, pointing to their conver-
gence on socio-economic issues. Yet, in the second round, Marine Le Pen 
was not able to attract many votes from the left, while not benefitting 
form a strong support amongst conservative Fillon voters (Evans and 
Ivaldi 2018). These weak vote transfers point to the fact that the current 
strategy of the FN leads to an electoral impasse: while reaching a ceiling 
amongst economically left-leaning working-class voters, Marine Le Pen 
was also not able to mobilize the culturally conservative fringes of the 
mainstream right.
Additionally, the claims on the professionalization of the party and 
its candidate have also been shattered. Marine Le Pen has remained 
vague and inconsistent on major electoral issues (membership to the EU 
and the Euro) and has proven ill-prepared in the second-round debate, 
5  Note that in this coding scheme, ‘fighting terrorism’ is coded as a valence issue, where-
as Marine Le Pen has in fact been highly confrontational on that issue. Therefore, we 
could interpret her campaign as even more confrontational than this data suggests.
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which has been considered to influence voters—negatively—for the FN 
(whereas campaign debates are usually considered to barely influence 
voters). Overall, Marine Le Pen has trapped herself in a ‘tribune isola-
tion’ of conflictual politics during the campaign, which undermined her 
credibility as a political leader (Perrineau 2018). So far, the March 2018 
congress of the FN has not provided a greater clarification on the party’s 
substantial strategy, but it confirmed Marine Le Pen as its almost uncon-
tested leader.
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Reconfiguration of the Italian Party 
System, 2013–2018: A Two-Stage 
Political Earthquake?1
Lorenzo Cicchi & Enrico Calossi
Introduction
The Italian election of 2018 has been described by many as a ‘political 
earthquake’ with effects so destructive they have been felt abroad, espe-
cially in Brussels. When elections provide outcomes that are particu-
larly shocking, political commentators and academics often deploy the 
term ‘electoral earthquake’ to capture the nature of the impact. Indeed, 
observers used this evocative metaphor in Italy after the 2013 election 
(Chiaramonte and De Sio 2014). What we need, then, is an apt but novel 
descriptor for the events of 2018. In fact, the last two elections really ought 
to be considered part of the same seismic shock, the effects of which have 
been felt in in different arenas at various points in time.
The party system can be divided into three distinct arenas: the electoral 
arena, the parliamentary arena and the government arena. The Italian 
party system had not yet settled from the 2013 shock (when the change 
was perceived primarily in the electoral and parliamentary arenas) by the 
time of the 2018 election, when a further disruptive tremor was felt (the 
aftershock affecting also the governmental arena). Thus, if the 2013 elec-
tion was the first stage in this long seismic process (the ‘earthquake’), the 
2018 election was its second stage—a brutal ‘aftershock’ that laid com-
plete waste to whatever had been left standing after the first.
1  A previous version of this chapter has been published by the same authors as “The 
Italian party system’s three functional arenas after the 2018 election: the tsunami after 
the earthquake” in Journal of Modern Italian Studies, Volume 23, Issue 4, pp. 437-459.
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This chapter seeks to measure the changes wrought in the three arenas 
over these two seismic elections. From our perspective, this change must 
be viewed in a long-term perspective. Thus, we analyse the entire his-
tory of elections during the Republican era in Italy, i.e. the period 1948–
2018. We devote significant attention to events in the so-called ‘Second 
Republic’—the institutional and political equilibrium seen in Italy after 
the 1994 election. Our analysis reflects a series of indicators for each 
of the arenas, relying on the theoretical speculations of Bardi and Mair 
(2008), who were the first to suppose that the complex concept of the 
party system might be disaggregagted analytically into these three func-
tional arenas of competition between political parties.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next part provides a descrip-
tion of the background and the results of the 2018 ‘aftershock’ election. 
We then present a review of the literature, covering the key works on 
the historical evolution of the Italian party system, from the preiod of 
so-called imperfect bipartitism (Galli 1967) to the emergence of polar-
ized pluralism (Sartori 1976), and the more recent categorizations of 
the system’s evolution toward fragmented bipolarism (D’Alimonte 2005) 
and then transition—most recently—to contemporary tripolarism (Chi-
aramonte and Emanuele 2018). The next section is empirical and anal-
yses in detail the evolution of the three functional arenas over the entire 
1948–2018 period. Here, we present first the descriptive statistics for each 
arena separately, and then comparatively, focusing especially on the key 
differences between the two ‘seismic’ junctures—that of 1994 and the one 
between 2013–2018. The final section draws the findings of the analysis 
together and offers some tentative conclusions about the possible future 
evolution of the Italian party system.
Background: Italy’s 2018 general election
In December 2017 the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, 
issued a decree to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of 
the Republic. New elections were then scheduled for 4 March 2018, to 
be conducted under a new electoral law. This came after a tumultous 
2013–2018 parliamentary term, in which the electoral system was subject 
to a series of incoherent reform attempts. The existing system—known 
generally as the Porcellum—was essentially proportional, but gave a sig-
nificant seat bonus to the winning coalition or party. Some of the pro-
posed changes to it were purely political, like the approval of the Italicum, 
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which was not so different from the Porcellum but was thought to work 
only for the Chamber of Deputies (a constitutional amendment in 2016 
proposed to make the Senate non-elective). Others came after judicial 
interventions, for example the verdict handed down by the Constitu-
tional Court in 2014 which mandated a weaker version of the Porcellum 
(without any seat bonus for the winners). After the 2016 constitutional 
reform attempt failed—having been rejected by voters at the December 
2016 referendum—two different and contradictory electoral systems 
for the two chambers were in effect. Therefore, on 26 October 2017, a 
new electoral law—seeking to harmonize the electoral formulas of the 
Chamber and the Senate—was approved (Pedrazzani and Pinto 2018). 
The so-called Rosatellum provides that 37% of seats (232 in the Chamber 
and 116 in the Senate) are assigned by first-past-the-post and 61% (386 in 
the Chamber and 193 in the Senate) through a proportional formula with 
a threshold of 3% of valid votes cast on a national basis. The remaining 
2% were reserved for the ‘Italians abroad’ constituencies. However The 
new electoral law, as had the Mattarellum and the Porcellum systems 
preceding it, incentivized parties to form pre-electoral alliances and 
coalitions (Chiaramonte and D’Alimonte 2018). In the event, prior to 
the 2018 elections only two were formed: one centre–left and the other 
centre–right. Next to the incumbent centre–left coalition (led by the 
Partito Democratico / PD in alliance with smaller partners), both the 
centre–right coalition (Forza Italia / FI, Lega—Salvini Premier, Fratelli 
d’Italia / FdI and Noi con l’Italia / NcI) and the stand-alone Movimento 
Cinque Stelle (M5S) had the highest chance of winning the election. In 
addition to these major competitors, other minor parties participated in 
the elections: Liberi e Uguali (LeU) and Potere al Popolo (PaP) on the 
left. The Casa Pound Italia (CPI) and Italia agli Italiani (IaI) on the right 
side also warrant mentioning (Valbruzzi and Vignati 2018).
In the event, the M5S—as a single list—won the most votes. Never-
theless, as a sum the centre–right parties obtained a greater vote share, 
winning a plurality of seats in the two chambers. Matteo Salvini’s Lega 
Nord emered as the core of this centre–right bloc, surpassing the previ-
ously dominant Forza Italia. The centre–left alliance, led by former the 
prime minister Matteo Renzi, came third. no coalition having obtained 
a clear majority, Italy entered a political impasse, which took three long 
months to resolve, when the M5S and the Lega Nord finally reached an 
agreement to form a governing coalition, with their respective leaders as 
deputy prime ministers. The parties agreed to nominate Giuseppe Conte, 
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a M5S-linked law professor and non-parliamentarian, as prime minister 
(Valbruzzi 2018).
The enormous growth of Lega, whose vote share in 2018 was four 
times that obtained in 2013 (Orsina 2018), and the confirmation of 
the primacy of M5S amongst the Italian parties gave the impression of 
epochal change.2 This set the stage for the winners—like the M5S leader 
Luigi Di Maio—to wax lyrical about the birth of a new, ‘Third Republic’. 
This cathartic climate was also exemplified by the informal name given to 
the new governing coalition—the ‘government of change’—chosen by the 
two partners to define their alliance (or ‘contract’, as they put it).
Despite these colourful developments, from the general point of view 
of the format and mechanics, the party system resulting from the 2018 
election presents a continuity with that after the 2013 election. In fact, 
although some scholars, after the 2013 elections, had used the expression 
‘three and a half pole’ party system (Cotta and Verzichelli 2016), because 
of the presence of the so-called ‘third pole’, the coalition under the lead-
ership of the incumbent prime minister Mario Monti (Pasquino 2013), in 
2018 the system kept its tripolar configuration as it had been substantially 
in 2013. This proves that the 2013 result was not a provisional deviation 
from the bipolarism that had characterized the ‘Second Republic’ up to 
that time. Five years later, Italy still has a tripolar party system.
However, some important transformations have occurred. For the 
first time in the history of the Italian Republic, the forces of the old ‘con-
stitutional arch’ (largely comprised within the centre–left coalition) came 
in third. This meant they were well behind the centre–right coalition—
but also the M5S group. In addition, the parties that only had dominated 
the parliament just five years before—the PD and the Popolo della Lib-
ertà, with 758 seats out 945—took just 34% of the seats in 2018.
The exceptionality of the 2018 election is largely due to the great 
success of the non-mainstream parties, which, for at least three reasons 
proved unique in Western Europe. First, parties that burst onto the scene 
and make a splash in their electoral debut typically cannot repeat this 
performance the second time around. However, the M5S, which had 
done well at its electoral debut in 2013 (25.6%), improved on this perfor-
2  Already in 2013, the M5s achived the highest vote share of any single party in the 
Chamber of Deputies, if the ‘Italians abroad’ constituencies are excluded. However, at 
the time, the PD gained more seats, as it was part of the coalition that obtained more 
votes.
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mance on the second try in 2018 (reaching 32.7%). Second, the Lega—
reconstituted as a radical right party by Salvini (Passarelli and Tuorto 
2018)—relinquished its original local and regional autonomism and 
therefore abandoned its previous name of Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza 
della Padania (‘Northern League for the Independence of Padania’). This 
saw it expand its electoral base to the entire Peninsula and led to the 
quadrupling of its vote share. Third, the electoral strategy of conquering 
centrist voters by positively insisting on Europe and civil rights failed. 
This was the misfortune of the PD under Renzi, who had adopted that 
centrist strategy upon becoming leader in 2014. The result was the worst 
result ever for the left in Republican history (De Sio 2018).
Alongside these preliminary observations, the next section offers an 
original analytical framework for analysing in detail the electoral results 
and to include them in the historical tendencies that have characterized 
the evolution of the Italian party system.
Changes in three arenas of the Italian party system
The nature of the interactions between political parties is important to 
classify the different types of party systems (Sartori 1976). Simply, when 
there are not interactions between parties, we cannot speak of ‘systems of 
parties’ but only of ‘sets of parties’, which are ‘mere sums of their parts’ 
(Mair 2006). This assumption is agreed within the literature and repre-
sents the starting point of the scholars who work on the classification of 
the different kinds of system. This research focus prevented the literature 
from concentrating on other aspects of the party systems for quite a long 
time, above all the constituent elements of a party system. Already in 
1979, Mogens Pedersen (1979, p. 1) stressed that the nature of interac-
tions between different ‘levels’ of a party system are a crucial considera-
tion: 
A concise mapping of party system change would have to cover the levels of 
parliament and government, the level of the party as an organization, and the 
level of the electorate. Party system change, then, can be defined as the total 
set of changes in patterns of interaction and competition at these three levels 
as well as between them.
Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair (2008) took this point further, by inter-
preting party systems as multifaceted phenomena. They identified the 
existence of three dimensions: vertical, horizontal and functional. In this 
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chapter, we concentrate on the functional aspect. Actually, according to 
the authors, within party systems there are at least three different com-
petitive arenas: electoral, parliamentary and governmental. The funda-
mental element that distinguishes these three arenas it that parties follow 
different principles while operating in the three different environments 
because the incentives they receive are different. Within the electoral 
party systems (or, one might say, ‘the electoral face of a party system’) 
parties are shaped by a survival logic: they compete for each individual 
vote. Put simply, competition prevails, even if the its strategy is strongly 
influenced by the electoral formula applied: centripetal for the plurality 
systems, centrifugal for the proportional ones.
In the ‘parliamentary party system’, the logic is different. Usually, after 
elections, no clear (and unique) winner emerges and parties try to form 
post-electoral alliances to test support for forming an executive. There-
fore, cooperation is necessary, and the coalition formation logic prevails. 
In the governmental arena, cooperation is sometimes the rule. At other 
times—usually when there are coalition cabinets—competition tends 
to exist as member parties (typically the junior ones insistently provoke 
the others in the coalition to assert their importance. This methodical 
approach is very useful for interpreting the Italian case, in which the 
three arenas are shaped by different logics of competition. Before the 
1990s, the fragmented nature of the Italian party system saw polarization 
prevail in the electoral arena. This was because parties took particular-
ized or extreme positions to seek votes. In the parliamentary arena, in 
contrast, cooperation prevailed. In distinct contrast, since the 1990s frag-
mentation has characterized more the parliamentary arena than the elec-
toral one. Parties have been more competitive inside the parliament than 
during elections. Polarization has occurred even amongst parties in the 
same government. An example of this is the difficult relations amongst 
the ministers of the second Prodi government (2006–2008), when mem-
bers of the same executive (the DS and Margherita ministers on one side 
and the left-wing ones on the other) adopted different positions and even 
publicly demonstrated in streets against the executive. Thanks to the 
analytical approach we adopt here, we can measure the extent to which 
change has happened in the three functional arenas of the Italian party 
system, with particular attention on the 2018 election. We chose two 
indicators—volatility and innovation—and we use two indexes to eval-
uate the most significant changes in the three arenas.
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First, we employ the index of volatility. As defined by Pedersen, this 
index calculates the total amount of change experienced by all individual 
entities in a closed system. For each entity it calculates the net change of a 
particular characteristic between two periods of time, then takes the abso-
lute value of this change (to prevent positives and negatives from cancel-
ling out) and divides the result by the total amount of the characteristic 
in the system at the first and second time periods (Pedersen 1979). As 
explained by Casal Bértoa, Deegan-Krause and Haughton (2017, p. 143), 
this formula can be simplified as the sum of the absolute value of the 
vote change of all parties divided by two. However, alongside the classic 
index of ‘electoral volatility’3—which is thought to measure change in the 
electoral arena—we adapt this index also for the other two arenas. For the 
latter, rather than considering the change of votes, we examine change 
in the parties’ seat shares across two terms of the Chamber of Deputies 
(‘parliamentary volatility’) and the percentage change between one cab-
inet and the next in the number of ministers occupied by exponents from 
a given party (‘government volatility’).
The second index is designed to measure the relevance of new parties 
in the three arenas. Put simply, ‘electoral innovation’ is the sum of vote 
share attained by all the new parties. Similarly, the ‘parliamentary inno-
vation’ is given by the total percentage of seats obtained by new parties 
in a given election.4 ‘Governmental innovation’, in turn, corresponds to 
the percentage of ministers (the prime minister included) filled by new 
parties.
These three indexes force us to define what we consider to be a new 
party. The theme of ‘newness’ of party is widely debated in literature 
(Emanuele and Chiaramonte 2016). Harmel and Robertson (1985) main-
tain a very inclusive definition, treating any new list name as sufficient 
for defining the party as a truly new entity. Other, more restrictive, defi-
nitions for the labelling of parties as ‘new’ require the presence at least 
of a merger (Birch 2003; Powell and Tucker 2014; Bolleyer 2013) or a 
split amongst existing parties (Mainwaring, Gervasoni, and España-Na-
jera 2016; Hug 2001; Tavits 2006; Zons 2015; Barnea and Rahat 2011). 
Again, others require other criteria being matched, as the existence of a 
‘start-up organization’ (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Chiaramonte and Ema-
3  For electoral volatility, our analysis is based solely on votes cast for the election for the 
Chamber of the Deputies.
4  We also calculate these two indicators considering only the Chamber of Deputies.
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nuele 2017) or new personnel (Sikk 2005; Marinova 2015). In this work, 
we combine some of the existing approaches. First, similarly to Emanuele 
and Chiaramonte (2016), we define as new parties those that for the first 
time got more than 1 per cent of votes in an election. For example, Lega 
Nord had already run in the 1987 general election, but took fewer than 
1% of the votes. Therefore, we label it as a new party only in 1992, when 
it reached 8%. Second, we do not label as new those parties that have 
simply adopted a new name while retaining the same politicans and plat-
form. Third, in case of a merger, we do not consider these actors as new 
parties if they retained the old leaders, ideologies and structures.5 Fourth, 
in case of splits, we only label the smallest offshoot(s) of the original party 
as a new one. 6
Measuring volatility and innovation in the three arenas
Our analysis starts from the electoral and parliamentary arenas. In fact, 
as Pedersen (1979, p. 2) has noted:
even if elections are far from always being decisive events, they are still the 
best available vantage point for a study of change, because change will either 
be a result of elections, or elections will register any change which may occur 
in the party system.
Table 4.1 shows the evolution of the Italian party system in terms of elec-
toral and parliamentary volatility, both for parties and blocs (coalitions).
5  Therefore, the Partito Democratico in 2007 and the Popolo della Libertà in 2008 are 
not considered new parties.
6  For this reason, in the case of the end of the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), we only 
consider Rifondazione Comunista (PRC) as a new party, as it was smaller than the Par-
tito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS). The Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI) also stands 
out as notable, as one faction was allowed to retain the name and the other one was 
allowed to keep the logo. Therefore, neither the latter, institutionalized as the Cristiano 
Democratici Uniti (CDU) neither the former are labelled as new parties.
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Table 14.1. Party and bloc electoral and parliamentary volatility, 
1948–2018
Electoral cy-
cle (T1–T2)
Electoral 
volatility
Parlia-
mentary 
volatility
Party vola-
tility at T2
Bloc volatili-
ty at T2
Party vola-
tility at T2
Bloc 
volatility 
at T2
1948–1953 12.4% n/a 14.0% n/a
1953–1958 6.5% n/a 6.6% n/a
1958–1963 7.7% n/a 8.0% n/a
1963–1968 7.6% n/a 6.8% n/a
1968–1972 5.9% n/a 6.8% n/a
1972–1976 9.5% n/a 8.9% n/a
1976–1979 5.5% n/a 6.0% n/a
1979–1983 8.5% n/a 8.4% n/a
1983–1987 8.1% n/a 7.4% n/a
1987–1992 18.7% n/a 18.5% n/a
1992–1994 40.9% n/a 46.0% n/a
1994–1996 15.8% 22.6% 21.7% 26.4%
1996–2001 22.8% 7.7% 23.1% 11.4%
2001–2006 8.9% 5.4% 13.8% 14.4%
2006–2008 16.9% 13.2% 24.5% 16.2%
2008–2013 40.3% 32.5% 44.8% 35.2%
2013–2018 29.7% 19.9% 42.9% 42.9%
Source: Authors’ own elaboration
The result of the heavily controversial7 1953 election gave birth to a polit-
ical balance that would last for roughly four decades. The DC was at the 
core of a centrist coalition (with the Partito Liberale, PLI, the Partito 
Social Democratico, PSDI, and the Partito Repubblicano, PRI) opposed 
7  The controversy arose on account of the super bonus of two-thirds of seats granted 
to the winning coalition scoring at least 50% of the votes. This was introduced by the 
incumbent, DC-led government prior to the elections. In the event, the centrist bloc 
scored 55,038 votes below the necessary threshold, so the normal proportional alloca-
tion of seats applied. The provision was subsequently repealed in 1954.
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by a strong left-wing opposition (with the Partito Comunista, PCI, in a 
stronger position than the Partito Socialista, PSI) and a weaker right-
wing opposition (the Partito Nazionale Monarchico, PNM, and the 
Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI). This core basic structure of the party 
system remained very stable until 1992. After the 1953 election, electoral 
volatility reached 12.4%, due to the strong recovery of the left-wing par-
ties, but it never again reached 10% before the restructuring of the party 
system that took place after 1994. The electoral fluxes were character-
ized by steady growth of the PCI until 1976, erosion of votes for the DC 
(until 1983) and the PSI (until 1976), and the steady dissolving of the 
monarchists’ party. Already in 1967 Giorgio Galli could coin the term 
‘imperfect bipartitism’ to describe the DC–PCI dynamic, even if the gap 
was still as high as 13%. Indeed, only in 1983 did the distance between the 
two reached a minimum: 32.9% vs 29.9.
As Table 4.2 indicates, during the first 20 years new parties had a 
very limited impact. From the 1970s and into the 1980s, however, the 
first signs of instability in the party system emerged, with several new 
parties appearing. But the first real symptom of a crisis, anticipating the 
1992–93 collapse, was seen in the 1992 election. For the first time inno-
vation exceeded 10%, reaching 16.1%. The three new parties—La Rete 
(1.86%), PRC8 (5.62%) and the Lega Nord (LN, 8.65%)—together took 
16.1% of votes. Of these three new parties the success of the latter sent 
alarm bells through the political system, as many commentators noted 
(Biorcio 1997). In fact, the LN launched a populist critique against the 
traditional ‘system of parties’ and explicitly placed itself outside of the 
classic left–right divide, which had characterized the Italian party system 
until that point. In conclusion, it was the first time that a new party out-
side of the political mainstream, other than the marginalized MSI and the 
already dissolved monarchists, had scored so well in an Italian election 
since 1946.
8  When the PCI transformed into the PDS most of the leadership joined the new par-
ty, which kept within its new electoral symbol the ancient PCI logo (Ignazi 1992). In 
contrast, the PRC was led by a minor faction of the former leadership and the electoral 
symbol, although it kept the classical hammer and sickle in a prominent position, was 
completely different from that of the PCI (Bertolino 2004). Therefore, the PDS can be 
considered as the PCI ‘in a new fashion’, while only the PRC can be considered as a new 
party. 
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Table 14.2. Electoral and parliamentary innovation, 1948–2018
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
The 1992 legislature was very short lived. The ‘Mani Pulite’ (‘clean 
hands’) judicial investigation and the approval of the mixed–majoritarian 
electoral system (Mattarellum) resulted in a complete reorganization of 
the Italian party system. Electoral volatility skyrocketed to 40.9% and 
three new parties entered the scene. Two of the new parties were very 
small: Alleanza Democratica (1.2%) and Patto Segni (4.7%). But the 
third—Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia—made an instant splash, imme-
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diately becoming the biggest party in the system, taking 21% of votes. In 
total, the three new parties took 26.9% of the vote, a level never reached 
by new parties before. These changes induced many to speak of the emer-
gence of a so-called ‘Second Republic’, even if all other constitutional 
aspects of Italian democracy bar the electoral system contined in the 
same framework as per the previous 40 years.
The system seemed to settle into a relative stability in the period. In 
the four elections between 1996 and 2008, volatility only once reached 
22.8% (in 2001) and in 2006 was down to the levels seen in the 1950s 
and 1960s (8.6%). However, this period was characterized by the birth 
of other new parties: Rinnovamento Italiano in 1996, Italia dei Valori, 
Democrazia Europea and the Partito dei Comunisti Italiani in 2001, 
the UDEUR in 2006, and finally la Destra and the Movimento per l’Au-
tonomia in 2008. However, the overall shares of votes obtained by these 
new parties was much lower than witnessed by the three new entrants 
in the 1992–1994 period. These indicators appeared to confirm that the 
party system, at least in the electoral arena, had found a new level after 
the changes of 1994. This seemed validated also by the fact that almost 
the total of the votes was concentrated in only two coalitions in 2006 and 
that the votes received by the two biggest parties in 2008, the PDL and 
the PD, reached 70.5%, the second highest score after the 73.1% score 
recorded in 1976.
The fragility of this apparent new equilibrium, however, was demon-
strated clearly in the 2013 election. The ‘electoral earthquake’ reflected 
both high volatility (40.3%, the same score recorded in 1994) and a large 
number of new entrants—five in fact. These were: Fare per Fermare il 
Declino (1.1%), Fratelli d’Italia (1.96%), Sinistra, Ecologia e Libertà 
(3.20%), the self-defined ‘third pole’ Scelta Civica (8.3%) and the effective 
third force of that election, and biggest party overall, the M5S (25.6%). 
Overall, 40.2% of votes went to parties that had not even existed prior to 
the previous election five years earlier. From an electoral point of view, 
other new parties entered the scene in 2018, +Europa, Liberi e Uguali 
and Potere al Popolo, but their vote share in total did not exceed more 
than 7 per cent. In contrast, volatility skyrocketed—reaching the third-
highest level on record—indicating that the new electoral landscape after 
the 2013 general elections was as unstable as the post-1953 and post-1992 
ones has been.
Concerning the evolution of the format and dynamics of the parlia-
mentary arena in comparison with those of the electoral arena, it is note-
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worthy that ‘institutional factors may also be responsible for creating dif-
ferent conditions of competition in the two arenas’ (Bardi and Mair 2008, 
pp. 157–8). The electoral system is one of the most important aspects that 
shape the differences and similarities between party systems. As for the 
format of the party systems in the two arenas, it is easy to understand that 
the proportional formula imposed a strong similarity between the two. 
The elections of 1953 and 1992 recorded the highest electoral volatility 
and were subsequently the ones with the greatest parliamentary volatility. 
The same happened for party innovation, which was almost non-existing 
in both the arenas until 1992.
As for the dynamics of competition, the analysis is more complex. 
The proportional system produced ‘polarized pluralism’ (Sartori 1966) in 
the electoral arena, characterized by centrifugal competition. However, 
parties that during the elections proposed different policy solutions and 
seemed to represent incompatible Weltanschauungen were able to nego-
tiate and find agreements in the parliamentary arena. Even if the period 
1948–1992 was characterized by the stability of the ruling coalition, this 
did not prevent the formation of a consensual climate on many general 
issues, at least amongst the parties of the ‘Constitutional Arch’ (i.e. the 
mainstream), which saw some commentators define the Italian party 
system as ‘bargained pluralism’ (Hine 1993). Sartori and Hine’s defini-
tions seem to be at odds, but that contradiction is only apparent: as the 
Italian party system was polarized in the electoral arena and consensual 
in the parliamentary one. Obviously, the main reason is that the electoral 
arena has never been really competitive. The DC constantly occupied the 
centre of the system having two incompatible oppositions on the left and 
the right. The inclusive strategy of this ‘centrism’—with PSLI, the PLI and 
the PRI in the ruling coalition—always characterized the DC’s behaviour. 
The consequence was a continuous enlargement of the governing coali-
tion, which passed from the centrist formula of the 1950s, to a centre–left 
one in the 1960s and 1970s and then to a ‘pentapartito’ format in the 
1980s.
The consensual imperative of the parliamentary arena is not only 
exemplified by the progressive expansion of the governmental coalition 
but was also characterized by other two processes. The first was the recur-
rence of the ‘external support’ from parties formally located at the oppo-
sition, the monarchists and the neo-fascists in the 1950s and the com-
munists in the 1970s. The second, and more frequent, was the sharing of 
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public offices and state resources amongst parties. This process, which 
touched many sectors of society—from the management of the national 
health service to the distribution of the top-level positions in state insti-
tutions, and from the introduction of public funding for political parties 
(Pizzimenti and Ignazi 2011) to the ‘occupation’ of the municipalized 
companies—was completely in line with the conceptualization of the 
‘cartel party’ system (Katz and Mair 1995; Bardi 2006).
Things changed abruptly in 1994, when the approval of the new 
mixed–majoritarian electoral system and the judicial investigations 
into the ruling parties provoked a dramatic impact on the format and 
dynamics of the party system in the two arenas. The new electoral law 
facilitated the structuring of the electoral supply into three different blocs 
and new parties (Forza Italia overall) emerged. From that time on, two 
tendencies can be measured. The first is the divergence between elec-
toral and parliamentary volatilities, with the latter constantly higher. This 
effect is clearly due to the distortive effect of the new mixed–majoritarian 
system. The Mattarellum (which adopted the first-past-the-post formula 
for three-quarters of the seats) assured higher volatility in the parliamen-
tary arena: 46% vs 40% in 1994, 21% vs 15% in 1996, 23% vs 22% in 2001 
(see Tables 4.1 and 4.3). These gaps were almost of the same degree in 
the three elections run with the Porcellum system (which granted 340 
seats to the coalition or list with the highest number of votes): parlia-
mentary volatility was 13% vs 8% of the electoral arena in 2006, 24% vs 
16% in 2008, and 44% vs 40% in 2013. The second process was the great 
parliamentary strength of the centre–left and centre–right, always able to 
occupy more than 90% of the seats, with peaks in 2001 when only 11 seats 
were left to third parties and in 2006 when the two coalitions occupied 
the entire Chamber of Deputies. In 2008, this tendency toward bipolarity 
seemed to lead even to a bipartization of the system.
This tendency came to a complete halt in 2013. The change was imme-
diately observed concerning electoral supply: three coalitions running 
in the elections (centre–right, centre–left and centre) and at least three 
alone-standing lists with the hope of winning seats (M5S, Fare per Fer-
mare il Declino, and Rivoluzione Civile). Also in this case, high volatility 
in the electoral arena is reflected in a higher volatility in the parliamen-
tary one (44% to 40%), but the party innovation was not as strong: elec-
toral innovation was 40% but it was only 26% in the parliamentary arena. 
This happened because the PD, an existing party, secured the bonus, 
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leaving fewer seats to the new parties. For the 2018 election, the recently 
introduced ‘mixed’ electoral formula (the Rosatellum) continued to pro-
duce significant disproportional effects. Volatility in the parliamentary 
arena was also high in this election (42%) and higher than in the elec-
toral one. This demonstrates that the 2013 election was far from shaping a 
new stable party system in the parliamentary arena. On the contrary, the 
innovation caused by successful new parties was very limited: only 2.6% 
of seats was conquered by new lists (see Table 4.2).
Moving on to the analysis of the governmental arena, we see that vol-
atility and innovation show interesting results. Table 3 presents the scores 
of governmental volatility for the 65 governments of the Italian Repub-
lican period, together with additional information on the government 
(party of the prime minister, cabinet size and share of ministers between 
technocratic or independent ministers, new parties and established par-
ties). Figure 4.1 shows graphically the trend of governmental volatility, 
and Table 4.4 presents detailed information on governmental innovation.
Table 4.3. Governmental composition and volatility, 1953–2018
Year Legisla-
ture
Govern-
ment
Party of 
Prime 
Minister
Cabinet 
size
Techno-
cratic & 
independent 
ministers
Ministers 
from new 
parties
Minis-
ters from 
existing 
parties
Govern-
mental 
volatility
1953 2 Pella DC 19 0% 0% 100% 0%
1954 2 Fanfani I DC 19 0% 0% 100% 0%
1954 2 Scelba DC 21 0% 0% 100% 28.6%
1955 2 Segni I DC 21 0% 0% 100% 0%
1957 2 Zoli DC 21 0% 0% 100% 28.6%
1958 3 Fanfani II DC 22 0% 0% 100% 18.2%
1959 3 Segni II DC 24 0% 0% 100% 18.2%
1960 3 Tambroni DC 23 0% 0% 100% 0%
1960 3 Fanfani III DC 23 0% 0% 100% 0%
1962 3 Fanfani IV DC 24 0% 0% 100% 12.5%
1963 4 Leone I DC 20 0% 0% 100% 12.5%
1963 4 Moro I DC 24 0% 16.7% 83.3% 37.5%
1964 4 Moro II DC 24 0% 0% 100% 4.2%
1966 4 Moro III DC 23 0% 0% 100% 8.0%
1968 5 Leone II DC 22 0% 0% 100% 34.8%
1968 5 Rumor I DC 25 0% 0% 100% 16.0%
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1969 5 Rumor II DC 23 0% 0% 100% 16.0%
1970 5 Rumor III DC 26 0% 0% 100% 34.6%
1970 5 Colombo DC 26 0% 0% 100% 3.8%
1972 5 Andreot-
ti I
DC 25 0% 0% 100% 38.5%
1972 6 Andreot-
ti II
DC 27 0% 0% 100% 29.6%
1973 6 Rumor IV DC 29 0% 0% 100% 27.6%
1974 6 Rumor V DC 26 0% 0% 100% 6.9%
1974 6 Moro IV DC 25 0% 0% 100% 38.5%
1976 6 Moro V DC 22 0% 0% 100% 20%
1976 7 Andreotti 
III
DC 21 4.8% 0% 95.2% 4.8%
1978 7 Andreotti 
IV
DC 22 4.5% 0% 95.5% 0.2%
1979 7 Andreot-
ti V
DC 22 0% 0% 100% 22.7%
1979 8 Cossiga I DC 25 0% 0% 100% 16.0%
1980 8 Cossiga II DC 27 0% 0% 100% 44.4%
1980 8 Forlani DC 27 0% 0% 100% 11.1%
1981 8 Spadolini PRI 28 0% 0% 100% 5.3%
1982 8 Spadoli-
ni II
PRI 28 0% 0% 100% 0%
1982 8 Fanfani V DC 28 0% 0% 100% 10.7%
1983 9 Craxi I PSI 29 0% 0% 100% 12.1%
1986 9 Craxi II PSI 29 0% 0% 100% 0%
1987 9 Fanfani VI DC 26 23.1% 0% 76.9% 48.3%
1987 10 Goria DC 30 3.3% 0% 96.7% 46.7%
1988 10 De Mita DC 31 0% 0% 100% 4.0%
1989 10 Andreotti 
VI
DC 31 0% 0% 100% 3.2%
1991 10 Andreotti 
VII
DC 32 0% 0% 100% 10.1%
1992 11 Amato I PSI 26 7.7% 0% 92.3% 10.6%
1993 11 Ciampi Techno-
cratic
28 32.1% 14.3% 53.6% 38.7%
1994 12 Berlus-
coni I
FI 26 7.7% 76.9% 15.4% 76.9%
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1995 12 Dini Techno-
cratic
25 100% 0% 0% 92.3%
1996 13 Prodi I Ulivo / 
Indep.
24 20.8% 12.5% 66.7% 79.2%
1998 13 D’Alema I DS 26 11.5% 7.7% 80.8% 33.3%
1999 13 D’Alema II DS 27 7.4% 7.4% 85.2% 16.2%
2000 13 Amato II Techno-
cratic
25 12.0% 0% 88.0% 13.8%
2001 14 Berlusconi 
II
FI 24 12.5% 0% 87.5% 79.7%
2005 14 Berlusconi 
III
FI 25 4.0% 0% 96.0% 19.0%
2006 15 Prodi II Ulivo / 
Indep.
27 14.8% 11.1% 74.1% 82.1%
2008 16 Berlusconi 
IV
PDL 25 4.0% 0% 96.0% 94.1%
2011 16 Monti Techno-
cratic
20 100% 0% 0% 96.0%
2013 17 Letta PD 22 13.6% 4.5% 81.8% 86.4%
2014 17 Renzi PD 17 11.8% 0% 88.2% 19.3%
2016 17 Gentiloni PD 19 0% 0% 100% 19.5%
2018 18 Conte Inde-
pendent
19 31.6% 42.1% 26.3% 100%
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First of all, it is worth noting that until 1994 total volatility (the change in 
ministers representing different parties) was constantly below 50%: the 
majority of ministers always came from the DC. Volatility was due to the 
change of quotas between the parties in the governing coalition: four par-
ties of the ‘centrist’ formula (other than the DC, also PLI, PSDI and PRI) 
between 1948 and 1963, and four during the ‘centre–left’ experience (with 
the PSI replacing the PLI in the governmental coalition), and the five in 
the ‘pentapartito’ period (DC, PSI, PLI, PSDI and PRI) between 1981 and 
1993. Volatility in the governmental arena did not reflect electoral or par-
liamentary volatilities nor the transition from one governmental formula 
to another, but rather the relationships between parliamentary parties. 
The transition phases where characterized by ‘monochrome’ DC-led 
or centrist executives with the external support (without direct minis-
terial participation) of parties officially in the opposition. This was the 
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case when the MSI and the monarchists supported the Tambroni exec-
utive in 1960, when the socialists supported the Fanfani IV executive in 
1962 and the communists supported the Andreotti III executive in 1976. 
These experiments were clear attempts to enlarge the governmental coa-
lition at a later stage. This happened with the entry of the PSI in the first 
‘centre–left’ cabinet in 1963, which is also the only case of innovation that 
happened in the governmental arena before 1993. Note as well that from 
1948 until 1981, every Italian prime minister was a Christian Democrat. 
This informal rule was broken in 1981, when the Republican Giovanni 
Spadolini became prime minister and again in 1983, when it was the time 
for the Socialist leader Bettino Craxi (Ignazi 1997).
In 1992, following Mani Pulite, it became necessary to form a new 
executive, led by a non-politician and supported by the largest possible 
coalition. For that reason, in the Ciampi cabinet there were significant 
changes. For the first time two new parties, the PDS and the Greens, 
obtained ministerial offices: four ministers out of 28 belonged to new 
parties. However, this historical event had no practical consequences, 
because already the day after the government had sworn in, 4 May 1993, 
the PDS and the Greens withdrew their ministers from the cabinet, as 
a form of protest because the Chamber of Deputies voted against the 
opening of a judicial investigation of Bettino Craxi.
The watershed elections of 1994 show striking results for both indi-
cators. For the first time, volatility reached values higher than 50%. For 
governmental innovation, it was even more pronounced and reached the 
highest peak ever (76.9%), because the three main parties forming the 
governing coalition had never been in power before (FI, LN and AN). 
Volatility was very high also in 1995, as this was a non-partisan govern-
ment vis à vis the almost complete absence of technocratic ministers of 
the previous cabinet (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014). As Figure 4.1 
shows, volatility keeps growing during the late 1990s–early 2010s period, 
consistent with the alternation of power between centre–left and centre–
right. If we ignore the intra-legislature government reshufflings,9 vola-
tility grew continuously over this whole period (Prodi I: 79.9%; Berlus-
coni I: 79.67%; 2006: Prodi II: 82.1%; Berlusconi II: 94.1%) until Letta in 
2013, when it again fell below 90% (86.2%).
9  For the technocrat-led governments Dini and Monti, formed after political govern-
ments, volatility is higher than 50%.
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Figure 14.1. Governmental volatility, 1948–2018
Note: governments indicated with an asterisk are formed after a general election, at 
the beginning of a new legislature. Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
The 2018 Conte government—the first such case in Republican history—
shows total volatility (100%). In fact, through the past every executive 
had at least some ministers belonging to parties that had been in office 
in the previous cabinet.10 Today, there is a total rupture with the past. 
If volatility is extraordinarily high, innovation is relatively low, as the 
yellow–green cabinet has a number of technocratic ministers, and the 
‘nationalized’ Lega had already been in power in 1994, 2001 and 2008. 
Therefore, only the eight ministers from the M5S count for the measure 
of governmental innovation.
Table 4.4. Governmental innovation, 1953–2018
Year Govern-
ment
Party of 
Prime Min-
ister
Ministers from new parties
1953 Pella DC
1954 Fanfani I DC
1954 Scelba DC
1955 Segni I DC
10  Most notably, politicians from centrist parties, a legacy of the long run of DC-centred 
cabinets.
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1957 Zoli DC  
1958 Fanfani II DC
1959 Segni II DC
1960 Tambroni DC
1960 Fanfani III DC
1962 Fanfani IV DC  
1963 Leone I DC
1963 Moro I DC 4 Antonio Giolitti, Giovanni Pierac-
cini, Giacomo Mancini, Achille 
Corona (PSI)
1964 Moro II DC
1966 Moro III DC  
1968 Leone II DC
1968 Rumor I DC
1969 Rumor II DC
1970 Rumor III DC
1970 Colombo DC
1972 Andreotti I DC  
1972 Andreotti II DC
1973 Rumor IV DC
1974 Rumor V DC
1974 Moro IV DC
1976 Moro V DC  
1976 Andreotti 
III
DC
1978 Andreotti 
IV
DC
1979 Andreotti V DC  
1979 Cossiga I DC
1980 Cossiga II DC
1980 Forlani DC
1981 Spadolini PRI
1982 Spadolini II PRI
1982 Fanfani V DC  
1983 Craxi I PSI
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1986 Craxi II PSI
1987 Fanfani VI DC  
1987 Goria DC
1988 De Mita DC
1989 Andreotti 
VI
DC
1991 Andreotti 
VII
DC  
1992 Amato I PSI
1993 Ciampi Technocratic 4 Francesco Rutelli (Verdi), Vin-
cenzo Visco, Luigi Berlinguer, 
Augusto Barbera (PDS)
1994 Berlusconi I FI 20 Ministers from Forza Italia, Lega 
Nord, Alleanza Nazionale.
1995 Dini Technocratic  
1996 Prodi I Ulivo / Indep. 3 Lamberto Dini, Augusto Fantozzi, 
Tiziano Treu (Rinnovamento 
Italiano)
1998 D’Alema I DS 2 Oliviero Diliberto, Katia Belillo 
(PdCI)
1999 D’Alema II DS 2 Agazio Loiero, Salvatore Cardina-
le (UDEUR)
2000 Amato II Technocratic  
2001 Berlusconi 
II
FI
2005 Berlusconi 
III
FI  
2006 Prodi II Ulivo / Indep. 3 Antonio di Pietro (IdV), Paolo 
Ferrero (PRC), Emma Bonino 
(RI)
2008 Berlusconi 
IV
PDL
2011 Monti Technocratic  
2013 Letta PD 1 Enzo Moavero Milanesi (SC)
2014 Renzi PD
2016 Gentiloni PD  
2018 Conte Independent 8 Ministers from M5S
Source: authors’ own elaboration
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So far, we have analysed the innovation and volatility of the Italian party 
system separately for the three functional arenas. However, a number 
of insights comes from comparing these two characteristics in the three 
arenas together. As shown by Figure 4.2, there is a clear-cut division in the 
three arenas between the pre- and post-1994 periods. In the long period 
between 1953 and 1993, electoral and parliamentary volatility never 
exceeded 10%, and consistent with what one would expect in a pure pro-
portional system, these two indicators produced virtually identical scores. 
Governmental volatility, on the other hand, has a more undulating trend, 
showing high peaks and low troughs, but never reaching 50%.
Figure 4.2. Party system volatility in the three arenas, 1953–2018
Note: only governments formed after new elections are considered. Source: Authors’ 
own elaboration.
The election of 1992 showed some preliminary signs of disruption. Both 
electoral and parliamentary volatility showed—at that time—the highest 
value since 1953, close to 20%, while governmental volatility was still 
low. After 1994 then, electoral and parliamentary volatility show a much 
different and wavier pattern—they reached peaks of over 40%, but also 
shrank back to levels close to 10% (in 2006). Yet again, the biggest pre- 
and post-1994 difference lies in governmental volatility—in the first 
period, never above 50% and then consistently over 75% in the second. 
It is also worth noting how, under the mixed proportional-majoritarian 
systems (Mattarellum and Rosatellum) and the majority bonus propor-
tional system (Porcellum), the results of electoral and parliamentary vol-
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atility have tended to diverge much more than under the previous pro-
portional system. The current Rosatellum, in particular, is the electoral 
system that so far has led to the biggest discrepancy between the two vol-
atilities: around 13%.11 This is another element of novelty of the election 
of 2018, a moment of substantial halt in respect to the previous setting 
not only for the already mentioned full governmental volatility.
Figure 4.3. Party system innovation in the three arenas, 1953–2018
 Note: only governments formed after new elections are considered. Source: Authors’ 
own elaboration.
Additional insights come from the comparative analysis of innovation 
in the three arenas. Here, more than volatility, we can appreciate how 
1994 and the two-stage process across 2013–2018 were indeed moments 
of epochal change in the Italian party system. If we exclude these occa-
sions, the index of innovation in all the three arenas never exceeds 12%. 
In 1994, the result of new parties amongst the electorate and in the parlia-
ment (notably FI), led to a government where 77% of ministers belonged 
to new parties. Between 1996 and 2008, the years of bipolarism, these 
indexes returned to moderate levels. In 2013, the indexes of electoral and 
parliamentary innovation mark the first stage of the political ‘earthquake’ 
(Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2014). Mainly because of the exploits of 
11  In 2018, the parliamentary volatility scores is about 29% while the electoral volatility 
scores around 42%.
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the populist M5S,12 electoral innovation in 2013 was, in fact, the highest 
in the entire period of Italian Republican history (40%)—indeed, much 
higher than in the next-most volatile case, in 1994 (25%). However, due to 
the bonus attributed under the Porcellum electoral law—which favoured 
the winning centre–left coalition—parliamentary innovation was lim-
ited to about 25%, approximately the same score as recorded in 1994. If 
these effects, then, were not perceived in the governmental arena, with 
the formation of the continuity-oriented Letta cabinet characterized by 
extremely low governmental innovation, they would concern this arena 
as well five years later, when the ‘aftershock’ laid waste to the electoral 
landscape. Despite the Lega having already been in power, and the sur-
prisingly high number of technocratic ministers, the Conte government 
is, indeed, the second most innovative government since 1953. There-
fore, if 1994 was a single moment of transition from one-party system to 
another, in the 2010s the passage occurred in bursts with the new system 
taking five years to fully take shape.
Conclusions
This study has analysed the nature of the shift in the the Italian party 
system after the 2018 election. The impression of a significant change is 
widespread and the present chapter has sought to assess empirically the 
degree of this change. Thanks to the historical analysis of the indexes of 
party volatility and innovation in the electoral, parliamentary and gov-
ernmental arenas, we have indicated that the party system in all three 
arenas was considerably stable in the period 1953–1992. The seismic sen-
sors of the Italian party system went haywire in 1994, when both indica-
tors skyrocketed at the same moment across all three arenas. Something 
different happened at the 2018 general elections. In fact, on this occasion, 
the volatility index reached new maximal levels only in the governmental 
arena, as volatility in the other two arenas is lower in 2018 than was the 
case in 2013. Most importantly, the innovation index of the 2018 election, 
very high for the governmental arena, is relatively low for the electoral 
and the parliamentary ones. For this indicator too, the crucial moment of 
change has been the 2013 election.
12  But not only the M5S. We saw in 2013 the highest number of new parties emerge (five 
in total). In addition to M5S, Sinistra, Ecologia e Libertà, Fratelli d’Italia, Scelta Civica 
and Fare per Fermare il Declino each took at least 1% of the votes at this election.
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Therefore, at least two differences can be registered between the two 
reshaping events of the Italian party system. The first is that the 1990s 
shift was instant, at the 1994 election, whereby the alliances of political 
parties (the forging of the electoral blocs) and the modification of the 
electoral system, rather than the voting behaviour of citizens, had an 
impact on the transformation of the party system in all three functional 
arenas. In contrast, the change of 2013 was mostly a consequence of the 
voters’ strategies—since the electoral formula and the electoral alliances 
did not change. The change in voting behaviour, however, was enough 
to modify the electoral and the parliamentary faces of the Italian party 
system. But the variation in the governmental arena happened only with 
the ‘aftershock’ in 2018, when a new change in voters’ behaviour—but not 
of alliance strategy—ran in parallel with the introduction of a new elec-
toral formula. Thus, we must conclude that a party system transition that 
was instant in 1994 has taken two elections (five years) to pan out fully in 
the present moment. For the first transformation of the party system, a 
single transition event was suficient. For the second, two different occa-
sions were necessary. However, we do not know yet if this could be inter-
preted as the passage toward a new, ‘Third Republic’, as has already been 
posited by some commentators. After all, it is still questionable whether 
the 1993 events truly embodied a transition in the Republic itself, from 
‘first’ to ‘second’ rather than a transition in the Republic’s party system 
(which is more certain). In any case, only after the next election—if vola-
tility and innovation in the three arenas reduces substantially—will we be 
able to affirm that the Italian Republic has acquired a new party system. 
Such a system would then be fully consolidated in all the three different 
functional arenas, and we could safely call it the ‘third party system’ of the 
Italian Republic, if not a ‘Third Republic’.
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CONFERENCE PROGRAMME
 Launch Conference “2017: Europe’s 
Bumper Year of Elections”
8-9 March 2018, Theatre, Badia Fiesolana 
INTRODUCTION
Europe’s wave of key 2017 elections kicked off with the Netherlands’ gen-
eral election in March, when citizens cast their votes for the members of 
the Dutch parliament. France followed, with its first round of the pres-
idential election in April, and the second round in May. In September, 
Germany voted for its Chancellor. Austrian, Romanian and UK citizens 
also went to the polls during this turbulent year. This conference alter-
nates between a series of country-specific and thematic election panels, 
devoted to specific elements that characterised the political and elec-
toral scenario of 2017. A roundtable, focusing on the outlook for the 
2019 European elections, concludes this two-day launch conference of 
the newly established European Governance and Politics Programme 
(EGPP).
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